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Strader v. Graham: Kentucky's
Contribution to National Slavery Litigation
and the DredScott Decision
Robert G. Schwemm
INTRODUCTION
N 1841, three Kentucky slaves in Louisville boarded a steamboat bound
for Cincinnati. Within days, they had made their way to Detroit and
then to permanent freedom in Canada. Their owner, a prominent central
Kentucky businessman, soon tracked them down and tried to lure them
back to bondage in the United States. When these efforts failed, he sued
the steamboat owners for the value of the lost slaves in a Kentucky court.
After ten years of litigation, this case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Court's decision in favor of the Kentucky slaveholder would prove to be
an important precedent a few years later when the Court considered the
freedom claim of another slave, Dred Scott.
The latter case, Dred Scott v. Sandford, may be the most important
decision ever handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court. Decided in 1857,
DredScott was only the second time the Court held unconstitutional an Act
of Congress, and it was a far more important exercise of this judicial review
power than the first in Marbury v. Madison.' Dred Scott prompted Abraham
Lincoln's rise to the presidency and was a major cause of the Civil War,4 the
i Copyright 2oo8 Robert G. Schwemm. Ashland-Spears Professor, University of
Kentucky College of Law. I thank Pen Bogert, Sharon Davies, Mary Davis, Andrea Dennis,
Gene Gaetke, and Sarah Welling for their helpful comments on this paper.
2 Scott v. Sandford (DredScott), 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393 (1857).
3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury held unconstitutional
a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act that authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of
mandamus. Id. at 173-74. Chief Justice Marshall's determination that this power exceeded
that given to the Court in Article III had the effect of denying a judgeship to one of his political
allies, which meant that Marbury involved only one man's career and was not at all politically
contentious. On the other hand, the ruling in Dred Scott that the anti-slavery provisions of
the Compromise of 1820 were unconstitutional favored the prevailing Justices' political views
on the most important issue of the day, and it caused a national firestorm of unprecedented
proportions. See infra notes 446-58 and accompanying texts.
4 For the role that Dred Scott played in Lincoln's rise from obscure prairie lawyer to
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event that drove much of subsequent United States history. Something
like the Civil War may have occurred without DredScott, but the timing of
the war and many of its particulars were shaped by this decision, as were
the key provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which still define to a
great degree what liberty and equality mean in the United States today.'. The key issue in Dred Scott-how, if at all, a Negro slave could obtain
his freedom by spending time on free soil-had also been considered by
the Court in prior cases.6 This Article deals with one of these, Strader v.
Graham,7 the case brought by the Kentucky businessman whose slaves
escaped on the defendants' steamboat and the only Kentucky slave case
ever to reach the Supreme Court.8
In Strader, the Kentucky slave owner, Dr. Christopher Graham, had
allowed three of his slaves who were musicians to go to Ohio and Indiana
for occasional performances, after which they would return to Kentucky.
When the slaves later fled to Canada, making the first part of their journey
on a steamboat owned by Strader and another man, Graham sued the boat
owners for the monetary value of his lost slaves. One of the defenses was
that the slaves had become free as a result of their time in Ohio and Indiana
and were therefore no longer Graham's property at the time of their escape.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals-then the state's highest court--ruled
for Graham, holding that the slaves' brief sojourns to Ohio and Indiana had
national political figure, see DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 199-209 (1995). For Dred
Scott's role as a cause of the Civil War, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 417-567 (1978); and CARL B. SWISHER,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 'ME TANEY PERIOD 1836-64 650
(1974) ("[Tjhe Lincoln-Douglas debates, with the Dred Scott decision at their core, led to
[Lincoln's] nomination and election as President in I86o, and thereby precipitated the Civil
War."); infra notes 45o-58, 467-72 and accompanying texts.
5 See infra notes 479-81,496-97 and accompanying texts.
6 See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (I o How.) 8z (185 1); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
215, 230-32 (1847) (upholding Kentucky slave owner's damage claim against Ohio defendant
pursuant to the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act and rejecting defendant's arguments that this Act was
unconstitutional or conflicted with the Northwest Ordinance and that slavery violated natural
law); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (I6 Pet.) 539,546-48,573 (1842) (holding unconstitutional
a Pennsylvania law that barred the use of force in removing any person from the state to return
that person to slavery). See generally William M. Wiecek, Slavery andAbolition Before the United
States Supreme Court, i82o-186o, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978), reprintedin ThE LAW OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY 635 (Kermit H. Hall ed., 1987).
7 Strader v. Graham, 5I U.S. (Io How.) 82 (1851).
8 Like Strader, Jones v. Van Zandt involved a Kentuckian's claim for the loss of his slave,
but the claim in Jones was initially presented in an Ohio federal court, whereas Strader is the
only U.S. Supreme Court case involving a Kentucky slave claim whose prior history involved
the Kentucky courts. See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 68, io9 (1861)
(rejecting Kentucky's effort to have the Supreme Court order Ohio's governor to surrender
a free black who had allegedly violated Kentucky law by helping a Kentucky slave girl
escape).
9 See infra note 191.
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not changed their status in Kentucky, 10 and the defendants appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court. In an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, the Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Kentucky court's ruling because
this ruling was based entirely on state law and then went on to declare
that, in any event, it agreed with the Kentucky court's determination that
the slaves' time in Ohio and Indiana had not changed their status.1 Both
rulings--on the jurisdictional point and on the slaves' status-were later
relied on by the Justices in their opinions in DredScott.'2
This Article provides a detailed description of Strader, including its
factual background, its reflection of Kentucky slave law in the first half of the
nineteenth century, and its significance for DredScott and other subsequent
slave-related matters. Part I provides an overview of Kentucky slave law as
it evolved up to the time of the Strader litigation. Part II describes Strader's
factual background and the Kentucky court decisions it produced. Part III
covers Strader in the U.S. Supreme Court. Part IV deals with post-Strader
events, including a review of the Dred Scott case and the role that Strader
played in that litigation. Part V provides some concluding observations
about how the Strader case reflects the role of slavery, law, and lawyers in
antebellum Kentucky and what Strader and DredScott might teach us in the
modern era.
I. KENTUCKY SLAVE LAW AT THE TIME OF STRADER
"The development of the state along every line was either directly or
indirectly affected by slavery.""
A. Early Times Through 1800
Kentucky was originally part of Virginia and was settled at about the
time of the American Revolution by frontiersmen who often brought
slaves with them. 4 In 1777, a census taken at Fort Harrod, Kentucky's
first settlement, "counted 19 slaves, 7 of them children under ten years of
age, in a total population of 198." 1' By the time of the first national census
in 1790, Kentucky had a total population of 73,077, of whom 61,133 were
Io See Strader v. Graham, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 633 (Ky. 1847), aff'd, 51 U.S. (io How.) 82
(1851); Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173 (Ky. 1844).
Ii Strader, 51 U.S. (to How.) at 93-95. The Court's opinion in Strader is discussed infra
Part III.C.
12 See infra notes 389, 431, 435-38, 443 and accompanying texts.
13 2 WILLIAM ELSEY CONNELLEY & E.M. COULTER, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 796 (Charles
Kerr ed., 1922).
14 THOMAS D. CLARK, A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 192-93 (1992).
15 LOWELL H. HARRISON & JAMES C. KLOTTER, A NEW HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 167 (1997).
2008- 2009]
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white, 11,830 were slaves, and 114 were free colored.16 By 1840, the year
before Graham's slaves fled Kentucky,17 the state's total population had
increased ten fold to almost 780,000, of whom over 182,000 (23%) were
slaves and about 7300 (1%) were free colored. I"
Virginia's original dominion extended not only to Kentucky, but also to
a vast stretch of land north of the Ohio River, and this territory is crucial
to our story. In the 1780s, Virginia and other states ceded their claims to
these lands to the United States.19 On July 13, 1787, Congress, acting under
the Articles of Confederation, created a formal territory out of these ceded
lands in an act titled the "Northwest Ordinance.""0 This Ordinance created
the Northwest Territory out of the region north of the Ohio River, south
of the Great Lakes, and east of the Mississippi River, and provided for its
governance and ultimate division into "not more than three, nor more than
five States."'" The governance provisions of the Northwest Ordinance
included a prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory, albeit one that
required the return of fugitive slaves who fled to the territory.2 2 After the
I6 See JOSEPH C.G. KENNEDY, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN I86o: COMPILED
FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE EIGHTH CENSUS 600 (1864), available at http://wwwz.
census.gov/prodz/decennial/documents/i86oa-I5.pdf. The Kentucky population figures in
the following chart are derived from this source:
Slaves vs.
Year Whites Free colred Slaves Total TOTAL
179 61_ 133 114 11830 16% 73.077
1800 179-871 741 40.343 18% 220-955
110 324-237 1-713 80_561 20% 406-511
19820 434.644 2.759 126_732 22% 564,135
1830 51777 4-917 165,213 24% 687-917
1840 590-253 7-317 182-258 23% 779.828
1850 761-413 10_011 210.981 21% 982-405
1860 919-484 10-684 225,483 20% 1_ 155684
17 See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying texts.
I8 See supra note 16.
I9 See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) z 12, 221-22 (1845); NORTHWEST TERRITORY
CELEBRATION COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 AND THE OLD NORTHWEST
TERRITORY 14 (1937).
2o The Northwest Ordinance, whose formal title was "An Ordinance for the Government
of the Territory of the United States, north-west of the river Ohio," is reprinted in Act of Aug.
7, 1789, ch. 8, I Stat. 50 , 51-53 n.(a).
21 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, i Star. 50, 51-53 n.(a) (Art. V of the Northwest Ordinance).
Eventually, the states of Ohio (in 1802), Indiana (in 1816), Illinois (in I818), Michigan (in
1837), and Wisconsin (in 1848) were formed out of the Northwest Territory and joined the
Union on an equal footing with the original states. See note (a) in I Stat. 53 (regarding Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan); Act of May 29, 1848, ch. 9, Star. 233 (regarding Wisconsin).
22 Art. VI of the Northwest Ordinance provided:
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adoption of the Constitution, the first Congress passed a statute re-enacting
the Northwest Ordinance with a few minor modifications that did not alter
its anti-slavery provision.23 These laws governing the Northwest Territory,
along with Kentucky's being part of the slave state of Virginia, established
the Ohio River as the boundary between free and slave territory in the
region between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River.2
4
In 1789, Virginia enacted a law to make "the District of Kentucky into
an Independent state. '2 5 Known as the "Compact with Virginia," this law
provided for the holding of a Kentucky constitutional convention and for
delegates to this convention to be elected by "the free male inhabitants
of each county above the age of twenty-one years."216 Pursuant to this
process, Kentucky adopted its first constitution on April 19, 1792,7 and was
admitted to the Union as the fifteenth state on June 1, 1792.28
Kentucky's first constitution recognized slavery in Article IX, which
barred the legislature from emancipating slaves without the consent of, or
payment to, their owners.2 9 This article was adopted by the constitutional
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted: Provided always, that any person escaping
into the same from whom labour or service is lawfully claimed in any
one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and
conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51-53 n.(a).
23 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 50-53.
24 This boundary was further confirmed in 1790 when Congress enacted the "Southwest
Ordinance" to govern the area south of the Ohio River generally corresponding to the modern
state of Tennessee in a law whose language closely tracked the Northwest Territory statute,
except that slavery was allowed. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 123.
25 13 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, 17-21 (1823), reprinted in I
MICHIE's KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 841-43 (zoo2) [hereinafter MICHIE].
26 See id. at 17-18, reprinted in I MICHIE,supra note 25, at 84I.
27 See Ky. CONST. of 1792, reprinted in I MICIIE, supra note 25, at 777-88.
28 See Act of Feb. 4, 1971, ch. 4, I Stat 189, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 845.
29 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. IX, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 784. In its entirety,
Article IX provided:
The Legislature shall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation
of slaves without the consent of their owners, or without paying their
owners, previous to such emancipation, a full equivalent in money for the
slaves so emancipated; they shall have no power to prevent emigrants to
this State from bringing with them such persons as are deemed slaves
by the laws of any one of the United States, so long as any person of the
same age or description shall be continued in slavery by the laws of this
State; that they shall pass laws to permit owners of slaves to emancipate
them, saving the rights of creditors, and preventing them from becoming
a charge to the county in which they reside; they shall have full power
to prevent any slaves being brought into this state as merchandise; they
2008-2009]
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convention after a bitter debate by a 26-16 vote. 0 The leading opponents
of this provision were religious leaders-indeed, all six of the ministers
who were constitutional delegates voted against Article IX 3 1-and, perhaps
in reaction to this, the new constitution also barred ministers from serving
in the General Assembly.
3
Kentucky's first constitution also provided that "[aIll laws now in force,
in the State of Virginia, not inconsistent with this Constitution, of a general
nature, . . . shall be in force in this State until they shall be altered or
repealed by the Legislature,"3 3 which meant that Virginia's slave laws were
carried over to the new state. 3 At the time, Virginia had a number of such
laws,3" one of which, enacted on October 17, 1785, divided the populace
shall have full power to prevent any slave being brought into this State
from a foreign country, and to prevent those from being brought into this
State, who have been since the first day of January, one thousand seven
hundred and eighty-nine, or may hereafter be, imported into any of the
United States from a foreign country. And they shall have full power
to pass such laws as may be necessary, to oblige the owners of slaves to
treat them with humanity, to provide for them necessary clothing and
provision, to abstain from all injuries to them, extending to life or limb;
and in case of their neglect or refusal to comply with the directions of
such laws, to have such slave or slaves sold for the benefit of their owner
or owners.
Id.
30 See HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note I5, at 175.
31 See J. WINSTON COLEMAN, JR., SLAVERY TIMES IN KENTUCKY 290-91 (1940) [hereinafter
SLAVERY IMES]. The principal opponent of Article IX was a Presbyterian minister named
David Rice, who a few months before the convention had published a pamphlet, Slavery
Inconsistent with Justice and Good Policy, arguing that slavery was harmful to whites, as well as
blacks, because it reduced public and private virtue and promoted sloth. Id. at 29o-9I; see also
HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 174.
32 See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 24, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 779; see also
CLARK, supra note 14, at 95. Both slavery and the prohibition on clergy serving in the General
Assembly were also made part of Kentucky's two subsequent antebellum constitutions in
1799 and 1850. See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. II, § 27, reprintedin I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 779;
Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 26 (18oo), reprinted in I MCHIE, supra note 25, 791 (barring clergy
from service in the legislature); infra note 54 (providing for slavery).
33 See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 6, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 783-84.
34 See, e.g., infra notes 35-36 and accompanying texts.
35 In Virginia's early decades, most people from Africa were indentured servants, but by
the late I6oos, Africans and their descendants were increasingly seen as slaves. See Virginia
Historical Society, Becoming Virginians: A Selection of Virginia Slave Laws, 1662-i 705, http://
www.vahistorical.orgtsvazoo3/slavelaws.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). In 1705, the Virginia
General Assembly confirmed their status as slaves, declaring that: "All servants imported and
brought into the Country... who were not Christians in their native Country... shall be
accounted and be slaves. All Negro, mulatto and Indian slaves within this dominion ...
shall be held to be real estate." See PBS, Africans in America/Part i/Virginia's Slave Codes,
http://www.pbs.orgtwgbh/aialpart/Ip268.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2oo9). This 1705 law also
limited slaves' ability to travel and associate with whites, provided for whipping, hanging, and
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into three groups-whites; negros; and mulattos, who were defined as those
persons with at least one fourth negro blood-with slavery being confined
to the latter two groups.36
After almost six years of statehood, the Kentucky General Assembly
in 1798 adopted what amounted to the state's own slave code, a lengthy
statute with forty-three sections entitled "An Act to reduce into one, the
Several Acts respecting Slaves, Free Negroes, Mulattoes, and Indians."'3'
This law, as amended over the years, "remained the basis for all legal action
throughout the entire period of slavery.
38
Section 1 of the 1798 Kentucky statute defined, by negative implication,
who could be slaves, providing: "No persons shall henceforth be slaves
within this commonwealth, except such as were so on the 17th day of
October, in the year 1785, and the descendants of the females of them."39
The 1798 statute also implied that any "negro, mulatto, or Indian" could be
a slave,' and it provided that "all such slaves" shall be treated as either "real
estate" for purposes of inheritance or "other chattels or personal estate" for
purposes of satisfying debts.4
other physical punishments for slaves found guilty of crimes, and absolved masters who killed
slaves that resisted correction. Id. The basic features of this Virginia slave law remained in
place through 1776, by which time African-American slaves accounted for 40% of Virginia's
population. See Virginia Historical Society, Becoming Virginians, http://www.vahistorical.org/
sva2003/virginians.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
36 See 2 WILLIAM LITTELL & JACOB SWIGERT, A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAW OFKENTUCKY
1164 (1822). The full version of this law's definition of mulattoes provided:
Every person, of whose grandfathers or grandmothers any one is,
or shall have been a negro, although all his other progenitors, except
that descending from a negro, shall have been white persons, shall be
deemed a mulatto; and so every person who has one fourth part, or more,
of negro blood, shall in like manner be deemed a mulatto.
Id.
37 Id. at 1149-59.
38 SLAVERY'TMES, SUpra note 31, at 17 n.22.
39 2 LITTELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at I 149-5o. The referenced date corresponded
to the enactment of the Virginia statute described in the text two paragraphs earlier. See supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
Children born to female slaves were automatically considered slaves for life and owned
by their mother's owner, even if the mother was subsequently freed or had been promised
her freedom at a later time. See infra note 74 (describing Ned v. Beal, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 238 (Ky.
181o)).
40 See 2 LITTELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 1155 (quoting section z8 of this law to the
effect that "[a]ll negro, mulatto, or Indian Slaves ... shall be held, taken and adjudged to be
real estate, and shall descend to the heirs and widows of persons departing this life, as lands
are"); see also id. at 1150-54 (authorizing, in sections 5, 6, 13, 19, and 2o, different treatment,
compared to whites, of persons who are negro, mulatto, or Indian).
41 Id. at 1155-56 (setting forth sections 28-29).
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Among its other provisions, the 1798 statute authorized private suits to
"recover any slave" and for "damage for the detention, trover or conversion
thereof."4 It also set forth a procedure for how owners could emancipate
their slaves.43 Other provisions:
" specified how slaves could be sold, bequeathed, and inherited;"
" restricted slaves in various ways, including their ability to travel, have
guns, be on land belonging to others, assemble and speak in groups, and
engage in commerce;4"
e limited the ability of all negroes, mulattos, and Indians, whether slave or
free, to testify, 6 and made it a crime for every such persons to "lift his or her
hand in opposition to any person not being a negro, mulatto or Indian" ;47
* dealt with how slaves could be punished for crimes, including "punished
with stripes," "ten laches on his or her bare back," "thirty laches on his or
her bare back, well laid on," "laches not exceeding thirty nine, on his or
her bare back, well laid on," "burnt in the hand [and] such other corporeal
punishment as the court shall think fit to inflict," and death by execution,
4
and, in the case of execution, the monetary compensation due their owners
from public funds;
49
* barred all persons, including whites, from harboring slaves and engaging
in trade with them without their owners' consent;50 and,
* repealed all prior laws dealing with the importation of slaves into the
state and barred such importation from foreign countries."'
In 1799, Kentucky adopted a new constitution, which became effective
on June 1, 1800.52 This second constitution provided for the carry-over of
42 Id. at I 156 (setting forth section 32).
43 Id. at 8855 (setting forth sections 27, originally enacted Dec. 17, 1794).
44 Id. at 1155-59 (setting forth sections 28-31, 33-35,37-43).
45 Id. at 1150-52 (setting forth sections 3-1l).
46 Id. at 1150, 1153-54 (setting forth sections 2, i9, and zI).
47 Id. at 8853 (setting forth section 13).
48 Id. at 1150-54 (setting forth sections 3-5, 7, 12-13, 18, and 20). "Whipping was by far
the most common form of punishment, both by the owner and by the governmental authorities
for public crimes. County seats had public whipping posts, as did many small communities."
HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 170. "Branding and ear cropping were done to identify
runaways." Id. at 169. Executions were by hanging. For example, in 1838, "four slaves were
hanged in Lexington, witnessed by a vast crowd estimated to be from 10,000 to 20,000." 2
CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 809.
49 2 LITTELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 1154-55 (setting forth section 24). "The
amount of money paid out of the state treasury for slaves hanged was said to be $68,000 in
1830." 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 8o9.
50 2 LrrELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 1151-53 (setting forth section io (harboring)
and section 12 (commerce)). Other restrictions on whites included subjecting slave owners
to fines for allowing their slaves to gather in public groups and to "go at large and trade as a
freeman." Id. at 1151, 8853 (setting forth, respectively, sections 8 and 14).
51 Id. at H 54-55 (setting forth, respectively, sections 23 and z5).
52 See Ky. CONST. of 1799, sched., § 6 (i8oo), reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at
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all laws then in force 3 and also adopted virtually verbatim the slave article
of the first constitution, this time as Article VII.54 However, unlike the 1792
constitution, which extended suffrage to "all free male citizens of the age of
twenty-one years,"55 the new constitution barred "negroes, mulattoes and
Indians" from voting.5 6 This second constitution was in place for almost
half a century and governed the state during the 1840s when the Strader
litigation was in the Kentucky courts.
5 7
B. Steamboats and the 1800-1840 Period
An important occurrence in the early nineteenth century-and one of
special relevance to our story-was the development of the steamboat. In
1807, Robert Fulton operated the first commercially successful steamboat
in the United States, running on the Hudson River from New York City to
Albany.5" Four years later, Fulton built a steamboat in Pittsburgh and took
it down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to Natchez, stopping in Louisville
in October of 181 1.59 By 1816, a steamboat could make the journey upriver
from New Orleans to Louisville in twenty-five days, a time that would be
789-802.
53 See Ky. CONST. of 1799, sched., § I (i8oo), reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 8oo.
54 Article VII, entitled "Concerning Slaves," provided a first section that was virtually
identical to Article IX of the 1792 constitution (see supra note 29), save for certain punctuation
changes, changing "Legislature" to "General Assembly" in the first phrase, and changing "the
county in which they reside" to "any county in this commonwealth" in the phrase dealing
with preventing emancipated slaves from becoming a public charge. See Ky. CONST. of 1799,
art. VII (18oo), reprinted in I MIcHIE, supra note 25, at 797-98. A second section was added,
as follows:
§ 2. In the prosecution of slaves for felony, no inquest by a grand jury
shall be necessary but the proceedings in such prosecutions shall be
regulated by law except that the General Assembly shall have no power
to deprive them of the privilege of an impartial trial by a petit jury.
Id.
55 See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § i, reprinted in I MIcHIE, supra note 25, at 781.
56 K.CONST. of 1799, art II, § 8 (i8oo),reprintedin IMcmE,supra note 25,at 790 (quoting
Article II, § 8 as extending suffrage to "every free male citizen, (negroes, mulattoes and Indians
excepted), who at the time being, hath attained to the age of twenty-one years").
57 See infra Part II.B-.E and notes 272-77 and accompanying texts.
58 See Microsoft Online Encyclopedia 2oo8, Steamboat, http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia-761558257/Steamboat.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
59 See Cincinnati.com, Two Centuries on the Ohio River, http://www.cincinnati.
com/tallstacks/history-2centuries.html (last visited Oct. 12, zoo8). Louisville was a natural
stopping point on the Ohio River, because the near-by rapids, or "falls," was the only serious
impediment to boat traffic along the river. In the late 182os, a canal was built to bypass these
rapids, allowing cargo and passengers to travel on one steamboat all the way from Pittsburgh
to New Orleans without changing vessels or waiting for high water. Id.
2008-2009]
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steadily reduced through improved vessel design until it took less than five
days in 1853. 6
The Zebulon Pike, built in Cincinnati in 1817, was the first steamboat
designed primarily for passenger service. 61 Within two years, seven more
steamboats were built in Cincinnati, and by 1834, 304 such vessels had
been built at Pittsburgh, 221 at Cincinnati and Covington, and 103 at
Louisville. 62 Steamboat traffic helped establish Cincinnati and Louisville
as major cities in the first half of the nineteenth century.63 The steamboat
trade along the Ohio River was flourishing in 1841 when Graham's three
slaves fled Kentucky on a steamboat from Louisville to Cincinnati, 64 and
it continued to grow until about 1852 when some 8000 landings were
recorded in Cincinnati.
65
Eventually, Kentucky slave law came to reflect the increased use of
steamboats on the Ohio River and the opportunity these boats presented
to escaping slaves. Thus, in 1824, the General Assembly passed a law
that made the master of such a boat subject to liability-and criminal
sanctions-for taking slaves "out of the limits of this state" without their
owner's permission. 66 Four years later, this law was amended to also make
60 See About.com, The History of Steamboats, http://inventors.about.com/library/
inventors/blsteamship.htm.
61 See Cincinnati:com, supra note 59.
62 Id.
63 For example, in 181o, Cincinnati's population was 2540, but by 1850, "the city had
115,435 residents, a population second only to New Orleans among western river cities in
that year." See Campbell Gibson, Population of the Ioo Largest Cites and Other Urban Places in
the United States: 179o to I99O tbl. 4 (Population Division U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working
Paper No. 27, 1998), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/
twpsoo27/tabo4.txt. Cincinnati's vast population stemmed in part from the city's large
manufacturing sector. "Steamboats helped . . . enable capitalists to restructure urban
commodity production in Cincinnati and to create racialized labor markets. Members of the
city's African American community, one of the largest in the North in 1850, ... numbered
3,172." T"OMAS C. BUCHANAN, BLACK LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI: SLAVES, FREE BLACKS, AND THE
WESTERN STEAMBOAT WORLD 47 (2004).
64 See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying texts.
65 See Cincinnati.com, supra note 59.
66 The Act of 1824 provided:
That any master or commander of a steam-boat or other vessel, who
shall hereafter hire, or employ, or take as passenger, or otherwise, out
of the limits of this state, or shall suffer to be hired or employed, or
taken as passenger on board of such steam-boat or other vessel under
his command or in his charge, or otherwise take out of .the limits of
this state any person or persons of colour; unless such coloured person
or persons shall have in their possession, the record of some court of
the United States, properly exemplified, providing his or their right to
freedom; or unless such master shall have the permission of the master
of such persons or persons of colour for such removal, every such
master or commander of a steam-boat or other vessel, shall be liable to
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liable, in addition to the boat's master, "the owners, mate, clerk, pilot and
engineer of any steam vessel" and to make clear that the law did not apply
"to any person of colour who is not a slave."67 Graham's suit in Strader
would be based on this law.68 Of course, steamboats could also be used to
transport Kentucky slaves down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New
Orleans and plantation work in the Deep South.69
indictment, fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of a jury, and shall,
moreover, be liable in damages to the party aggrieved by such removal;
and the steam-boat or other vessel in which such coloured person or
persons shall be hired or employed, or taken as passenger, or otherwise
removed out of the limits of this commonwealth, shall be liable to the
party aggrieved by such removal, and may be proceeded against by suit
in chancery, and condemned and sold to pay and satisfy such damage
and the costs of suit.
1824 Ky. Acts 406-07.
67 See 1827 Ky. Acts 178-79. The legislature's purpose in enacting this statute, according
to an 1830 opinion of the Court of Appeals, was:
to prevent the removal of slaves out-of the limits of the state, without the
consent of their owners. The evil intended to be averted was, the loss of
property to our citizens, resulting to owners of slaves, by tolerating the
masters and commanders of vessels in hiring, or in any other manner,
taking slaves on board, and transporting them out of the limits of the
state. Such conduct, on the part of masters and commanders of vessels,
might render it impossible for owners of a slave to reclaim him.
Edwards v. Vail, 26 Ky. (3 J.J. Marshall) 595, 596 (1830); see also McFarland v. McKnight, 45
Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 5oo, 506, 511 (1846) (noting that the offense condemned by this law "consists
in taking of the slaves on board the steam vessel and transporting them" out of the state and
that the statute thereby "has singled out a particular class of wrongs for the purpose of giving
a more effective remedy").
The McFarland case involved the 1831 escape of a Kentucky slave couple aboard the
steamship Versailles from Louisville to Cincinnati, which events and the couple's subsequent
life as free persons in Canada are recounted in KAROLYN SMARDZ FROST, I'VE GOT A HOME IN
GLORY LAND: A LOST TALE OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (2oo7).
68 See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., BucHANAN, supra note 63, at 81-ioo; WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE
INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET 41-42, 47-50, 62-63 (i999). For example, in 1841
a few months after Dr. Graham's slaves escaped, Abraham Lincoln was returning from a
Kentucky vacation on a steamboat:
[H]e encountered twelve chained slaves, "strung together precisely like
so many fish upon a trot-line." A "gentleman" was taking them from
their Kentucky homes to the Deep South, where, Lincoln recognized,
"the lash of the master is proverbially more ruthless and unrelenting
than any other where." Years later he would remember the brutality of
the scene.
DONALD, supra note 4, at 89.
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Kentucky slave law in the early decades of the nineteenth century
also evolved through other legislative enactments and judicial decisions.
For example, in its first year of operation under the 1800 constitution,
the General Assembly adjusted the procedure by which owners could
emancipate their slaves. 0 A number of laws passed in the early 1800s dealt
with crimes committed by slaves and how such slaves were to be punished.7
1
Other statutes, passed in 1814 and 1815, modified the prohibition on the
importation of slaves into the state for commercial purposes.72
Judicial decisions relating to slaves during this period generally involved
inheritance or commercial disputes between whites, reflecting the slaves'
status as property.7 3 A few cases dealt with emancipation and related
issues.74 As in other slave states,7" Kentucky law allowed slaves to sue for
their freedom in court.76 One 1820 decision by the Court of Appeals in
70 See I C. S. MOREHEAD & MASON BROWN, DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF KENTUCKY
6o (1834) (quoting the Act of Dec. 15, I8oo, which adjusted the emancipation provision,
described supra note 43 and accompanying text, by providing that anyone over 18 years of age
who owned slaves might emancipate them).
71 See 2 LITTELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 1159-64 (setting forth, inter alia, section 3
of an Act passed Dec. 20, 18oo (dealing with bail for imprisoned slaves); section 19 of an Act
passed Dec. 22, 18oz (providing for the death penalty for any slave "convicted of murder,
arson, rape committed on a white woman, robbery from the person, or burglary" and for public
whipping of slaves convicted of "any other offense"); section I of an Act passed Dec. 27, 1806
(providing for appointment of counsel for slaves accused of felonies); an Act passed Jan. 25,
1811 (providing punishments for various crimes by slaves, including death for conspiring "to
rebel or make insurrection"); and section I of an Act passed Feb. Io, 1819 (providing death for
any slave who shot a gun at or wounded with intent to kill a free white)).
72 See, e.g., 2 LIT-ELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 1162 (setting forth the Act of Feb.
8, 1815). This prohibition was strengthened by a law passed in 1833, but was ultimately
repealed in 1849. See, e.g., 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 809; infra note 271 and
accompanying text.
73 See generally 2 LiTTELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 1165-68, for the Court of Appeals'
decisions.
74 See Court of Appeals' decisions described in 2 LITTELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at
I166-68. Among these cases were Davis v. Curry, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 238, 239-40 (Ky. 18 Io), which
held that the burden of proof is on a person of color claiming freedom, because in a "great
majority of instances ... the characteristic marks of the African are found to be connected
with slavery, and the existence of the latter may well be inferred from the proof of the former.
Color being one of the criteria by which the African race is distinguished from the rest of the
population of the country, must consequently afford ... a presumption of slavery"; and Ned
v. Beal, 5 Ky. (z Bibb) 298, 299 (Ky. I8i I), which held that the children of a female slave who
were born after the death of her owner, who had by will directed that she be free at a certain
later time, are slaves, based on the "general rule ... that the children follow the condition of
their mother at the time of their birth."
75 See, e.g., Dennis K. Boman, The Dred Scott Case Reconsidered: TheLegal and Political Context
in Missouri, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405,406-13,417-20 (2000) (reviewing freedom statutes and
pre-Dred Scott cases in Missouri); Michael P. Mills, Slave Law in Mississippi from 817-1861:
Constitutions, Codes and Cases, 71 Miss. L. J. 153,176-88 (2001) (discussing Mississippi freedom
cases); infra text accompanying notes 311-14,384-88 (describing Missouri freedom cases).
76 The legal technique used by Kentucky slaves suing for their freedom was to bring "an
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such a case, Rankin v. Lydia,77 was still an important precedent over two
action of trespass, assault, battery, and false imprisonment" against the putative owner. See,
e.g., Amy v. Smith, I I Ky. (I Litt.) 326, 327 (Ky. 1822); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.)
467, 467 (Ky. 1820). If the slave prevailed, he or she would be given judgment for a nominal
amount (e.g., "one cent" in Rankin) and declared free. See Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) at
470.
In 18o8, the General Assembly amended the law governing such freedom suits by
providing a two-year statute of limitation for those actions based on Virginia or Pennsylvania
records of freedom, finding that "creditors, purchasers and others are exposed to great injustice,
by the assertion, by persons held in slavery, of dormant claims to their freedom, founded
upon certain acts of the legislatures of Virginia and Pennsylvania." See Amy v. Smith, I I Ky.
(I Litt.) at 330 (quoting "an Act limiting actions in certain cases" approved Feb. 20, 18o8).
Further amendments to the freedom-suit law were enacted from time to time thereafter.
For example, in 184o, an amendment made clear that such suits would not abate upon the
putative owner-defendant's death and that successful suits might result in damages for the
slave-plaintiff covering "the value of the services of such free person of color, whilst retained
in slavery." See Ky. LAWS 225-26 (Loughborough 1842) (setting forth an Act approved Feb.
12, 1840).
77 Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) at 467. In Rankin, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of the slave Lydia, on the grounds that she had become free when her master took her
from Kentucky to reside with him in the free territory of Indiana and declared her to be free
there and that this freedom could not be lost by her being sold back into Kentucky.
Rankin has a number of interesting aspects. One of Lydia's putative owners after she was
sold back into Kentucky was Robert Todd of Lexington, see id. at 468, who was the father of
Abraham Lincoln's future wife. See DONALD, supra note 4, at 84, 96. Also, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals' opinion in Rankin, written by Judge Benjamin Mills, contained some passages
reflecting a clear hostility toward the institution of slavery. For example, Judge Mills wrote:
Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of this state, and the right to hold
them under our municipal regulations is unquestionable. But we view
this as a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without
foundation in the law of nature, or the unwritten and common law..
. In a state such as ours, where we have been habituated to slavery, in
black, if we read or hear of an African in another state or territory, bound
to servitude of any character, whether limited or otherwise, we are apt to
affix to him, not only the appellation, but the legal condition of a slave.
... [F]reedom is the natural right of man, although it may not be his
birthright. By municipal laws of a government it may be taken away..
.. [W]e consider Lydia as free. Not because she acquired that freedom
by the laws of Kentucky, but during her absence from the state, by the
voluntary and unequivocal acts of her master, and that when it is thus
acquired it ought to be held equally sacred here, whether she is brought
against her will, as it would be, had it been her birthright. It is enough
if it exists now-it is equally as precious, valuable and sacred as if it
commenced with her existence.
Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) at 470, 474-75, 479. Two years later, Judge Mills, in dissent,
wrote another dramatic opinion in favor of a slave's freedom suit. See infra note 83 para. 2
(discussingAmy v. Smith). Mills lost his seat on the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1828 when,
after being re-nominated by the Governor, he was rejected by the Senate. See H. LEVIN, 'M1E
LAWYERS AND LAWMAKERS OF KENTUCKY 316-17 (1897).
2008- 2009]
KENTUCKYLAW JOURNAL
decades later in the Strader litigation.7"
Also in the 1820s, a variety of amendments to Kentucky's slave code
were enacted. For example, in 1823, the General Assembly passed a law
that required court clerks to keep records of emancipation certificates
describing the ex-slaves "as to colour, age, form, height, and particular
accidental marks" and that provided penalties for anyone who transferred
such an emancipation certificate to a slave with the intent of illegally
freeing him.7 9 Meanwhile, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided about
a dozen cases dealing with emancipation issues,"0 but the bulk of its slave-
based docket continued to involve inheritance and commercial disputes
between whites."' In 1822, this court also opined, in a 2-1 decision that
anticipated the Supreme Court's ruling in Dred Scott,"2 that blacks could
never become U.S. citizens, nor could they, even if free, be considered
citizens of Kentucky.
83
78 In its 1844 decision in Strader, the Kentucky Court of Appeals distinguished the
experience of Dr. Graham's slaves, who had only been in free states for temporary visits, from
Lydia's experience in Rankin, which was described as a case involving
a master [who] remov[ed] with his slave from this State to Indiana,
then a territory, with the intention of residing there, and having become
actually a resident there, and made a registry under the laws of the
territory, of Lydia, whom he had taken as a slave from Kentucky, lost
thereby his dominion as a master and owner over her, and could not
resume or re-create it by bringing or selling her back to Kentucky.
Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 18o (Ky. 1844).
Years later in Dred Scott, the Rankin case would also be cited by Justice McLean in his
dissent. See Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 536 (1857).
79 See MOREHEAD & BROWN, supra note 7
o , at 61o (setting forth "An Act to amend the law
respecting the Emancipation of Slaves: Approved November 13, 1823").
8o See cases cited in MOREHEAD & BROWN, supra note 7o, at 61o nn.2 & 3.
81 See, for example, the cases described in Ky. LAWS 557-58 (Loughborough 1842).
8a See infra note 422.
83 See Amy v. Smith, is Ky. (i Litt.) 326 (Ky. 1822). This decision ruled against the
slave Amy, holding in relevant part that, because she could not be a citizen of any state, she
was not entitled to invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution to
challenge a Kentucky law restricting freedom suits. Id. at 330-35. According to the majority:
"No one can ... be a citizen of a state, who is not entitled, upon the terms prescribed by the
institutions of the state, to all the rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon
the highest class of society." Id. at 333. Thus, Amy, whose freedom suit here was based on
her claim that she had become a free citizen in Pennsylvania or Virginia prior to her being sold
into Kentucky:
can not have been a citizen, either of Pennsylvania or of Virginia, unless
she belonged to a class of society, upon which, by the institutions of the
states, was conferred a right to enjoy all the privileges and immunities
appertaining to the state. That this was the case, there is no evidence in
the record to show, and the presumption is against it. Free negroes and
mulattoes are, almost everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded
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The 1830 national census revealed that, for the fifth straight decade,
slaves' proportion of the overall Kentucky population had grown (to 24%),
but the next ten years would see the first reversal of this trend (to 23% in
1840). 84 It had become clear that Kentucky's climate and soils were not
generally favorable to a slave-based economy. The main crops of grains,
tobacco, and hemp did not need slaves in the fields during the growing and
dormant seasons, and many Kentucky planters had moved south to the
cotton belt, taking their slaves with them.85
As a result, the slave trade between Kentucky and the lower South grew
steadily from 1820 onward.16 Cotton provided a continuous demand for
slaves in the Deep South, and the Kentucky market was a major supplier
of this demand.87 In 1840, for example, a prominent Kentucky slaveholder
estimated that "some 60,000 Kentucky slaves had been sold to the Deep
South in the past seven years." 8
race of people; insomuch so, that, under the constitution and laws of
the United States, they can not become citizens of the United States.
... [Als the laws of the United States do not now authorize any but a
white person to become a citizen, it marks the national sentiment upon
the subject, and creates a presumption that no state had made persons
of colour citizens.
Id. at 334. Although these sentiments were expressed about citizenship status in Pennsylvania
and Virginia, they obviously also meant that no colored person, even if free, could be a citizen
of Kentucky, because, as the Court noted about Virginia, "we know that free people of colour
have never been considered or treated, either in the practice of the country or by the laws of
the state, as possessing the rights and privileges of citizens." Id.
In dissent, Judge Mills, whose general hostility toward the institution of slavery had been
recorded in an earlier decision, see supra note 77 (discussing Rankin v. Lydia), concluded that
Amy had indeed previously achieved all of the civil rights needed to make her a Virginia
citizen and that she therefore could not lose her free status as a result of a Kentucky law
limiting freedom suits. Amy v. Smith, I I Ky. (I Litt.) at 343-45.
84 Seesupra note 16.
85 Among the Kentucky planter-families to move south was that of Jefferson Davis,
who was born in Kentucky in 18o8 and moved with his family to Mississippi in 812.' Davis
returned to Kentucky for schooling at Transylvania University before attending West Point.
After two stints in the military, he returned to Mississippi as a slave-owning planter and
pursued a political career. He served twice in the U.S. Senate (1847-51 and 1857-6 1) and was
President Pierce's Secretary of War (1853-57), before becoming President of the Confederacy
during the Civil War. See, e.g., LIFE AND REMINISCENCES OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, BY DISTINGUISHED
MEN OF His TIME 3-64 (1890); LEVIN, supra note 77, at 565.
86 See, e.g., SLAVERYTIMES, supra note 31, at 145-94.
87 Id. at 149.
88 FROST, supra note 67, at 40 (referring to Robert Wickcliffe's comments to the Kentucky
legislature).
With the legislative repeal in 1849 of the prohibition on slave-importation for commercial
purposes, slave trading in the 185os became even more widespread. See SLAVERY TIMES, supra
note 31,at 144, 151,155.
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In the 1830s, with increased steamboat traffic on the Ohio River and
the rise of abolitionism and the Underground Railroad,8 9 the problem
of runaway slaves grew in Kentucky.9° One response was the General
Assembly's enactment in 1835 of a bill that created a bounty system by
authorizing various payments to any person "who shall hereafter arrest, and
secure within any jail in this Commonwealth, or deliver to the owner, any
slave that shall have runaway [sic] from his or her owner." 9' A year later, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that the justice of human
slavery could be judged only by God and suggesting that abolitionists were
exercising freedom of the press to the point of "licentiousness.""
89 As for the rise of steamboat traffic and the Underground Railroad, see, respectively,
supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text and infra notes 148-51 and accompanying texts.
As to abolitionism, in 1827, Kentucky had eight abolitionist societies with about 2oo
members. HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 175. In 1833, Danville native James G.
Birney helped organize a small group that called itself the "Kentucky Society for the Relief
of the State from Slavery." 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 8oo. Two years later,
Birney organized the Kentucky Abolition Society as a branch of the American Anti-Slavery
Society, which had been founded by William Lloyd Garrison in 1833. Id. at 8oo-oi. In 1835,
Presbyterian leaders issued "An Address to the Presbyterians of Kentucky, proposing a Plan
for the Instruction and Emancipation of their Slaves." Id. at 802.
9o Records of runaways in the 183os are sparse, but during the I85os, it was estimated
that Kentucky lost nearly 20,000 slaves annually across the Ohio River. CLARK, supra note 14,
at 202-1O. One of the witnesses in the Strader litigation testified in 1845 that "eight or ten
years ago that it [allowing a slave of good character to go to Cincinnati] would not [lessen his
value], but at this time it would not be safe to let a slave of any character to go Cincinnati."
Deposition of Christopher Chinn, Transcript of Record at 116, Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S.
(io How.) 82 (I85I), microformedon U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, Vol. 39, Reel 15
(Microform, Inc.) [hereinafter Supreme Court Record].
91 See Ky. LAWS 523 (Loughborough 1842) (setting forth an Act approved Feb. 28,
1835). The payments ranged upward from $Io depending on how far from the owner's home
county the slave was arrested. Id. This law was amended three years later to specify $ioo in
compensation "for apprehending fugitive slaves taken without this Commonwealth, and in a
State where slavery is not tolerated by law." Id. at 524 (setting forth an Act approved Feb. 8,
1838).
Also in 1838, the legislature adopted a law patterned after the 1824 steamboat statute, see
supra notes 66-67 and accompanying texts, that made "the owner and proprietors of any mail
stage, or other coach, or railroad cars" liable for a $ioo penalty if a slave escaped after traveling
thereon "without a written request of their owners, or in the company of their owners" and
also made such owners and proprietors subject to private suit by "the owner for the full value"
of all such slaves along with "damages as the owners may incur in attempting to recover such
slaves." See Ky. LAWS 554 (Loughborough 1842) (setting forth an Act approved Feb. 8, 1838).
92 According to this resolution, as to the institution of slavery:
the people of Kentucky hold themselves responsible to no earthly
tribunal, but will refer their case to Him alone, through the mysterious
dispensations of whose Providence, dominion has been given to the
white man over the black. He alone may judge of its compatibility with
his will, and of its political expediency, we who witness its practical
operation, are best competent to speak.
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Kentucky slavery had permeated the entire culture of the state. In
1816, a visitor to Kentucky noted that "the rich hold labor in contempt,
and frequently make the possession of slaves a criterion of merit." 93 Even
though the "great majority of white Kentuckians never owned a slave ...
because they could not afford to,"' slave ownership connoted wealth and
prestige,95 and, then as now, the wealthier classes had a disproportionate
influence on the laws and mores of the times.'
2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 803. As to the abolitionist press, the resolution
commented that "freedom of the press is one thing-licentiousness another." Id.
93 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 796.
94 HARIsON & KLOTTER, supra note I5, at 168. During the first third of the nineteenth
century, a "slave cost more than many Kentucky farmers earned in cash over two or more
years." Id. According to the 1850 census, only z8% of white families held slaves, with a
quarter of these owning just one. Id.
95 See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 4, at I66:
Even nonslaveholders, who constituted an overwhelming majority of
the Kentucky voters, were opposed to any form of emancipation. The
prospect of owning slaves.. . was "highly seductive to the thoughtless
and giddy headed young men," because slaves were "the most glittering
ostentatious and displaying property in the world." As a young
Kentuckian told [Lincoln], "You might have any amount of land; money
in your pocket or bank stock and while travelling around no body would
be any wiser, but if you had a darkey trudging at your heels every body
would see him and know that you owned slaves."
Id.
96 Henry Clay's life provides an example of how one who seemed instinctively opposed to
slavery came to moderate his views as his wealth and power increased. Born to a modest family
in Virginia, Clay moved to Lexington in 1797 at the age of twenty and was admitted to the bar
less than a year later. See STEPHEN ARON, How THE WEST WAS LOST: TIE TRANSFORMATION OF
KENTUCKY FROM DANIEL BOONE TO HENRY CLAY 83,92-93 (1996); MAURICE G. BAXTER, HENRY
CLAY THE LAWYER 18-19 (2000). In his early days in Kentucky, Clay called for emancipation,
but after his marriage in 1799 to a woman from a rich and prominent family, his law practice
flourished, and his views on slavery changed. BAXTER, supra, at 19. By 1804, Clay owned a
great deal of land and many slaves, and he often represented slave interests, both in litigation
and in his legislative activities. See ARON, supra, at 95-97; BAXTER, supra, at 23 (reporting that
Clay's i8o8 tax bill showed he owned fourteen slaves). Later as a prominent Whig politician,
Clay again opposed slavery and favored sending blacks back to Liberia, believing that the
two races could not live together harmoniously. See CLARK, supra note 14, at 205. In 1829,
Clay wrote that he desired to see Kentucky rid of slavery, which brought heavy criticism on
him. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 796. Clay's efforts to help elect anti-slavery
delegates to the Kentucky constitutional convention in 1849 were soundly defeated, see infra
note 272 and accompanying text, but he continued to be elected to the Senate, where he was a
principal architect of the Compromise of 1 850, as he had been of the Missouri Compromise of
I8zo. See infra notes 268-69 and 385 and accompanying texts. Clay continued to own slaves
until he died in 1852. See Statement of Assets of Henry Clay (July IO, 185 1), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF HENRY CLAY 904 (Melba Porter Hay ed., 1991) (listing, in Clay's Last Will and Testament of
July io, 1851, assets that included "27 or 28 slaves estimated at @ $9,000"); Executive Order
of Millard Fillmore (June 29, 1852), in IO THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 968 (Melba Porter Hay
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Thus, from the mid-1830s, Kentucky was in constant dispute with its
northern neighbors across the Ohio River. 97 "Kentucky was developing
more and more into a common interest with the rest of the slave holding
states, and her leadership was coming to be identified with the leadership
of the South." 98
II. STRADER v. GRAHAM: BACKGROUND AND KENTUCKY DECISIONS
A. Factual Background
1. The Slaves and Their Owner.-The slaves involved in the Strader case
were three young men named George, Reuben, and Henry. At the time of
their escape in 1841, they were described by their owner, Dr. Christopher
Graham of Harrodsburg Springs, Kentucky, as:
three yellow men between nineteen and twenty-three years of age, well
trained as dining room servants and as scientific musicians, in which
capacity they had been in the habit, for some years, of playing together on
various instruments, at balls and parties, and during the watering season
were retained by [Graham] at the house kept by him at the Harrodsburg
Springs, to play for the entertainment of his company.99
Being "yellow" meant that these men were mixed-blood mulattoes 00
The "scientific" nature of their musical training, which was attested
to by many witnesses,101 is a description of musicians rarely used today,
but then apparently meant having been trained in music theory as well
as being performers.10 The men played the violin and numerous other
ed., 1991) (noting Clay's death on June 29, 1852).
97 See, e.g., 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 804-o6 (describing Kentucky's
relations with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois during this period).
98 Id. at 804. Further evidence of this was an 1835 resolution passed by the General
Assembly noting that slave states "are hereby assured of the earnest co-operation of the
state of Kentucky, to resist, at all hazards, every effort to interfere with the subject either by
Congress, any state, or combination of private persons." Id. at 803 (quoting 1835 Ky. Acts.
683-86 (Resolutions dated Mar. i)).
99 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 173 (Ky. 1844). Graham's
original complaint described George as "a yellow man.., about five feet ten inches high, well
formed and likely, about 20-21 years old"; Reuben as "also ... a yellow man .. about six feet
in height, slender made, well formed, likely, and about twenty-one years old"; and Henry as
"also ... a yellow man about five feet ten inches in height, twenty-one years old, and of a fine
countenance." See Bill of Sept. 16, 1841, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 6. "Likely"
apparently meant having a pleasing appearance. See, e.g., Deposition of Joseph A. Thompson,
Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 121 (describing Graham's escaped slaves as, inter
alia, "likely, in fact, handsome young men").
ioo See, e.g., FROST, supra note 67, at 6, II.
IOl See, e.g., Depositions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 25, 31,33, 121.
102 Interview with Ron Pen, Director, John Jacob Niles Ctr. for Am. Music, Sch. of Music,
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instruments, 10 3 and Reuben, their leader, "was a very fine prompter, with
a fine clear voice [who] directed the cotillons, and managed the ball room
with great skill.""' The "watering season" referred to the months in
summer and early fall when Dr. Graham's resort in Harrodsburg was most
popular. 0
The three young men were "slaves for life," according to Graham, who
wrote that he had "paid for them an unusual sum" and that they were
"of good disposition and honest" and had been "faithful hardworking
servants."' °6 According to one of Graham's clerks who worked with George,
Reuben, and Henry for many years, they were not only "musicians of the
first order," but also "the best trained dining-room servants I ever saw."'107
Graham was an amazing man, an entrepreneur who lived to be 100 years
old. Born in 1787 near what is now Danville, Kentucky,08 he was a veteran
Univ. of Ky., in Lexington, Ky. (Oct. 13, 2oo8); see also Deposition ofJ. H. Rice, Supreme Court
Record, supra note 9o, at 133 (noting that deponent, "being a musician," is "well acquainted
with the principles of music himself' and considered Dr. Graham's slaves more valuable for
having played at various events and in various locales because "it was necessary to keep up
with the fashionable music, and the figures and forms of cotillions").
103 See Depositions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 25 (noting that "George
generally played on the violoncello, though he played very well on the small violin"); id. at 83
(referring to the slaves as performing "well on a violin"); id. at 124 (testifying that deponent
had sold to Dr. Graham "a fine violin with steel bow and a case, and a fine extra keyed clarionet,
for one hundred twenty dollars, which he told me at the time were for the use of his boys"); id.
at 134 ("their musical instruments were very fine, of the first quality; and they played upon a
great variety of instruments").
1o4 Deposition of R.D. Harlan, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 135.
105 See J. WINSTON COLEMAN, JR., THE SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FAMED
WATERING-PLACES OF THE BLUEGRASS STATE, I800-1935, at 40 (1955) [hereinafter SPRINGS OF
KENTUCKY] (describing the "watering season" as just after April and May); Deposition of J.S.
Everett, Supreme Court Record, supra note go, at 50 (describing the "watering season" as "the
summer and fall"); see also SLAVERY TIMES, supra note 3 1, at 40 (noting that prosperous guests
flocked to Graham Springs and other Kentucky "watering-places during the summer and
early autumn months"); infra notes 113-14 and accompanying texts.
Io6 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 174 (Ky. I844); see also infra
text accompanying notes 122-24. This description was of Reuben and Henry. For more on
George, see supra notes 99, 1o3.
The details of Graham's purchase of George are unknown. Graham purchased Reuben and
Henry on November 28, 1836, at a court-house auction to settle the estate of their deceased
prior owner (Anthony Hunn) in Stanford, Lincoln County, Kentucky, where "Reuben was
struck off at the price of eleven hundred and fifty-five dollars, and Henry was struck off at
the price of thirteen hundred dollars." Deposition of Thomas Helm, Supreme Court Record,
supra note 90, at 123.
107 Peter Davis' deposition, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at lO; see also
Deposition of J. G. Carter, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at I 18 ("having been in the
habit of visiting and being about taverns a great deal, I unhesitatingly state, that they excelled
any as dining-room servants I have ever seen").
io8 See "lhE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LOUISVILLE 362 (John E. Kleber ed., 2001) [hereinafter
LOUISVILLE ENCYCLOPEDIA].
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of the War of 1812, an early graduate of the Transylvania Medical School,
and said to be "for many years the champion off-hand rifle shot of the
world."' 1 In 1819, he moved to Harrodsburg, which a generation earlier
had been Kentucky's first settlement, and there he practiced as a family
physician and came to know many of the original settlers, including Danial
Boone."' In 1827 and 1828, Dr. Graham purchased two "springs hotels" near
Harrodsburg, then combined them under the name of "Graham Springs"
(also known as "Harrodsburg Springs"), and successfully operated them for
a quarter century "as the most fashionable resort in Kentucky.""'  Graham
Springs "became known as the 'Saratoga of the West,' uniting 'society for
pleasure and health from the extremes of the continent."'
'
1
2
Every year during the "watering season," the Graham Springs resort
would attract hundreds of well-to-do guests from all parts of the country,
especially the South." 3 Wealthy planters and their families from the Deep
South came to "escape the dreaded yellow fever and hot weather."'' 4 Many
famous Kentuckians also stayed at Graham Springs, including Isaac Shelby,
Henry Clay, Robert Breckinridge, John Hunt Morgan, and Cassius M. Clay,
as well judges and others who would eventually play a role in Graham's
slave litigation."' In addition to the resort's many amenities, bathing in the
local "springs" was thought to be beneficial for one's health."
6
Graham Springs included a large main structure and various out
buildings. The main building, according to one visitor in 1834, "contains a
dining-room, in which one hundred and fifty persons may be comfortably
seated, an excellent ball-room, parlours, chambers, &c., and two rows of
109 SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 1o5, at 23.
I 10 2 LEWIS COLLINS & RICHARD H. COLLINS, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 614 (1966).
III SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 1O5, at 24.
112 Id. (quoting an 1829 description in a Frankfort publication).
113 See id. at 26-29.
114 Id. at 26. Guests from the South would often bring their house slaves with them,
and these family servants "pitched in and worked side by side with those attached to the
establishment." Id.
115 Id. at 29,45-46. For example, the guest list in the mid-1830s included the Bibbs and
the Marshalls, id. at 29, 46, families that included judges who would preside, respectively, over
the trial and appellate proceedings in Graham's case in the Kentucky courts. See infra notes
177-8o and accompanying text (regarding Chancellor Henry Bibb) and notes 197-200, 250
and accompanying texts (regarding Court of Appeals Judge Thomas Marshall). Another guest
was John J. Crittenden, who stayed at Graham Springs while he was Governor of Kentucky,
SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 105, at 45-46, and who would later be Graham's lawyer in
the U.S. Supreme Court. See infra note 29o and accompanying text.
iI6 Proprietors of Kentucky's springs hotels made "lavish ... claims for the mineral waters,
some of which were pronounced 'most efficacious in restoring delicate females to health and
vigor.' A number allegedly restored 'vigor and buoyancy to the diseased constitutions."'
SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 105, at 41 (quoting ads appearing in a Frankfort newspaper
in 1837 and a Lexington newspaper in 1845).
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very comfortable cabins."117 Guests were provided room and board for $5.00
per week," 8 which would be the equivalent today of about $125 (using
a conversion factor of $1 in 1841 for just over $24.50 in 2007 dollars). 1 9
According to one well-traveled guest, "The table is the best that I have
ever sat down to at any place."'' 0
Dr. Graham was a genial host,' whose establishment provided, in
addition to the baths and various other day-time activities, many after-
dinner entertainments, including a weekly cotillion conducted by a
"professor of dancing," performances by traveling actors, and, relevant here,
a "splendid band of music."' 2 During the day, this band was stationed in a
stand on the grounds: "before daylight you are awakened by the delightful
music which continues until night, when it is moved to a most splendid
ball-room where you enter dazzled by the glittering lights and interesting
company." '' 3 As for the slave musicians:
Dr. Graham's three slave boys composed the house orchestra, competing
with the professional actors for the entertainment spotlight of the resort.
George, Henry and Reuben's musical abilities were well known throughout
the South, and for years they furnished the music for the gay dances and
cotillions held in the large ballroom at the Springs. During the fall and winter
months, Dr. Graham allowed them to go to Louisville and Lexington to play
for hire at fashionable dances and balls. In addition, they were excellent
waiters; from their long experience at Graham Springs, their services were
much in demand in the wealthy homes of the Bluegrass and on Kentucky
and Ohio river steamboats.'24
1'7 Id. at z8.
18 Id. at 39.
I I9 Calculation, based on changes in the Consumer Price Index, performed by the
Author on July IO, 2oo8, using the "Measuring Worth" section of the "How Much Is That?"
Web site. Measuring Worth, Relative Value of U.S. Dollars, http://www.measuringworth.com/
uscompare/ (last visited July 10, 2008).
120 SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 105, at 27. The young lady quoted in the text was
particularly enamored of the fact that "ice-cream in profusion" was available. Id.
Graham, at least in his early inn-keeping days, was concerned about guests making off
with food, admonishing the public: "Should there be found any one so regardless of their
own character, so inconsiderate and so unjust as to take board out of this establishment, such
are requested to avoid the society of the Springs, the pleasure of the walks and the use of
the waters." Id. at 40 (quoting an 1828 advertisement for Graham Springs in a Lexington
newspaper).
121 Id. at 27,45.
122 Id. at 27. "The evening meal was at seven and dancing began at eight." Id. at 43.
123 Id. at 27 (quoting a young female guest). "The ball-room at night was a scene of
enchantment; old Dr. Graham, the proprietor, was the master of ceremonies and the life of the
party." Id. at 29 (same).
124 Id. at 44.
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In 1837, Graham sent two of these slaves, Henry and Reuben, "to live
with Williams, a free man of color, to learn music."' At the time, Williams
led a band operated out of Louisville and made up of slaves, free blacks,
and German immigrants."2 6 When Graham sent his slaves to Williams, he
signed a paper "to give liberty to my boys Henry and Reuben, to go to
Louisville with Williams, and play with him till I may wish to call them
home."1"7 This paper authorized Williams "to take them to Cincinnati,
New Albany, or to any part of the south, even so far as New Orleans."',,
While Henry and Reuben were with Williams, they went two or three
times to New Albany (an Indiana town just across the Ohio River from
Louisville), once or twice to Madison, Indiana (a town just across the Ohio
River between Louisville and Cincinnati), and once to Cincinnati, "playing
as musicians, at balls or other entertainments at those places."' 19 Whether
125 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 174 (Ky. 1844). This must have
been soon after Graham purchased them. See supra note i6 para. 2 (giving November 28,
1836, as the date that Graham purchased Henry and Reuben). At the time, Williams was one
of the 5000-7000 "free colored" living in Kentucky, who made up about one percent of the
state's overall population. See KENNEDY, supra note 16, at 603-04.
126 Interview with Pen Bogert, Reference Specialist, Filson Historical Soc'y Library,
Louisville, Ky., in Louisville, Ky. (June 16, 2oo6) [hereinafter Bogert Interview].
127 Graham's paper provided in its entirety:
Harrodsburg, August 3oth, 1837.
This is to give liberty to my boys Henry and Reuben, to go to Louisville,
with Williams, and play with him till I may wish to call them home.
Should Williams find it in his interest to take them to Cincinnati, New
Albany, or to any part of the south, even so far as New Orleans, he is at
liberty to do so. I receive no compensation for their services, except that
he is to board and clothe them.
My object is to have them well trained in music. They are young, one
17 and the other 19 years of age. They are both of good disposition
and strictly honest, and such is my confidence in them that I have no
fear that they will ever act knowing wrong, or put me to trouble.-They
are slaves for life, and I paid for them an unusual sum; they have been
faithful hard-working servants, and I have no fear but that they will
always be true to their duty, no matter in what situations they may be
placed.
C GRAHAM, M.D.
P.S. Should they not attend properly to their music, or disobey Williams,
he is not only at liberty but requested to bring them directly home.
C. GRAHAM
Exhibit A. No. 2, filed by defendants, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 14.
128 Id.
129 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 174-75 (Ky. 1844); see also
Deposition of M. D. Blaique, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 52-53 (testifying, in a
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George went with them during some of these trips was disputed. 130 In any
event, the slaves' time with Williams and their out-of-state sojourns with
him ended about two years prior to their escape in early 1841. During
the next two years, their time was divided between Graham's resort in
Harrodsburg "during the watering season" and another of Graham's homes
in Lexington, from where they were at "liberty to go to the neighboring
towns to play as musicians, and to give their master what they made beyond
their expenses."131
The slaves' "running off" in 1841 imposed a "great loss" on Dr. Graham,
"for he, notwithstanding the high prices he has had to pay for music ever
since, has never been able to procure a band of music that gave the same
satisfaction to his company, or that managed the ball-room with anything
like the same skill." 131 Still, Graham Springs continued to flourish for many
deposition given by a Cincinnati woman who operated dancing schools there and in Madison,
Indiana, that Reuben, Henry, and George had played at Cincinnati "at a ball given by me in
May, 1837" and also in Madison, Indiana, "the same season.., at a ball given there by me");
Thomas Riddell's deposition, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 53-54 (testifying that
Reuben and Henry played two or three times in New Albany, Indiana, "during the Christmas
holydays [sic] of 1837").
130 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5. B. Mon.) at 175; see also depositions cited supra
note 129. Eventually, the trial court found that George was not authorized by Graham to travel
outside the state, as Reuben and Henry had been. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying
texts.
131 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) at 175. The three often earned $50
or more ($IZZ5 in today's dollars, see supra text accompanying note 119) for a single night's
performance. See Depositions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 90 (testifying that a
Harrodsburg tavern keeper had "paid the sum of $50 for their services one night at a ball, and
that that sum was not an unusual price to be paid for them"); id. at 11z (testifying that Graham
"was in the habit of getting for their services from $50 to $75 per night, at large balls and
parties, and that was a customary sum for their services"); id. at 133 (testifying that students at
near-by Bacon College had "paid to. Dr. Graham the sum of $5o for the services of said boys,
to play for them on a public occasion" and that deponent's "father paid the sum of $55 for said
slaves to play one single night, for a ball at his father's house, in the town of Harrodsburg").
It was not unusual for Kentucky slaves to be hired out to earn money for their owners.
See, e.g., SLAVERY TIMES, supra note 3 1, at 123-26; FROST, supra note 67, at 76. In the process,
slaves might even earn a little money for themselves (e.g., for overtime work), and some
accumulated enough funds to buy their own freedom. SLAVERY TIMES, supra note 3 1, at 125.
One Kentucky slave put up for sale in 1849 was described as a "very good rough lawyer...
not fitted to practice in the Court of Appeals or in the Court of Chancery, but take him in a
common law case, or a six-penny trial before a County Magistrate and 'he can't be beat."' Id.
at 127 (quoting a slave ad in a Louisville newspaper captioned "Negro Lawyer at Auction").
132 Peter Davis' deposition, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 101-02; see also
Deposition of H.S. McFatridge, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at io8 (testifying, in
1845, that Graham "incurred an expense annually, of at least five or six hundred dollars, in
procuring music competent to fill their place, and yet the same satisfaction has never been
given to his visitors"); Deposition of Chr. Chinn, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 117
(testifying, in 1845, "that the loss of said slaves has been a serious one to [Graham's] watering
place, and that in my estimation they were superior musicians to any other band [Graham] has
ever had at his watering place, either French or German"); Deposition of Joseph A. Thompson,
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years thereafter. During the off-season of 1842-43, Graham erected an even
more "elegant and commodious brick hotel," a "splendid building, costing
upwards of $30,000," four stories high, and "now capable of accommodating
one thousand persons." 13 3 In 1853, Graham sold the resort and thereafter
successfully pursued other ventures.I 34 He died in Louisville in 1885 a few
months after celebrating his 1 0 0 ,h birthday.
135
2. The Slaves' Escape.-In late 1840 and early 1841, Graham was spending the
off-season in New Orleans, 13 6 while George, Reuben, and Henry remained
at home, helping to entertain President-elect Harrison in Lexington 37 and
playing at various other events in central Kentucky.'38 Eventually they went
to Louisville, 13 9 from where they decided to escape from their Kentucky
Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 122 ("the loss sustained by complainant [Graham],
by their running off, has been of great disadvantage to the watering place of complainant; and
their place has never been supplied by any music he has been able to obtain, at from five to
six hundred dollars per season").
133 SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 105, at 41-42 (quoting a Graham Springs ad in
an 1845 Lexington newspaper). Using the conversion factor of $1.OO/$24.5o, see supra text
accompanying note 119, the $30,000 in renovations would cost about $735,000 today.
134 SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 105, at 79 (reporting that Graham sold the resort
"[alt the height of its prosperity in May, 1853 .... to the United States of America for one
hundred thousand dollars . . . to be used as a United States Asylum for aged and invalid
soldiers"). After the main building burned in 1856, the government moved the old soldiers to
a facility in Washington, D.C., and sold the Kentucky property. Id. at 79, 85. In I9I 1, a new
owner revived the resort, but this business failed in 1934, and the property was eventually sold
for use as a hospital. Id. at 85, 96-97.
After Graham sold the resort, he "traded in Mexico, and engaged in business successfully
in various parts of the West and South, accumulating a large fortune." T IE BIOGRAPHICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KENTUCKY OF THE DEAD AND LIVING MEN OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
439 (1878) [hereinafter KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL]. At the age of ninety, he was described in a
contemporary book as residing "in Louisville, and is engaged with much of his former zest in
every good word and work," id., which included doing research and writing about the history
of Kentucky's early days. See LOUISVILLE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note io8, at 350.
135 See LOUISVILLE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note io8, at 350.
136 See Harvey McFatridge's deposition retaken and Deposition of George P. Richardson,
Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 35, 38.
137 See SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 105, at 44 (reporting that, in connection with
an early 1841 visit to Lexington by William Henry Harrison to confer with his fellow-Whig
Henry Clay after the former's election as president, "Dr. Graham's musical waiters were sent
over from Harrodsburg to assist in receiving the aged President-elect").
138 See Harvey McFatridge's deposition retaken and Deposition of George P. Richardson,
Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 35, 37-38.
139 See Deposition of George P. Richardson, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at
38.
Deponent ... was engaged in teaching classes in dancing, in Louisville;
that knowing the said boys to be fine musicians, he saw Reuben the
leader with them, and invited them to come to his class-room to play for
his pupils, which he promised to do, but they did not come; deponent
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bondage.' In Louisville, they boarded the steamboat Pike4' for its regular
one-day trip to Cincinnati, probably sometime in late January of 1841.142
The Pike's captain, John Armstrong, had "a universal custom never to take
a negro away from Louisville on board said boat, unless with his master,
or unless some reference is made to some good and respectable citizen
of Louisville." 143 However, Graham's slaves, who may have traveled on
then went to Williams and inquired where the boys were; Williams could
not inform deponent, but said that the boys were shy of him.
Id.
14o Another slave later wrote that, while in Louisville, he:
met three slaves of Doctor Graham, of Harrodsburg, Kentucky. Their
names were Henry, Reuben, and George; all smart, fine fellows, good
musicians and yielding the doctor a handsome income.... "Now," said
I, "boys, is the time to strike for liberty. I go for Ohio to-morrow. What
say you?" They pondered the question, and we all determined to start,
as a company of musicians, to attend a great ball in Cincinnati-and,
sure enough, it was the grandest ball we ever played for.
LEWIS CLARKE & MILTON CLARKE, NARRATIVES OF THE SUFFERINGS OF LEWIS AND MILTON
CLARKE, SONS OF A SOLDIER OF THE REVOLUTION, DURING A CAPTIVITY OF MORE THAN TWENTY
YEARS AMONG THE SLAVEHOLDERS OF KENTUCKY, ONE OF THE So CALLED CHRISTIAN STATES OF
NORTH AMERICA 82-83 (1846).
141 The Pike, according to its owners, "has, ever since she was built, except when
prevented by ice or low water, been engaged as a regular mail packet between Louisville
and Cincinnati, leaving each city every alternative day, except for a short time in 1840 .... "
Answer of Strader and Gorman, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 13. The Pike began
this service about 1839. See Deposition of Alfred Downing, Supreme Court Record, supra
note 90, at 51.
142 Witnesses varied as to the exact date that George, Reuben, and Henry made their
journey from Louisville to Cincinnati aboard the Pike. See Deposition of H S. McFatridge,
Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 24 ("about the 23d of January, 1841"); Deposition
of W.W. Collins, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 30 ("between the 25th and 3oth of
that month [January, 1841]"); Deposition of Jacob Hinkle, Supreme Court Record, supra note
90, at 32 ("the latter part of the month of January, A.D. 1841"); Deposition H.S. McFatridge,
Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 1o9 ("they went off [on the Pike] on the 9th of
January, year 1841"); id. at I 12 ("in the trip of the steamboat Pike of the 23d of the month
of January, 1841"); Deposition of Roger Turner, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at z8
("some time in the month of February, 1841"); Deposition of George N. Cardwell, Supreme
Court Record, supra note 9o, at 93 ("about the month of February, 1841").
143 Deposition of John Armstrong, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 44. Other
witnesses confirmed that this was Captain Armstrong's policy and that the Pike's officers
were "very particular" about enforcing this policy. See Depositions, Supreme Court Record,
supra note 90, at 45-46, 48-49, 51, 138. As the Pike's clerk testified: "We never carry them
unless we know them to be free, or travelling in company with their masters, or some person
of respectability. We do not take written evidence of their freedom, unless we know the
signature. We pay no attention to the common free papers that blacks carry, knowing that so
many of them are forged." Deposition of Charles C. Bacon, Supreme Court Record, supra
note 90, at 47.
Indeed, another runaway slave, who initially fled on the Pike along with George,
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the Pike before as part of Williams's band, 144 were able to go to Cincinnati
without being challenged, "whence they escaped to Canada."'' 41 (Slavery
in Canada had been abolished years before.")
Kentucky slaves who managed to get into Ohio were still subject to
retrieval by their owners. Cincinnati and other Ohio River towns included
both bounty-hunters who sought to capture and return such slaves1
47
and also abolitionists whose Underground Railroad "stations" would
temporarily hide runaways while they considered whether to travel farther
north to permanent freedom in Canada. 48 Indeed, sometimes the same
person would help slaves escape and then "capture" and return them to
Kentucky for the ransom.' 49 Whether a large or small number of Kentucky
Reuben, and Henry, was later apprehended on a second trip aboard that boat and returned to
Kentucky:
[T]he boy Albert, who belonged to Mrs. Littell, of Louisville, and went
off at the same time and in company with the slaves in controversy, and
afterwards recovered from Canada, and sold in the South, having made
his escape to Louisville, took passage again on the same steamboat
Pike, and passed up the river on her as far as Carrolton, when he was
discovered by some gentlemen to be a runaway slave, and lodged in the
jail at Carrolton, by some one at that place, and afterward brought to
Louisville, and there lodged in jail, when his master removed him ....
Deposition of James S. Graham, Supreme Court Record, supra note go, at 84.
144 See Deposition of Alfred Downing, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 51
(testifying that, as the Pike's clerk in 1839 and I84o , he frequently saw Williams travel on the
Pike with two mulatto musicians as part of his band: "They paid no passage, but were in the
habit of playing on said boat. The captain of said boat told deponent to let them pass on the
boat whenever they pleased, that they had a proper pass. They played on the boat for their
passage.").
145 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 173 (Ky. 1844); see also infra
notes 152-61 and accompanying texts.
146 Upper Canada-today's Ontario-banned slavery by a provincial statute passed in
the 179OS. See FROST, supra note 67, at 24; see also id. at 221-33 (describing an 1833 Ontario case
that refused to return a Kentucky slave couple who had escaped to that part of Canada). As for
the rest of Canada, the British Parliament outlawed slavery in most parts of the British Empire,
including all of Canada, in the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833,3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73 (Eng.), which
became effective in 1834. See Canada, History of, in 3 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 145 (2003);
Slavery, in 17 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 504 (2003).
147 See, e.g., SLAVERY TIMES, supra note 3 1, at 203-04, 207-12, 238.
148 Some of the drama of these activities is captured in ANN HAGEDORN, BEYOND THE
RIVER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE HEROES OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (2002). See
also SLAVERY TIMES, supra note 31, at 218-44; FROST, supra note 67, at 241-44 (describing
Underground Railroad activities in Canada).
Harriett Beecher Stowe, a Cincinnati native, based her classic Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852)
on reports of the lives of slaves in the Maysville, Kentucky, area and on the activities of an
abolitionist Underground Railroad stop operated by Rev. John Rankin in Ripley, Ohio, across
the river north of Maysville. See SLAVERY TIMES, supra note 31, at 238-39.
149 See 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 807.
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slaves crossed the Ohio River as fugitives during this period-as George,
Reuben, and Henry did-is a matter of dispute among modern historians,10
but it is certain that thousands of American slaves did run away to freedom
in Canada during the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s.1s1
The details of Dr. Graham's slaves' journey to Canada are not known,
I5
1
but he went to extraordinary lengths to retrieve them.113 He first sent his
son, James, to search for them in Cincinnati.154 When this failed, Graham
hired three men to join him in a month-long pursuit of the slaves, which
started with a trip aboard the Pike from Louisville to Cincinnati."'5 This
150 Compare HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 171 (arguing that the "number of
runaways and the role of the Underground Railroad have been greatly exaggerated" and citing
figures showing that, in 185o "when Kentucky had nearly 211,000 slaves, only 96 fugitives
were reported"), with CLARK, supra note 14, at 208 (noting estimates, circa 1850, "that Kentucky
lost nearly 2o,ooo slaves annually" through the Underground Railroad); See also 2 CONNELLEY
& COULTER, supra note 13, at 805-07 (contending that the number of fugitive slaves from
Kentucky crossing the Ohio River "greatly increased" in the latter 183os, that "the number
of slaves carried away increased by leaps and bounds, beginning in 184t," and that "losses to
Kentucky in runaway slaves was said to be $2oo,ooo annually"); supra note 90 (discussing the
number of runaway slaves from Kentucky).
151 See, e.g., HAGEDORN, supra note 148, at 214 ("By the early 184os, there were
approximately fifteen thousand former [slave] runaways living in Canada"); see also FROST,
supra note 67, at 226 (describing how "hundreds of [black] families [went] north" into Canada
in the early I83Os); infra note 161 (noting that some 2o,ooo ex-slaves lived in Canada in
185o).
152 According to another runaway slave who traveled with them on the Pike- "We came to
Cincinnati, and the friends there advised us to go farther north. Doctor Graham's boys struck
for Canada, while I stopped at Oberlin, Ohio." CLARKE & CLARKE, supra note 140, at 83.
153 Graham seems to have known immediately that the slaves were engaged in an
escape attempt through Cincinnati. Bogert Interview, supra note 126. For example, he
did not bother to place any ads in the local Louisville newspapers seeking their return. Id.
(describing Bogert's detailed study of ads for runaway slaves in the two Louisville newspapers
of that time, the Louisville Public Advertiser and the Louisville Daily Journal). Furthermore, by
early March, he had confirmed, through a conversation with the Pike's captain, that the latter
"had taken Dr. Graham's slaves from Louisville to Cincinnati, on the steamboat Pike ... 
Harvey McFatridge's deposition, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 24.
154 Depositions of James S. Graham, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 25, 32,
83.
155 See Deposition of Isaac C. Vanarsdale, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9 o , at
97. Apparently, the reason Graham chose to travel on the Pike was to surreptitiously gather
evidence about the Pike's role in the slaves' escape. According to one of Graham's hired
companions:
[Clomplainant [Graham] conversed with some of the hands on said boat,
and ascertained the fact [that the slaves had earlier been on the Pike
during their escape], and drew Captain Armstrong, the commander of
the boat, into conversation in relation to them in my presence, who not
knowing complainant or his object, conversed freely in relation to them,
and admitted the fact, that they had gone from Louisville to Cincinnati
on said boat in my presence.... [Clomplainant asked whether they were
free or not; the captain then replied, that from their general appearance
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expedition followed the slaves' trail through various Ohio towns and ended
up in Detroit,116 from where Graham crossed the river into Canada and
tried to persuade the slaves to return to Kentucky. 5 7 Once on the Canadian
side, Graham claimed to have been set upon and nearly killed by a mob
of fugitive slaves, l"' but other accounts paint quite a different picture.'59
and fine style they played, that he thought they were free, but afterwards,
understood they belonged to some gentleman owning a watering place
in Kentucky; complainant asked him whether they exhibited any pass
or free papers; to which the captain replied, that supposing them to be
free he did not ask them for any pass; complainant having ascertained
what trip they went up the river, went to the register, and called several
others, as well as myself, to aid him in getting the names of passengers
and their residence, who had been on board said boat the same trip,
that he might be able to obtain additional proof; seeing us thus engage,
suspicion arose among the officers of said boat of what we were after;
the clerk came and abruptly snatched the register from the table while
complainant was examining it, saying that it was his property, and locked
it up in his counting-room.
Deposition of H.S. McFatridge, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 1o9.
156 See Harvey McFatridge's deposition, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 24
(described infra note 157); id. at 34 (testifying that Graham's company pursuing the slaves
"had previously search [sic] through many of the towns of Ohio" and thereafter "remained in
Detroit between ten and twelve days" prior to complainant's foray into Canada); Depositions
of Isaac C. Vanarsdale, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 27 (testifying that Graham
took "three men with him, deponent being one of the three men; that they were gone near
about one month, travelling [sic] night and day.... [and] he received two dollars per day, and
expenses borne"); id. at 97 ("We [expected] to overtake them at Oberlin, in Ohio, but finding
that they had left that place, we pursued them to Sandusky, and other points, to Detroit,
where we ascertained they had crossed into Canada.").
157 See Harvey McFatridge's deposition, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 24
(testifying that McFatridge and two others "accompanied complainant as far as Detroit, where
he remained until complainant crossed over to Canada ... in pursuit of said slaves").
158
Dr. Graham followed his runaway slaves to their Canadian destination,
and near Malden he was mobbed by a band of fugitive slaves. He
probably would have lost his life in the struggle had it not been for the
gallant rescue by General Ironsides, half-brother of the famous Indian
chief Tecumseh. The genial doctor from Harrodsburg returned home
"without his sleeves, lucky, so he said, that he had escaped from the fiery
fiends of perdition."
SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY, supra note io5, at 45.
159 According to an 1846 book written by an ex-Kentucky slave who had traveled with
George, Reuben, and Henry during the early part of their escape, but was not an eyewitness
to the Canadian encounter:
It was well they did [go beyond Ohio to Canada], for the doctor was
close upon them, offering a large reward. He reached Detroit within
a few hours after they had crossed the ice to Malden [in Canada]. He
attempted to hire some one [sic] to go over, and capture them; no one
would attempt this. He hired a man, at last, to go over and hire them
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In any event, Graham's slaves refused his entreaties. They also rebuffed
a final effort by Graham who, after returning to Kentucky, hired "a free
man of color, named Shelton Morris, who lives in Louisville, who went to
Canada for the purpose of inducing said slaves to return home." 60 As far as
we know, George, Reuben, and Henry spent the rest of their lives as free
men in Canada.
161
to get on a boat, and go to Toledo, to play for a ball. Doctor Graham
was to be in the boat, when it touched at Malden. For some reason,
the boys were quite cautious, and very reluctant to go. When the wolf
in sheep's clothing offered them five hundred dollars to go and play for
one ball, they were more suspicious than ever. When the boat touched
at the wharf, the boys were on the wharf, playing a gypsy waltz, a great
favorite of Doctor Graham's. When the doctor found his plan did not
work, sure enough, he came out to hear his favorite singers. He landed,
and spent several days in fruitless endeavors to persuade them to return
to Kentucky.
CLARKE & CLARKE, supra note 140, at 83. See also Deposition of Isaac C. Vanarsdale, Supreme
Court Record, supra note 90, at 27 (testifying that Graham "raised a company of about thirty
persons, and went to Maulden, having engaged an agent in Canada to bring the said slaves
on board the chartered boat when she landed at Malden; but the plan was defeated by being
betrayed, and that they did not get possession of the slaves, but returned home without
them.").
At Detroit we remained about ten days, -laying plans and making
arrangements for the purpose of recovering said slaves; ... complainant
[Graham] then chartered a steamboat with officers and strong guard on
board, having engaged an agent who pledged, upon being well paid, that
he would bring them on board said boat at the wharf in Malden, but said
agent betrayed the trust reposed in him, so that, upon the arrival of said
boat, a mob of some hundred were collected upon the wharf, and it was
with some difficulty the boat escaped. Complainant having been left
alone in the midst of them, remained some three or four days, and upon
his return we came home unsuccessful ....
Deposition of H.S. McFatridge, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at lo.
16o Deposition of H.S. McFatridge, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 24.
According to this deposition, the slaves had written a letter to Dr. Graham "in which they
informed [Graham] if he would send Shelton Morris to Canada, with money to bear their
expenses home, they would return with him." Id. Other witnesses confirmed Graham's
employment of Morris in this unsuccessful endeavor. See Depositions, Supreme Court
Record, supra note 9o , at 26, 86,91-92, 98, i io.
161 One account of the slaves' early days in Canada noted that there was a local election
going on at the time, "and the negroes being privileged to vote; great excitement prevailed.
That Col. Prince, the successful candidate for the provincial parliament of Canada, had
engaged said boys Reuben, Henry, and George to play at the polls in Alinson, opposite to
Detroit, during said election." Deposition of Isaac C. Vanarsdale, Supreme Court Record,
supra note 90, at 27.
For a contemporary description of the living conditions of the estimated 20,ooo escaped
slaves and their children who were residing in Canada a few years after these events, see
the 185o letter by Gerrit Smith, one of these ex-slaves, STANLEY HARROLD, ThE RiSE OF
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B. The Trial Court Proceedings
1. The Parties and their Claims.-On September 16, 1841, Dr. Graham filed
a "Bill" in the Louisville Chancery Court 16 against the Pike and its owner,
Strader & Gorman, a partnership comprised of Jacob Strader and James
Gorman, both citizens of Ohio. 163 The original sworn bill was signed on
Graham's behalf by his son James and was filed by the Louisville lawyers
Guthrie & Tyler. 64 The Pike, whose role as a defendant was reflected in
the fact that the case's title at this stage was Graham v. Steamboat Pike,
16
1
AGGRESSIVE ABOLITIONISM 189-91 (2004) (describing a few years after these events in); see
also John Davis Smith, Slavery andAntislavery, in OUR KENTUCKY: A STUDY OF THE BLUEGRASS
STATE 112-13 (James C. Klotter ed., 2d ed. 2ooo) (setting forth an 1859 letter from an escaped
slave in Canada to his former master in Springfield, Kentucky, asking for the release of his
wife and children).
162 The Louisville Chancery Court was created by the Legislature in 1835 to "have all
the equitable and chancery jurisdiction which the Jefferson circuit court now has." KY. LAws
157 (Loughborough 1842). Appeals from judgments of the Louisville Chancery Court were
to be to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Id. at 162 (section 18). A provision specifying how
to add additional parties was added as part of a series of amendments to the original enabling
act passed in 1839. Id. at 164 (section 4). Uniform rules governing chancery proceedings had
been established by the Legislature in 1796. See I WILLIAM LITTELL, THE STATUTE LAW OF
KENTUCKY 519 (1809).
163 See Bill, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 6.
The original documents of the trial court proceedings in this case are still available for
inspection at the Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, in Frankfort, Kentucky,
at Location #B-58--F-S-C, Box 45, Case No. 3225 (Louisville Chancery Court). The original
documents of the antebellum Kentucky Court of Appeals were lost in a fire in 1864. Interview
with Mark Stone, Supervisor, State Archives Ctr., Ky. Dep't for Libraries and Archives,
Frankfort, Ky. (Sept. 7, 2005). In this Article, all references to the Kentucky trial and appellate
court documents are to their printed versions in the record of the case in the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o.
164 See Bill, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 6. The key member of this firm
was James Guthrie, a "leading citizen" of Louisville whose earlier firm of Guthrie & Bullock
had been "the most prominent law firm in all Louisville." FROST, supra note 67, at io6, 128.
Guthrie had been a member of both Houses of the Kentucky General Assembly and would
go on to preside over Kentucky's constitutional convention in 1849 and become Treasury
Secretary under President Pierce (1853-57). See LOUISVILLE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note io8,
at 362-63. A pro-slavery Democrat, Guthrie supported the Union during the Civil War and
served as a U.S. Senator from 1865 until a year before his death in 1869. Idat 363. Some years
after representing Dr. Graham, Guthrie took the other side in a steamboat case involving
escaped slaves, unsuccessfully representing the steamboat defendants there. See McFarland
v. McKnight, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 500, 514 (Ky. 1846).
I65 See, e.g., Order Filing Strader and Gorman's Answer, Supreme Court Record, supra
note 90, at 12.
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was seized, 166 with the possibility that it would be sold to satisfy Graham's
claim.
1 67
Graham's suit was based on the Kentucky statute passed in 1824 that
made the owners, master, and boat subject to civil liability for taking slaves
"out of the limits of this state" without the owner's permission.1 68 The suit
claimed $1500 for each slave (about $36,750 today169) and other damages, 7 '
which eventually included $250 for the musical instruments and books they
took with them and $700-$1000 that Graham had expended "in fruitless
efforts to recover them."'
171
Defendants Strader and Gorman were represented by an experienced
Louisville lawyer, Garnett Duncan, 7 ' who had also represented Strader
166 Seizure of the Pike took some time. The plaintiff's first effort to do so began a few days
after the Bill's filing on September 23, 1841, but this and two subsequent efforts failed when
the Marshal reported that the boat was "not found." See Marshal's Returns, Supreme Court
Record, supra note 90, at 8-io. The fourth attempt succeeded, with the Marshal reporting on
November 26, 1841, that he "levied same day on the steamboat Pike, her engine, furniture,
&c.; and John Armstrong, captain of said boat, gave bond as required [$5,000], with Charles
M. Strader, as security, and restored them the boat." Id. at I I; see also id. at 16 (describing, in
the Chancellor's subsequent opinion, that "[t]he boat was arrested in the port of Louisville,
on the 2 6 1h November, 1841").
This was not the first time that the Pike had been seized, nor Strader threatened with a
damage judgment, in such a case. See Strader v. Fore, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 123 (Ky. 1841) (further
described infra note 173).
167 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 176 (Ky. 1844).
168 Seesupra notes 66-67 and accompanying texts.
169 Based on the conversion factor of $i.oo/$24.5o, described supra text accompanying
note I 19. This was substantially more than the average price of a slave in those days. "During
the first third of the nineteenth century, a male slave in the prime working years of eighteen
to thirty-five might cost $400-700 in Kentucky." HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note I5, at
168. Witnesses for Dr. Graham testified that the price of a common field hand in the early
184os was in the $8oo-$1o6o range. See Depositions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90,
at 24 ($800), 105 ($IOOO), 112 (from $800 to $iooo), 127 ($iooo), 132 ($o6o);seealso id. at 121
(testifying that the deponent had "paid for a boy without any of their qualifications, the sum of
$ i,o6o in the year 1840" and opining that "the value of the slaves in controversy was enhanced
one hundred per cent., in consequence of their high musical attainments").
170 See Bill, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 6.
171 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 173 (Ky. 1844).
172 See Answer of Strader and Gorman, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 13
(listing "Duncan & Ripley, P.Q." as the defendants' lawyers); see also Defendants' exception
to depositions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 74 (listing "Duncan & Ripley, P.Q." as
the defendants' lawyers); Defendants' exception to deposition offered and rejected, Supreme
Court Record, supra note 9o, at 81 (listing "Duncan & Ripley, P.Q." as the defendants'
lawyers).
As these filings show, Duncan practiced in a partnership with a lawyer named Ripley,
but Duncan was apparently the defendants' main lawyer, as evidenced by the fact that he is
listed alone as handling the Kentucky appeals (see Strader's assignment of errors, Supreme
Court Record, supra note go, at 56 (listing "Duncan" for Strader in the first appeal); Errors,
Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 146 (listing "Duncan, P.Q." for the appellants in
the second appeal)) and also as participating in the U.S. Supreme Court litigation. See infra
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in another escaped-slave case involving the Pike. 73 On March 4, 1842,
Duncan filed an answer for the defendants, generally denying that they
had any personal knowledge of the slaves' transport on the Pike and also
alleging that the slaves had become "free negroes" based on their prior
travels as authorized by Graham.
74
Later in March, the defendants filed an amended answer that more
specifically alleged grounds for the slaves' freedom and attached as an
exhibit the 1837 letter from Graham to Williams authorizing the slaves'
travels in Ohio and Indiana.17 - The U.S. Supreme Court's ability to review
this case would eventually turn on the defendants' argument that the
slaves had become free as a result of their prior travels in these two states,
text accompanying note 289 (noting the defendants' counsel's use of Duncan's brief in the
Supreme Court); see also Defendants' exceptions to deposition offered and rejected, Supreme
Court Record, supra note 90, at 81 (listing first "Duncan & Ripley" and then "Duncan" alone
as the defendants' lawyer).
Garnett Duncan became a member of the Kentucky bar in 1823. He would later serve
one term in the U.S. Congress (1847-49, the same term as Abraham Lincoln's, see infra note
262) and teach law at the University of Louisville (1846-47) when the Legislature, by Act of
Feb. 7, 1846, established there a "professor of the science of law, its history, and the law of
nations." LEVIN, supra note 77, at 165, 768.
Duncan's partner was apparently Charles Ripley, a Louisville lawyer who later became a
state senator (1855-59), see 2 COLLINS & COLLINS, supra note 11 o, at 357, and thereafter served
on two committees in early 1861 whose purpose was to emphasize Kentucky's neutrality in
the impending conflict between the Lincoln Administration and southern secessionists. Iid.
at 67-68.
173 See Strader v. Fore, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 123, 126 (Ky. 184). In this case, Duncan
convinced the Court of Appeals to reverse a slave owner's jury verdict against the Pike on the
ground that the suit should not have been brought only against the steamship:
without making the owner or any officer of the boat a party to the bill..
.. Strader, the owner of the steamboat in this case, ought to have been
made a defendant to the bill, and the Chancellor erred in overruling his
application to be permitted to make himself a party and defend the suit.
And we are of the opinion also, that if the owner was not on the boat at
the time of the alleged wrong, and be not, therefore, personally liable
therefor [sic], the master or other person who is personally responsible,
should also be made a defendant, for otherwise it might be possible that
damages may be assessed and enforced against the innocent owner of
the boat without any notice to the only individual personally responsible
for the alleged injury, and as against whom, therefore, the evidence
taken in this case would be unavailing and inadmissible, in a suit by the
owner for restitution or indemnity.
Id. at 124-26.
Duncan's practice also included successfully representing at least one slave owner in such
a case. See McFarland v. McKnight, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 500,514 (Ky. 1846) (listing "Pirtle and
Duncan" as representing the winning plaintiff).
174 See Answer of Strader and Gorman, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 12-13.
175 See Amended Answer, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 13-14.
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whose anti-slavery status derived from the Northwest Ordinance and its
re-enactment as an early U.S. statute.176
2. Pre-Trial Proceedings and Decision.-The trial court proceedings yielded
a mixed result. They were presided over by Chancellor George M. Bibb,
"one of the legal giants of Kentucky" during the first half of the nineteenth
century. 77 Bibb was born in 1776 in Virginia, where he practiced for a
short time before moving to Lexington, Kentucky, in 1798. He was twice
appointed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, serving in 1808-10 and
1827-29 (including periods as the chief justice during both tenures) and
was also twice elected to the U.S. Senate (1811-14 and 1829-35). When
the Louisville Chancery Court was created in 1835, 17 Bibb became its first
chancellor. He served until 1844, when President Tyler appointed him
Secretary of the Treasury.
1 79
Pursuant to Chancellor Bibb's orders, the parties took numerous
depositions from witnesses from early 1842 through the summer of 1843.180
Williams, the free black to whom Dr. Graham had entrusted Henry and
Reuben beginning in 1837, was not one of those deposed, presumably
because Kentucky law barred a negro from testifying in a case involving
whites. 8 Nor were depositions taken of the plaintiff or the individual
defendants, because in those days a person having an interest in a case was
not competent to testify.8 '
176 See Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 179. The Northwest
Ordinance and its re-enactment by the first Congress are described supra notes 20-24 and
accompanying texts.
177 LEVIN, supra note 77, at 76. The description of Bibb in the remainder of this textual
paragraph is from id. at 76-77, and KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL, supra note 134, at 394-95.
178 See supra note 162.
179 After the Tyler administration, Bibb remained in Washington and practiced law there
until he died in 1859, a period during which he was chief clerk of the Department of Justice
(essentially equivalent to being an assistant Attorney General today). LEVIN, supra note 77, at
77; see also SWISHER, supra note 4, at 779 (discussing an 1855 case that Bibb successfully argued
in the Supreme Court and describing him as "shrewd" and "a gentleman of the old school,
never having abandoned the garb of knee breeches in court appearances").
18o See Order, Leave Granted Complainant to Retake Depositions, and Order Opening
Commission, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 15; see also id. at 23-56 (setting forth a
total of twenty-five depositions taken by both sides).
181 See 2 LirrrELL & SWIGERT, supra note 36, at 115o (quoting section 2 of Kentucky's
1798 slave law as providing: "No negro or mulatto shall be a witness, except in pleas of the
commonwealth against negroes or mulattoes, or in civil pleas where negroes or mulattoes
alone shall be parties."); see also HARRISON & KLOTrER, supra note 15, at 169 (noting that, in
antebellum Kentucky, the "testimony of blacks was usually not accepted against whites").
182 Until well past the middle of the nineteenth century, courts in the United States
followed the common-law rule of excluding "testimony by parties to the lawsuit and all
persons with a direct pecuniary or propriety interest in the outcome." I KENNETH S. BROUN,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 313 (6th ed. 2006); see, e.g., Strader v. Graham, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.)
633, 634 (Ky. 1847) (upholding exclusion of defendant Armstrong's deposition on the ground
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At the conclusion of the deposition stage, Chancellor Bibb issued an
opinion that dismissed the claim as to Henry and Reuben on the ground
that the paper signed by Graham in 1837 when he sent them to Williams
had no time limit and therefore was sufficient authorization for the
defendants to transport them to Cincinnati.'83 As to George, Chancellor
Bibb "found no evidence of any license, permission, or liberty given, for
taking him on board and carrying him out of the limits and jurisdiction of
the State."' 4 Therefore, according to Bibb, the facts established that the
Pike and its owners were liable "for the damages thereby caused to the
plaintiff."' 5 Bibb ordered that a jury be empanelled "to ascertain such
facts as shall be submitted to them, respecting the asportation of the slave
George, and the damages to the plaintiff thereby."' 6 On March 1, 1844,
a twelve-man jury heard evidence that was limited to the depositions.'87
that "he was interested, and therefore incompetent, at the time"), aff'd, 51 U.S. (Io How.)
82 (1851). This disqualification was eventually lifted by statute in Kentucky. See JOHN D.
CARROLL, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CODES OF PRACTICE OF KENTUCKY § 605, at 478-79(6th ed. 1919)
(providing that, in general, "every person is competent to testify for himself or another").
183 See Chancellor's Opinion, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 17-18. This
opinion also ordered suppression of the deposition of the Pike's captain, John Armstrong, on
the ground that Armstrong was bound to the plaintiff based on the bond he had given when
the boat was originally seized. Id. at i8.
184 Id. at I8. As to the evidence that Williams "sometimes carried with him[] a third
musician," Bibb found that that person, being "described as a very black man," was not
George, who "is described by the witnesses as a yellow colored man." Id. See also Defendant's
instructions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 22 (finding "no evidence conducing to
prove" that Graham "permitted the slave George to go to Indiana or Ohio to perform services
as a musician").
185 Chancellor's Opinion, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 18.
This ruling suggests that the law under which Graham sued provided for what today
would be called "strict liability" (i.e., the defendants would be liable regardless of whether
they were negligent or not in checking whether George was authorized to travel out of the
state aboard the Pike); see also supra note 173 (noting that liability might be assessed "against
the innocent owner of the boat"); cf. infra note 239 (noting, in subsequent Kentucky Court of
Appeals' opinion, that the boat captain might be liable "for the loss which his act or neglect
occasioned"). Compare McFarland v. McKnight, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 5oo, 509 (Ky. 1846) (noting
that the offense in the steamboat statute "is in taking the slave on board the steam vessel and
transporting thereon and thereby. The transportation so done is the gist of the offense."),
with Singleton v. Carroll, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marshall) 527, 531-32 (Ky. 1831) (holding that one who
contracts with a slave owner for the services of a slave for a period of time is not liable to the
owner if the slave runs away without the hirer's negligence or fault).
I86 Decree, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at I8. The jury was presumably
empanelled pursuant to section 9of theAct of 1837, 1836 Ky. Acts IO6, which provided "The
damage sustained by the owner shall be ascertained in any proceeding in chancery, under
the .. .third section [referring to the substantive law], by a jury impanneled [sic] in the
court where the proceeding is instituted." C.A. WICKLIFFE, S. TURNER, & S.S. NICHOLAS, THE
REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY 143, 144 (1852).
187 See Order overruling defendants' motion for a new trial, Supreme Court Record,
supra note 9o, at 23. The twelve jurors' names are listed. Id. at 19, 20.
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After receiving instructions from Chancellor Bibb,58 the jury returned a
verdict for Dr. Graham for "one thousand dollars in damages." 189 Both
sides filed motions requesting a new trial-the defendants on a variety of
grounds and Graham on the ground that the verdict was "too small to be
justified by the evidence"-which Chancellor Bibb denied on March 5,
1844.190
C. The First Court of Appeals' Decision
1. Overview.-Both sides appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, then
the state's highest and only appellate court. 91 At this stage, Graham was
represented by new lawyers, Harlan & Craddock and Robertson. 19 The
188 The jury instructions caused a good deal of dispute, see Complainant's Instructions
to Jury and Defendant's Instructions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 20-22,
particularly as they related to damages. See, e.g., id. at 21 (determining to give an amended
version of Complainant's fourth proposed instruction to the effect that, in deciding George's
fair market value, the jury may take into account his "education and skill as a house servant,
or such like useful employment of labor,... but that skill in music is fanciful, and not to be
taken into account"); id. at 21 (determining to give a defendants' proposed instruction that the
jury "must compare the chances or probability of [George's] recapture with his value, and that
this value must be taken to be his fair market value, and not any fancy price that complainant
may have chosen to set upon him").
189 Verdict, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 23.
59o See Order Overruling Complainant's Motion for a New Trial and Order Overruling
Defendants' Motion for a New Trial, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 23.
19I Kentucky's first constitution provided that the state's judicial power "shall be vested
in one supreme court, which shall be styled the Court of Appeals, and in such inferior courts
as the Legislature may from time to time, ordain and establish." Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. V, §
1, reprintedin I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 781. The Judicial Article also provided for this court
of appeals to have "appellate jurisdiction.., with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the Legislature shall make." Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. V, §5, reprintedin I MIcHIE, supra note
25, at 782. On June z8, 1792, the legislature passed a law establishing the Court of Appeals.
See 1 LITrELL, supra note 162, at 1oi-10. This law was superseded by the Act of December
19, 1796, which provided, inter alia, that the court of appeals shall consist of a chief justice and
two judges (section i) and have jurisdiction to review decisions of inferior courts by appeal or
writ of error (section ii). Id. at 560-62. The second constitution, which became effective in
18oo and lasted until i85o, adopted the same basic features as the first constitution regarding
the court of appeals and also maintained all laws then in force. See Ky. CoNsT. of 1799, art.
IV, §§ 1, z, sched. (18oo) (setting forth Art IV, §§ 1 and 2, and "Schedule"), reprinted in 1
MICHIE, supra note 25, at 795, 8oo. As a result of a set of constitutional amendments that
became effective in 1976, Kentucky's highest court is now the Kentucky Supreme Court, with
the Kentucky Court of Appeals acting as an intermediate appellate court. See Ky. CONST. §§
109-124, reprintedin I MICHIE, supra note 25, 352-95 (setting forth §§ 109-124 of Kentucky's
current constitution).
192 See Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 187 (Ky. 1844); see also
Graham's assignment of errors, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o , at 57 (listing "Harlan
& Craddock" for Graham).
James Harlan was born in Mercer Country, Kentucky, in 18oo. He had been a
Commonwealth Attorney (1829-33) and served two terms in the U.S. Congress (1835-39) and,
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defendants were again represented by Garnett Duncan.193 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals was made up of three judges, Ephraim M. Ewing,"9
Daniel Breck, 19 and Thomas A. Marshall.1"
On October 14, 1844, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled for Dr.
Graham in a lengthy opinion by Judge Marshall. Thomas Marshall was
born in 1794 in Woodford County to a prominent Kentucky family-his
while representing Dr. Graham, was serving as the Kentucky Secretary of State (I84o-44).
Later, he was elected to the General Assembly and served as the state's Attorney General
from 1850 until his death in 1863. "He was a lawyer of great ability, and was one of the most
worthy and successful members of his profession in the state." KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL,
supra note 134, at 26. "One of his sons, James Harlan, became a judge of the circuit court at
Louisville, and another, John Marshall Harlan, associate justice of the United States Supreme
Court." LEVIN, supra note 77, at 120. (For more on Justice Harlan, see infra notes 412 and
489.)
George W Craddock, of Frankfort, was later described as "slow-moving, procrastinating,
shaggy-browed George W. Craddock, the embodiment of fairness and kindness, linked to
the irritability and pugnacity of a game cock, a living, perambulating storehouse of the basic
principles of all law, that to be unlocked required a contest." LEVIN, supra note 77, at Io8.
George Robertson (179o-1871) practiced as "Robertson, Harlan & Pirtle" and had been
a member of the court of appeals (Chief Justice for a time) from 1828 through 1843. See 2
COLLINS & COLLINS, supra note 1 io, at 687-89. (For more on Henry Pirtle, see infra note 233
and accompanying text).
193 See Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 187 (Ky. i844). For a
description of Duncan, see supra notes 171-72.
194 Ephraim M. Ewing was born in Tennessee in 1789. The son of a Revolutionary War
General, Ewing trained in law at Transylvania University and practiced for many years in
Russellville, Kentucky, from where he was elected to several terms in General Assembly.
In 1835, he was appointed one of the Associate Judges of the Court of
Appeals; in April, 1843, he became Chief-Justice of that Court, serving
with distinction until June, 1847, when he resigned and returned to his
private practice .... As a lawyer, he was exceptionably successful and
popular, and managed to accumulate a large fortune.... [Allthough
probably not ranking as one of the most brilliant men of his State, his
solid qualities and intrinsic worth made him a leader. He was a man
of noble sentiments, and great liberality of heart. His conscientious
convictions led him to free his slaves, and start them well in life for
themselves.
KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL, supra note 134, at 56. In 1847-49, Ewing was a Professor of Law
at the University of Louisville. LEVIN, supra note 77, at 768. He died in I86o. KENTUCKY
BIOGRAPHICAL, supra note 134, at 56.
195 Daniel Breck (1788-1871) served on the Kentucky Court of Appeals from 1843, when
he replaced George Robertson, see supra note 192 para. 4, until 1849. Breck "was a native of
Massachusetts, educated at Dartmouth, and came with a diploma, an unusual acquirement
for Kentucky in those early days." LEVIN, supra note 77, at 52o. He served many times in the
Kentucky legislature, was a member of Congress, "filled many other distinguished positions,
and was a successful banker." Id. Breck married a sister of Robert Todd of Lexington, who
was the father of Lincoln's wife. Id.
196 For a description of Marshall, see infra notes 197-99 and accompanying texts.
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father was a U.S. Senator and his uncle on his mother's side was U.S. Chief
Justice John Marshall' 97-and Thomas entered life with a "fortune which
was colossal at the time."' g After graduating from Yale, Thomas married
a niece of Henry Clay and lived for a time in Lexington, later serving as
a professor of law at Transylvania University (1836-49). He was elected
to the Kentucky House both as a young man (1827-28) and in his later
years (1863-65, from Louisville). Marshall was a long-time judge on the
Kentucky Court of Appeals (1835-1856 and again in 1866) and was its Chief
Judge on three different occasions (1847-51; 1854-56; and 1866). He died
in Louisville in 1871.1'
In Dr. Graham's case, Judge Marshall's opinion was made up of four
parts. The first part concluded that Graham's 1837 writing concerning
Henry and Reuben was directed only to Williams and therefore did not
justify the defendants' transportation of the slaves to Cincinnati in 18 4 1.11
The second, longest, and most significant part held that the slaves' earlier
travels to the free states of Ohio and Indiana did not change their status
as property owned by Graham in Kentucky.20' (This part is discussed in
detail in the next section.) A brief third part made clear that the slaves'
activities in traveling about Kentucky after their time with Williams did
not amount to an authorization by Graham for the defendants to take
them to Cincinnati."'2 Based on these three points, the court of appeals
concluded that Graham "has a right to maintain this suit for the recovery of
damages." 03
The opinion's fourth part described the types of relief to which Graham
was entitled. Given that the slaves were assumed to be "hopelessly and
irrecoverably lost,"z 4 the main element of damages was their "fair value."205
Judge Marshall's opinion described in some detail how the fair value of
escaped slaves should be determined. He noted that if the slaves were
present, their value could be ascertained "by putting them to sale."'  In
their absence, however, a less precise method would have to be used.
20 7
197 See 2 COLLINS & COLLINS, supra note I o, at 393-94-
198 Id. at 394.
199 Id.; see also LEVIN, supra note 77, at 174.
zoo Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 176-79 (Ky. i844).
201 Id. at 176-84.
202 Id. at 184-85.
203 Id. at 185.
204 Id.
205 Id.
zo6 Id. For more on Kentucky slave markets at this time, see supra note 86-88 and
accompanying texts.
207 Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) at 185. Judge Marshall wrote that
the jury:
should undoubtedly take into consideration the same circumstances
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According to Judge Marshall, the jury might consider, among other
factors relevant to the slaves' value, "their qualities as musicians, . . .
their acquirements in literature as well as in music, [and] their habits of
subordination or of independence."1 8 Overall, the jury was to determine
"how far any of these considerations should operate to enhance or diminish
the fair value of the slaves as such.
' '2
0
9
With respect to other potential elements of recovery, the court of appeals
held that Dr. Graham could not collect for the value of the books and
musical instruments that the slaves took with them, but that these items,
being essential to the slaves' value as musicians, could be "included in the
estimate of their personal value as musicians." 10 The court also determined
that Graham was entitled to damages for "the expenses incurred in the
unsuccessful attempts to recover the slaves ... if it was prudently made,
that is, if the prospect of success authorized the attempt."
2 1'
Finally, the court of appeals noted that, in addition to the Pike and its
owners, "it will be proper to make Armstrong, the master of the boat at the
time of the asportation, a party.""'2
2. Key Substantive Ruling: The Status of Kentucky Slaves Who Have Traveled
in Free States.-The most important part of the court of appeals' opinion
was its rejection of the defendants' argument that George, Reuben, and
Henry were free at the time of their journey on the Pike as a result of their
prior travels in the free states of Ohio and Indiana. 13 There was some
question whether this freedom argument could be made only by the slaves
themselves or also by third parties like the defendants, but the court of
which might be rationally supposed to affect [the slaves'] value in the
mind of purchasers, and they should give to each of these considerations,
and also to the opinions of witnesses having the requisite knowledge,
such weight as in their judgment it is entitled to have.
Id.
zo8 Id. at 185-86. The "habit of... independence" would produce a lower value. Thus,
the jury had a right to consider:
the liberties which had been allowed to [these slaves], and the effect of
all these circumstances, not only upon the value of their services, but
also in generating a restlessness under restraint, and a desire of freedom,
and in affording facilities and opportunities of escape, even if they had
not been taken on board the Pike.
Id. at 186.
zo9 Id. at 186.
21o Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 187; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (regarding the liability of a
steamboat's master).
213 See Graham v. Strader & Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon) at 179-84.
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appeals chose to by-pass this point. 1 4 Rather, it proceeded to rule on the
status of Graham's slaves and held that they were never free, because they
had made only "a temporary and momentary sojourn" to free states and
thereafter "chose to return" to Kentucky.15 The court here distinguished
one of its earlier decisions, Rankin v. Lydia, 1 6 which had held that a
Kentucky slave became free as a result of her owner's moving with her
to Indiana to take up residency there. 17 According to Judge Marshall's
opinion, however, Graham's slaves did not come within this ruling, because
of the short duration of their stays in Ohio and Indiana and the fact that
they "voluntarily" returned to Kentucky."1 8
This holding required the court of appeals to deal with the meaning of
the Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery provision.1 9 The court rejected the
defendants' argument that this provision conferred freedom on Graham's
slaves, because, according to Judge Marshall, the Northwest Ordinance
"was intended to apply to the inhabitants of the Northwestern Territory,
and not to mere travellers or temporary sojourners.""' ° Referring to the
"principle" embodied in Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery provision,
Judge Marshall wrote:
[Wihile it may be admitted, that in consequence of this principle, no citizen
or inhabitant of one of those States can hold another person as a slave in
that State, it does not follow, and we do not admit that the citizen of another
State, whose laws recognize and establish this species of property, loses
instantaneously and forever, by the mere force of this general principle, all
dominion and right of property in his slave whom he has taken with him in
travelling through one of those States .... so that upon the voluntary and
immediate return of both into their own State, the pre-existing relation
of master and slave must, in view of their own laws, be regarded as at an
end.2
2
1
Thus, according to Judge Marshall, neither the Northwest Ordinance
nor any law of a state ultimately created out of the territory it governed "can,
by its own mere force, produce the effect contended for [i.e., the freedom
of Graham's slaves]. 2 22 Rather, their status continued to be controlled by
214 See id. at 179-8o.
215 Id.
216 Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 467 (Ky. 182o). The Rankin case is
described supra note 77.
217 Graham v. Strader & Goman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) at i 8o (describing Rankin as set forth
supra note 77).
218 Id. at 182.
219 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
22o Graham v. Strader&Gorman, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) at i8o-8i.
221 Id. at 18o.
222 Id. at 18I. Judge Marshall did recognize that such a free state might refuse its "aid
to a master voluntarily bringing his slave within its territory, even for a temporary purpose, to
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Kentucky law, which, the court of appeals held, followed "the principle ..
. that a slave returning voluntarily with his master from a free State, is still
a slave by the laws of his own country."' 13 Because George, Reuben, and
Henry were merely "sojourners for a transient purpose, not inhabitants nor
residents," and because they "voluntarily returned" to Kentucky, they did
not become "free by reason of any of the facts referred to." ' 4
D. Trial Court Proceedings on Remand
The case was returned for further proceedings to the Louisville
Chancery Court, which by now was presided over by Bibb's successor as
Chancellor, Samuel S. Nicholas.2 ' Nicholas as a young man had studied
law under Bibb, and, like Bibb, he was a distinguished lawyer who had
earlier in his career been a judge on the Kentucky Court of Appeals
(1831-37).26 Nicholas was a slave-owner,2 7 and, unlike Bibb, he "was a
man of cold manners and exterior, and his affections and friendships were
limited." ' Nicholas served as Chancellor until the new state constitution
of 1850 made this post elective, and he chose to resign rather than run
for the office.2 9 "While his manners in the social circle were cold and
enforce his claim of dominion while there, but may aid the slave in resisting that claim, and
thus enable him, if he will, to remain there as a free man." Id. This potential for subjecting a
slave owner to the "temporary suspension of the legal right of enforcing his dominion" would,
however, be giving the principle of local freedom "its fullest effect." Id. Thus, ifa slave, like
one of Dr. Graham's, "acknowledges his subjection while there, and returns with his master in
a state of servitude, we perceive no principle which would afterwards entitle him to claim his
freedom in the domestic forum." Id.
223 Id. at 182. This principle, according to Judge Marshall, had been "sustained by the
opinion of eminent jurists." Id. at 182-83 (citing Justice Story's commentaries on conflicts of
laws and an 1836 opinion by Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw).
224 Id. at 183-84.
225 Born in 1797, Samuel Smith Nicholas was the son of a prominent Virginia native,
George Nicholas, who had moved to Lexington, Kentucky, in time to be an influential
member of the convention that wrote Kentucky's first constitution. KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL,
supra note 134, at 68o. Samuel Nicholas was orphaned at an early age and cared for by his
mother's family in Baltimore for a few years. Id. at 681. What little formal education Samuel
received came in a country school near Danville, Kentucky, although he did travel extensively
as a young man, working on a vessel that went to China and South America and as a fledgling
merchant in New Orleans. Id.
In the Supreme Court record of Straderv. Graham, Nicholas's name is mistakenly given as
"S. S. Nichols." See Bill of Exceptions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9
o, at 8 1.
z6 KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL, supra note 134, at 681.
227 Id. at 68z. However, according to a sympathetic account written in 1878, Nicholas
"ardently desired the gradual emancipation of the slaves in his State, for the furtherance, as
he supposed, of its material prosperity." Id.
zz8 Id. at 682.
229 Id. at 681. Nicholas served as Chancellor from 1844 to 1851. LEVIN, supra note 77,
at I6z.
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forbidding, his demeanor upon the bench, as judge, was unexceptionable
-always courteous, patient, respectful, and attentive.1
2 3 °
Pursuant to the direction of the Court of Appeals, 31 Chancellor Nicholas
gave Graham leave to file an amended complaint adding Armstrong as
a defendant party, which was done on November 15, 1844.23 This new
complaint was filed by yet another set of lawyers employed by Graham,
the Louisville firm of Pirtle & Wolfe. 33 A month later, Armstrong filed
an answer that adopted his co-defendants' position that the slaves had
become free by the time of their journey aboard the Pike,134 a claim that
Graham denied in a responsive pleading filed on January 10, 1845.235
Armstrong's late addition to the case raised two procedural issues. The
first was whether the depositions of other witnesses, which had been taken
230 KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL, supra note 134, at 682.
After his service as Chancellor, Nicholas was appointed by Governor Crittenden, along
with two others, to revise the Kentucky Code of Practice. Id. at 681. "The last years of his
life were spent in interpreting and expounding the Constitution." Id. at 682. When U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Catron died in mid-1865, President Johnson offered the nomination
to Nicholas, but he declined, "believing the Republican Senate would refuse to confirm him,
because of his well-known hostility to them and their measures." Id. at 681. Nicholas died
in 1869. Id. at 682.
231 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
232 See Amended Bill filed and Amended Bill, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at
68-69.
233 Id. Henry Pirtle (1798-i88o) had been a Louisville circuit judge (1826-32), LEVIN,
supra note 77, at 162, and a Kentucky state senator (i84o-1843). KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL,
supra note 134, at 682. Pirtle's practice in the 184Os included another steamboat case in which
he represented a slave-owner claimant. See McFarland v. McKnight, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 500,
514 (Ky. 1846) (listing Pirtle and Duncan as representing the winning slave owners). In 1846,
Pirtle filled the "Chair of Constitutional Law, Equity, and Commercial Law" at the University
of Louisville, a position he held until 1869. KENTUCKY BIOGRAPI'CAL, supra note 134, at
682. In 1850, he was appointed by Gov. Crittenden to succeed Nicholas as Chancellor of the
Louisville Chancery Court; he held this post through 1856 and later was elected to another
term (1862-68). Id.; LEVIN, supra note 77, at 239-42.
Pirtle's junior partner in the Graham v. Strader litigation was Nathaniel Wolfe (181 o- 865),
who would later serve in both Houses of the Kentucky legislature and become "one of the
most able and eloquent criminal lawyers in the country." KENTUCKY BIOGRAPHICAL, supra note
134, at 165; see also 2 COLLINS & COLLINS, supra note I IO, at 763.
By early 1845 as Graham's lawyers prepared for the second trial, Pirtle & Wolfe became
Wolfe, Pirtle & Speed. See Complainant's Exceptions to Deposition of Armstrong, Supreme
Court Record, supra note 90, at 72. James Speed, whose brother Joshua was Lincoln's closest
friend in the 184os, had met Lincoln when the latter visited the Speed family home near
Louisville in 1841. See DONALD, supra note 4, at 88. James Speed thereafter became "a
prominent attorney in Louisville" and was named Attorney General by President Lincoln
shortly after the latter's second election in 1864. Id. at 299, 550.
234 See Answer of Armstrong to Original and Amended Bill, Supreme Court Record,
supra note 90, at 69-7 1.
235 See Answer of Graham to Armstrong's Cross Bill, Supreme Court Record, supra note
90, at 71-72. Graham filed an amended version of this response on February 25, 1845. See
id. at 72.
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before Armstrong became a party, could be used without unduly prejudicing
him. Chancellor Nicholas allowed these depositions to be admitted against
Armstrong,136 and the court of appeals ultimately affirmed this ruling.137 The
other question was whether Armstrong's own deposition could be offered
by the other defendants. Nicholas ruled against admitting this deposition
on the ground that Armstrong was now a party.38 This ruling, too, was later
affirmed by the court of appeals.
39
Two separate juries were empanelled in April and June of 1845, but they
were discharged based on the defendants' objections that the depositions
were not ready to be presented.14° Many of the witnesses from the original
trial were deposed again, and numerous other depositions were taken in
the spring and summer of 1845.141
Finally, a third jury was chosen, 4 ' and on October 2 and 3, 1845, it
heard the depositions and Dr. Graham's 1837 note to Williams and received
instructions from Chancellor Nicholas.4 3  After retiring for "a short
time," the jury returned a verdict for Graham for $3000.244 Both parties
filed exceptions, which the Chancellor overruled in an opinion issued on
November 6, 1845,245 and Nicholas thereupon decreed that the plaintiff
was entitled to have the $3000 verdict "paid by the 15th day of this month,
or the said steamboat Pike, her engine, tackle, and furniture, be then
forthcoming, to be sold for the purpose of raising the same, together with
the complainant's costs."'246 A few weeks later, the defendants posted a
bond in order to take an appeal from this judgment.
47
236 See Bill of Exceptions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9
o, at 79-81.
237 Strader v. Graham, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 633,633 (Ky. 1847), aff'd, 51 U.S. (io How.) 82
(1851).
238 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
239 Strader v. Graham, 46 Ky. (7. B. Mon.) at 634. The court of appeals was to note that,
even if Armstrong was not a party at the time of his deposition, his potential liability-not only
to Graham, but to his employers "for the loss which his act or neglect occasioned"-gave him
sufficient interest in the case to make him "an incompetent witness for his principals." Id.
240 See Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 73-75.
241 See id. at 82-144 (setting forth twenty-eight depositions, all of which were taken
from early April through mid-August of 1845).
242 See Supreme Court Record, supra note 9
o, at 76-77. The names of the twelve jurors
are listed. Id. at 77.
243 See id. at 77-81.
244 Id. at 77-79.
245 See Bill of Exceptions, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90, at 79-81.
246 See Decree, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9
o, at 8z.
247 See Order Granting Appeal and Appeal Bond, Supreme Court Record, supra note 90,
at 82, 144-45.
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E. The Second Court of Appeals Decision
In this second trip to the Court of Appeals, the defendants continued
to be represented by Garnett Duncan. Graham was represented by
Robertson, Harlan and Pirtle, a firm that included the lawyers James Harlan
and George Robertson from the earlier appeal and Henry Pirtle from the
just-completed trial.148 The same three judges-Ewing, Marshall, and
Breck-made up the Court of Appeals, but by now, Marshall had become
the Chief Justice.1
49
The Court of Appeals took almost two years to decide the case. It
heard two days of oral argument in October of 1846, "but the court not
being sufficiently advised, took time. And at a court of appeals held on
the 28th day of July, 1847, the cause was reheard, and the court took time,
&c." a 0 Finally, on October 4, 1847, the Court of Appeals "being sufficiently
advised," upheld Dr. Graham's victory in a brief opinion again authored by
Chief Justice Marshall.
2
1'
The opinion began by noting that the case "now presents essentially
the same facts, and must be governed by the same principles."2  After
resolving the two evidentiary issues noted above,2 5 3 the Chief Justice dealt
again with the issue of whether the slaves' sojourns into free states affected
their status.
On this point, the opinion noted that, while there was "no room for
farther question in this Court," 4 additional comment was required because
another case (not identified) had since misperceived the earlier ruling.
255
This unnamed case had apparently read the earlier decision as indicating
that the slaves may have become free as a result of their time in Ohio
and Indiana and then reverted to their original status upon returning to
248 For more on these lawyers, see supra notes 192 (Harlan and Robertson) and 233
(Pirtle).
249 Marshall began a four-year tenure as Chief Justice in 1847; he also held this position
two other times, in 1854-56 and 1866. See supra text accompanying note 199; I COLLINS &
COLLINS, supra note 110, at 498.
250 See Orders-Cause Read, Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 146.
During the time that the Kentucky Court of Appeals was considering this case, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided another case involving a runaway Kentucky slave. In Jones v.
Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5. How.) 215 (1847), the Court ruled in favor of a damage claim brought
by the slave's owner against an Ohio defendant under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, whose
constitutionality the Court upheld; see also supra note 6 (describing this case further).
251 See Orders-Cause Read and Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court Record,
supra note 9o, at 146-47.
252 Strader v. Graham, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 633,633 (Ky. 1847), aff'd, 5i U.S. (io How.) 8z
(185I).
253 See supra notes 237 and 239 and accompanying texts.
254 Straderv. Graham, 46 Ky. (7. B. Mon.) at 635.
255 Id.
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Kentucky. This was wrong, according to Chief Justice Marshall. His earlier
opinion had contained "no concession either express or implied, that the
slaves in question were ever free, or could properly have become so by
being temporarily in a free State with their master or other citizen of this
State, having control over them." '56 Rather, the Chief Justice held that the
earlier decision "does not admit" that a Kentucky slave's travels to a free
state affects "the relation of master and slave, as existing under the laws
of their own State."' 5 7 In other words, they were never free, but remained
slaves even while traveling in Ohio and Indiana.
Having found no error in the trial court, the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion affirming the Chancellor's decree in favor of Graham on October 4,
1847.58 Four days later, Strader, Gorman, and Armstrong began the process
of seeking review in the U.S. Supreme Court by causing a "writ of error"
to be executed.5 9
III. STRADER V. GRAHAM IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
A. Events Leading Up to the Court's Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court did not hear oral argument in the case until
December 11 and 12, 1850, and decided it on January 6, 1851,260 which
was more than three years after the Kentucky decision being reviewed, an
extraordinary delay by today's standards but apparently not very unusual in
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 636.
259 See Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 149-50 (noting that a writ of error on
the defendants' behalf and signed by Chief Justice Marshall was issued on October 8, 1847,
and was executed on Graham twelve days later). On December I5, 1847, the clerk of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals certified its decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the case
was officially filed on February 12, 1948. Id. at 149-50.
A "writ of error" was a method of obtaining appellate review in common-law actions in
which "[o]nly questions of law were open to review in the superior court; questions of fact
were not subject to review." WILFRED J. RITz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT
OF 1798: ExPosING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING EVIDENCE 67 (1990); see also
Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Supreme Court and the Judiciary Act of1925,42 HARv. L.
REV. I, 29 (1928) (noting that, in Supreme Court review by means of an "appeal" as opposed
to a "writ of error," the facts were open to review). For more on the "writ of error" method of
Supreme Court review, see infra note 297.
z6o SeeAnne Ashmore, Dates of Supreme Court Decisions and Arguments: United States
Reports Volumes 2-107 (1791-1882), at 2, 54 (Aug. zoo6) (unpublished manuscript from the
United States Supreme Court Library), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/
datesofdecisions.pdf (reporting these dates for Straderv. Graham after noting that dates of oral
arguments and decisions did not appear in the official reports of Supreme Court cases until
1854).
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the mid-nineteenth century. 61 During this three-year period, a number of
significant events occurred, both nationally and in Kentucky.1
6
1
Among the events of national importance were the discovery of gold
in California in January of 1848;163 the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in
early 1848, which ended the Mexican-American War, guaranteed U.S.
sovereignty over Texas, and secured for the United States the present-day
states of California, Nevada, and Utah, and parts of Colorado, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Wyoming;"M the election later that year of General Zachary
Taylor, a Whig, as president; 65 and Taylor's death in July 1850 and his
replacement by Millard Fillmore.2 66 Shortly thereafter, President Fillmore
appointed the Kentuckian John J. Crittenden as Attorney General, 67 and
261 See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 4, at 281-92.
262 Although not an event of national importance at the time, it is noteworthy that in
this period Abraham Lincoln was elected to serve one term in Congress (1847-1849), his only
successful campaign for national office until the presidency in 186o. See DONALD, supra note 4,
at 114-15. During his time in Congress, Lincoln stayed in a Washington rooming house with
eight other Whig congressmen and unsuccessfully sponsored a proposal for the compensated
emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, while his wife Mary and their two sons
lived for a time with the Todd family in Lexington, Kentucky. Id. at 120-21, 135-37.
263 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 247 (Richard B. Morris & Jeffery B. Morris
eds., 6th ed. 1982).
264 See Mexico, History of, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 1978); see also
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 263, at 234.
265 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 263, at 249, 1166-67; Whitehouse.
gov, Biography of Zachary Taylor, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/ztl2.html
(last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
266 President Fillmore assumed office upon the death of Zachary Taylor on July 9, 1950.
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 263, at 254, 1029.
267 Fillmore appointed Crittenden to be Attorney General in July of 1850, less than two
weeks after the former became president. See ROBERT J. SCARRY, MILLARD FILLMORE 153-54,
169 (2OO1).
John J. Crittenden (1787-1863) was a prot6g6 of Henry Clay and a successful Whig
politician in his own right. After studying law under George M. Bibb, see supra notes 177-
79 and accompanying texts, Crittenden won his first election, to the Kentucky House of
Representatives from Logan County in 1811, and later served a number of terms in the U.S.
Senate (1817-19; 1835-41; 1842-48; 1854). See, e.g., Victor B. Howard, John Jordan Critenden,
in KENTUCKY'S GOVERNORS 54-56 (Lowell H. Harrison ed., 2004). Crittenden was governor
of Kentucky (1848-5o); was twice U.S. Attorney General (in 1841 under Harrison and in
1851-54 under Fillmore); and ended his career as a pro-Union, pro-slavery member of the
U.S. House (1861-63), where, at the outbreak of the Civil War, he unsuccessfully pushed for
a constitutional amendment reflecting the Missouri Compromise to preserve slavery. Id. at
56-57. He died in 1863. Id. at 57. For a biography by his daughter, see I TIE LIFE OF JOHN J.
CRITTENDEN (Chapman Coleman ed., 187 ).
Crittenden was a distinguished advocate in a number of important pre-Civil War cases in
the Supreme Court. See SWISHER, supra note 4, at 437-38, 779-808, 687 n.51; infra note 291
para. 2; infra note 308 and accompanying text. In 1861, at the age of seventy-three, he was
given serious consideration as Lincoln's first appointment to the Supreme Court. See SWISHER,
supra note 4, at 811-12. Over three decades earlier, he had been nominated to replace U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Robert Trimble of Kentucky late in the term of President John Quincy
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the more moderate views on slavery of the new President and Attorney
General helped lead to the Compromise of 1850,168 which included a more
aggressive Fugitive Slave Act. 69
In Kentucky, a House resolution, adopted unanimously in early 1849,
opposed "abolition or emancipation of slavery in any form or shape
whatever, except as now provided for by the constitution and laws of the
state." ' A few weeks later, the General Assembly repealed Kentucky's
ban on the commercial importation of slaves."7 1 This was also the year
that representatives for a new state constitutional convention were elected,
an election in which Whig candidates, led by Robert J. Breckinridge and
supported by Henry Clay, were overwhelmed by pro-slavery Democrats."'
The new constitution, which was adopted on June 11, 1850,273 contained
the same basic slavery provisions as the existing constitution, 7 4 and also
Adams, but the Senate did not act on this nomination. See I 'ThE LIFE OF JOHN J. CRITrENDEN,
supra, at 73. The seat eventually went to John McLean of Cincinnati after President Jackson
took office. See WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1849
(izth ed. 2005).
z68 The Compromise of 185o was a series of bills that were enacted in September
of that year. In addition to the Fugitive Slave Act, see infra note 269, these bills provided
for: (I) California to be admitted as a free state; (2) the territories of New Mexico, Arizona,
and Utah to determine by local vote ("popular sovereignty") whether each would permit
slavery; and (3) the abolition of the slave trade, but not slavery, in the District of Columbia.
See DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN STUDIES, AMERHERST COLLEGE, 'DIE COMPROMISE OF 1850 i-vii
(Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 1957).
269 The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act greatly strengthened the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.
See Act of Feb., 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302. The 1793 statute mandated the return of runaway slaves
to their masters, but the 185o version also required all U.S. citizens, even those in free states,
to assist affirmatively in the return of such slaves. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra note 263, at 253. In 1847, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1793
law in Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847) (further described supra note 6). In
the course of debate over the 185o Fugitive Slave Act, Attorney General Crittenden issued
an opinion that this tougher law would also be constitutional. See 2 TIE LIFE OF JOHN J.
CRITrENDEN, supra note 267, at 377-81.
270 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, SUpra note 13, at 813.
271 See id.
272 See, e.g., id. at 813-I6. Breckinridge "was defeated, and not a single out-and-out
emancipation candidate was elected. The conservative democrats carried the day. In the
same election that gave the Whigs a majority on a joint ballot in the Legislature of thirty votes,
the democrats captured the convention by a majority of six." Id. at 816.
273 See Ky. CONST. of 18so, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 803-24.
274 See Ky. CONST. of 185 o , art. X, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 818-19 (setting
forth Article X, entitled "Concerning Slaves"). Sections I and 3 of this Article were almost
identical to the two sections of the slavery article in the existing constitution that had been
adopted in 1799. Compare id., with supra notes 29, 54 (setting forth the 1799 constitution's slave
article). The principal change in § I of the new slave article was the addition of provisions
prohibiting the General Assembly from "providing for their [slaves'] removal from the State"
and requiring it to "pass laws ... to prevent [emancipated slaves] from remaining in this State
after they are emancipated." Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. X, § 1, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note
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added a new provision directing the General Assembly to bar free Negroes
and mulattoes from coming into the state and requiring newly freed slaves
to leave."' 5 The 1850 constitution also mentioned slavery favorably in
connection with its protection of property rights, providing that: "The right
of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and the
right of the owner of a slave to such slave, and its increase, is the same, and
as inviolable as the right of any property whatever." '76 Suffrage was again
denied to all but free white males. 77
One thing that did not change during the 1847-1850 period, however,
was the makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court, as no new justices were
appointed during this time. 78  The Court's nine members during this
period were:
* Chief Justice Roger Taney, a Maryland Democrat and one-time slave-
owner who was appointed by President Jackson in 1836 and would serve
until 1864;279
e John McLean, an Ohio Democrat from Cincinnati appointed by President
Jackson in 1829 who later became a Republican and served until 1861;2
80
25, at 818 (quoting Article X's § I).
275 See Article X, § z, which provided:
The General Assembly shall pass laws providing that any free negro or
mulatto hereafter immigrating to, and any slave hereafter emancipated
in, and refusing to leave this State, or having left, shall return and settle
within this State, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and punished by
confinement in the Penitentiary thereof.
Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. X, § I, reprinted in I MICHIE, supra note 25, at 818-i9; see also supra
note 274 (requiring, in Article X's § I, that the General Assembly pass laws preventing newly
emancipated slaves from remaining in the state).
The goal here was "forever [to] end the menace of a free negro population." 2 CONNELLEY
& COULTER, supra note 13, at 817. In 1851, the legislature acted pursuant to this provision by
declaring that all slaves emancipated must leave the state and by making it a felony for any
free negro to enter and remain in the state for over thirty days. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra
note 13, at 817-18.
276 Article XIII, § 3 (quoted in Ky. CONST. of 185o , art. XIII, § 3, reprinted in MICHIE,
supra note 25, at 820).
"Thus it was," as a 1922 history of Kentucky put it, "that while slavery was tending to die
as a practical institution, it grew as a political and constitutional issue, that welded the people
into a strong majority for its continuation." 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, Supra note 13, at 820.
277 See Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. II, § 8, reprinted in I MlcHIE, supra note 25, at 803-05
(setting forth Article II, § 8, which authorized the vote for "[e]very free white male citizen, of
the age of twenty-one years, who has resided in the State two years").
278 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1850 (setting forth a chart listing all Supreme
Court justices and their times in office).
279 See id. at 1849-5 o . For more on Taney, see CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY
(1935); SWISHER, supra note 4; infra notes 463-64 and accompanying texts.
28o See COHEN ET AL., Supra note 267, at 1849-5o. McLean would become one of the two
dissenters in DredScott. See infra notes 443-44 and accompanying texts. While on the Ohio
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* James M.Wayne, a Georgia Democrat and slave-owner who was appointed
by President Jackson in 1835 and would serve until 1867;2
81
* John Catron, a Tennessee Democrat appointed by President Jackson in
1837 who would serve until 1865;zs
* John McKinley, an Alabama Democrat appointed by President Van
Buren who spent his early adult years as a Kentucky lawyer and who died
in Lexington in 1852 after moving back to Kentucky during his tenure on
the Court;
283
* Peter V. Daniel, a Virginia Democrat appointed by President Van Buren in
1841 who would serve until 1 8 6 0 ;21
* Samuel Nelson, a New York Democrat appointed by President Tyler in
1845 who would serve until 1872;zss
* Levi Woodbury, a New Hampshire Democrat appointed by President
Polk in 1845 who died in September of 185 1;2' and
e Robert C. Grier, a Pennsylvania Democrat appointed by President Polk
in 1846 who would serve until 1870.287
Supreme Court, he had decided Ohio v. Carneal (1817), a case involving a Kentucky slave.
See TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 79 (2001). For
more on Justice McLean's background and service on the Court, see infra note 343.
28 1 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1849-5o. Wayne voted with the majority in Dred
Scott, but favored the Union in the Civil War. See HALL, supra note 28o, at 86-89.
282 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1849-50. Catron had served for many years
on Tennessee's highest court, was pro-slavery (having authored a major state-court decision
against emancipation, Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) I 19 (Tenn. 1834)), and voted
with the majority in DredScott, but sided with the Union in the Civil War. See HALL, supra note
28o, at 99-102. For more on Justice Catron's background and service on the Court, see infra
notes 336, 461 and accompanying texts.
283 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1849-50. McKinley was chronically ill toward
the end of his tenure, dying in Lexington in 1852, and thus was one of two Justices who were
replaced by the time of Dred Scott (by Campbell, an Alabama Democrat who voted with the
majority in Dred Scott, see infra text accompanying notes 404-05). See HALL, supra note 280,
at 103-o6.
284 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1849-5o. Daniel was an extreme pro-slavery
justice who would produce some of the most vitriolic anti-Negro language in Dred Scott. See
HALL, supra note 28o, at 107-10; infra note 42 1.
285 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1849-5 o . Nelson had long been a state judge and
would become one of two northerners (along with Grier) who voted with the majority in Dred
Scott, see HALL, supra note 280, at 111-14, where he drafted what was initially to be the Court's
opinion limited to the jurisdictional point and then refused to go beyond this, becoming the
only member of the majority not to opine on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
See infra notes 413, 434-37 and accompanying texts.
286 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1850. Woodbury, a Northerner who was pro-
slavery, was a one-time Democratic presidential candidate. See HALL, supra note z8o, at 115-
I8. He wrote the Court's 1847 opinion in Jones v. Van Zandt, upholding the 1793 Fugitive
Slave law. See supra notes 6, 269. He might well have become the Democrats' presidential
nominee in i852, but he died in 185 1, thereby becoming one of two Justice who were replaced
by the time of Dred Scott (by Curtis, a Massachusetts Whig who dissented in Dred Scott). See
infra note 410-I I and accompanying texts.
287 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 185o. Grier had been a Pennsylvania trial judge
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In December of 1850, the Justices heard two days of oral argument
in the Strader case. Appearing for the defendant-appellants was Charles
Lee Jones of Washington, D.C.,2 88 who was assisted on the brief by their
long-time Kentucky lawyer, Garnett Duncan.2 89  Graham chose to be
represented by an old Kentucky acquaintance, John J. Crittenden,219 who
was at the time the U.S. Attorney General"' and whose undertaking of this
private case seems highly irregular by modern standards.92
The briefs have not survived, but the basic arguments made by both
sides are available as a result of the practice in those days of the official
Supreme Court report including a detailed summary of counsels' arguments
prior to the Court's opinion.293 As will be seen in the next section, Mr. Jones
and Attorney General Crittenden argued both the merits of the case and
whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review it.
and would become one of two northerners (along with Nelson) to vote with the majority in
Dred Scott. See HALL, supra note 280, at 119-22. In his role as a circuit judge while on the
Supreme Court, he presided over a federal case where he favored a Virginia slave owner's
efforts to retrieve a fugitive slave in Pennsylvania, Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 Fed. Cas. 1038
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1847) (No. 16,865), and he wrote the Court's opinion in another fugitive slave
case, Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
288 See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (Io How.) 82, 85 (1850). Jones was an experienced
Supreme Court advocate, having been admitted to the Court's bar some ten years earlier. See
40 U.S. (15 Pet.)x (184I).
289 See Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (Io How.) at 85. For more on Duncan, see notes 172-73
and accompanying texts.
290 See Straderv. Graham, 51 (1o How.) U.S. at 85.
291 Crittenden is listed as the Attorney General at the beginning of Vol. 51 of the U.S.
reports (a. *) and within Strader, 51 U.S. (IO How.) at 85 ("Mr. Crittenden, Attorney General,
for defendants in error.").
During his tenure as Fillmore's Attorney General, Crittenden continued his active
Supreme Court practice, which included representing "Samuel Colt, the inventor of the
revolver in all his litigation there, a lucrative practice for Crittenden involving claims for
interest on Texas bonds," and obtaining substantial fees for representing Mexican claimants
and others involved in disputes over interests in California land. ALBERT D. KIRwAN, JOHN
J. CRITTENDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNION 272-73 (1962). For more on Crittenden,
including his experience as a Supreme Court advocate, see supra notes 267-69.
292 Current Justice Department rules prohibit its lawyers, including the Attorney
General, from representing private clients for compensation. See 5 C.F.R. § 38oi.Io6(b)(i)
(2oo8); see also I8 U.S.C. § 205(a)(2) (2000) (providing criminal penalties for any officer or
employee of the United States who "acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any... court..
. in which the United States... has a direct and substantial interest"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. I.I I (d)(i) (2008) (allowing government lawyers to represent private clients, but
expecting that such lawyers will comply with conflict-of-interest rules).
293 This practice was followed from the first days of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S (2 Dall.) 419, 419-29 (1793), through the latter part of the 19th century, see,
e.g., Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U.S. 57, 59-63 (1896), after which the modern practice of the U.S.
reports only providing a syllabus of the case and the Justices' opinions was adopted.
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B. Counsels' Arguments and the Court's Decision
1. Overview of the Court's Decision.--On January 6, 1851, the Court in an
opinion by Chief Justice Taney dismissed the writ of error, and thereby
upheld the Kentucky judgment, on the ground that the U.S. Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction to review the case.z94 In the course of his opinion,
the Chief Justice also expressed his views on some of the substantive issues
involved, suggesting that the Kentucky Court of Appeals had correctly
rejected the defendants' freedom argument, that the Northwest Ordinance
could no longer be used as the basis for such an argument, and that the
U.S. Constitution did not allow Congress to ban slavery in new states
formed out of territories like that governed by the Northwest Ordinance. 95
Separate concurring opinions by Justices McLean and Catron agreed that
the Court lacked jurisdiction, but did not opine on the other issues dealt
with in Taney's opinion.2 96
2. The Jurisdictional Issue.-With respect to the jurisdictional point, the
Court based its decision on section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, where
the first Congress gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction, inter alia, to "re-
examine[] and reverse[] or affirm[] ... upon a writ of error" a final judgment
of a state's highest court "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty
or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the
decision is against their validity." '97 This provision was still in effect at the
time of Strader and indeed continued without change until well into the
twentieth century.98
294 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (to How.) at 93-97; see also supra note z6o (giving date of
the decision).
295 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) at 93-97. These points are discussed in greater
detail infra notes 324-33 and accompanying texts.
296 Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (to How.) at 97-98. These concurring opinions are
described infra Part III.D.
297 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.2o, § z5, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (1845). The "writ of error"
authorized by section 25 was a relatively new method of review in 1793 that was limited to
questions of law. See supra note 259 para 2. The modern version of the statute governing the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review state-court decisions is set forth, infra note 298.
298 First amended in 1925 (Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 937), the modern
version of this provision now provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of
any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or
authority exercised under the United States.
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By the time of Strader, section 25 had been the subject of numerous
Supreme Court decisions.2 99 By its terms, section 25 jurisdiction existed only
when the state court decision being reviewed was "against [the] validity"
of a federal law (i.e., state court decisions favoring the federal claim were
not subject to section 25 review).300 However, once a case that did involve
an "against [the] validity" decision was presented, the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction was mandatory.30' Furthermore, this jurisdiction remained
good even if the Court ultimately affirmed the state court's ruling against
the federal claim.
302
Taney's view, which was shared by the two concurring Justices, was that
section 25 jurisdiction failed because the defendants' claim of freedom for
Dr. Graham's slaves was based neither on the Northwest Ordinance nor its
re-affirmation by the first Congress, but on the anti-slavery laws of Ohio.
(Ohio was the only state mentioned by the Justices, although the opinion
below and counsel's arguments in the Supreme Court regularly referred
to the slaves' travels in Indiana as well as Ohio. 30 3) Because the Kentucky
court's decision did not involve a ruling against the validity of a federal law,
but only against a claim based on another state's law, the Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction to review it under section 25.
Both Jones for the defendants and Crittenden for Dr. Graham devoted
most of their argument to the substantive point (i.e., whether the slaves'
brief travels in free states had made them free),3°4 but both also dealt with
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under this provision,
see ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 136-41 (8th ed. 2002).
299 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.zo, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 n.(d) (citing, as of 1845, over
two dozen such cases, including those described in this note and those cited infra notes 300,
302, and 308). These decisions included Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (0 Wheat.) 304
(1816), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 25's grant of jurisdiction to
review state court judgments involving U.S. law. Id. at 337-52.
300 See, e.g., Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56, 58 (1840); Gordon v.
Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) z68, 269 (18o6).
301 See STERN ET AL., supra note 298, at 135. The modern version of this provision, see
supra note 298, was adopted in 1988 and provides for review in such cases only by discretionary
"certiorari" rather than the mandatory "writ of error" or "appeal." See STERN ETAL., supra note
298, at 135-36.
302 See, e.g., Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 4o9-14 (1829); Wilson v. The
Blackbird Creek Marsh Ass'n, 27 U.S. (z Pet.) 245, 25o-52 (1829); Montgomery v. Hernandez,
25 U.S. 05 Wheat.) 129, 130-35 (1827).
303 See, e.g., Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) 82, 83-84 (I851) (referring to Indiana
and Ohio in the reporters' summary of the case), id. at 85-90 (referring to Indiana and Ohio in
counsel's arguments). Taney's opinion does at times use the plural form in referring to "the
States formed" out of the Northwest Territory, id. at 95, but neither he nor the two concurring
Justices ever mention Indiana explicitly. See id. at 92-98.
304 Id. at 85-90. On the merits, the key disputed point was whether the temporary
nature of the slaves' trips to Indiana and Ohio was relevant to their becoming free. Jones
argued that their "length of residence" there was "immaterial" and that they became free the
"instant" they set foot on free soil, id. at 85-88, whereas Crittenden claimed that they were not
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the jurisdictional issue. Making the case for jurisdiction, Jones argued that
the freedom claim was based on the Northwest Ordinance, noting that the
anti-slavery "laws of Ohio and Indiana only reiterate the provisions of that
ordinance."30 If, as Jones claimed on the merits, the slaves' travels in those
states made them free, then their freedom "was either by virtue of the
Ordinance, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States admitting
those states under that Ordinance with constitutions prohibiting slavery."3°
Jones concluded that, because the Kentucky court had ruled against this
claim, the case was appropriate for section 25 jurisdiction.3 7
free because "in this case there was no residence at all ... only a transient visit" followed by
"the voluntary return of the slave to his master." Id. at 88. For Jones, the temporary nature of
the slaves' activities in free states did not matter, because, unlike the case of a runaway slave,
they were on free soil "with the consent of their master." Id. at 85.
Even though Strader did not involve fugitive slave issues nor even the freedom of the
actual slaves involved-they having safely reached Canada years before the Supreme Court
argument-both lawyers concluded with dramatic rhetorical flourishes. In response to
Crittenden's point that George, Reuben, and Henry had waived their right to freedom by
voluntarily returning to Kentucky, see id. at 86, Jones stated:
It is a monstrosity in morals and in law, that a man who has been made
free by the operation of law can make himself a slave. On the coming
of the slave into the free State, by the mere force of the prohibition, his
shackles fall from him. Are they ever to be restored? By what law? If he
be free in Ohio and Indiana, how shall he be a slave elsewhere? What
power of man is to reintegrate that condition?
Id. at 9o .
For his part, Crittenden noted that the Northwest Ordinance was enacted "for large
purposes" and was not designed:
[t]o catch up a wandering fiddler, as in this case, upon a mere visit for
playing at a ball .... It degrades the character of that ordinance to suppose
so. It would give to it the effect of creating a border warfare, instead
of cultivating the courtesies and amenities of life .... If the doctrine
maintained on the other side be established, the Ohio [River] will be
made like the fabled Styx, the river of death, which, if once crossed,
can never be recrossed. It will destroy that amenity of intercourse, that
interchange of social courtesies, which now exist, and which do so much
to preserve those kindly and fraternal feelings upon which the success
of our institutions so much depends.
Id. at 88-9o.
305 Id. at 83.
306 Id. at 89.
307 Id. In favor of this jurisdictional argument, Jones here cited Justice Baldwin's
concurring opinion in Pollardv. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353,417 (1840), which had opined that
the Northwest Ordinance became part of federal law as a result of Art. VI of the Constitution,
a point that only Justice Catron's concurrence in Strader ultimately dealt with. See infra note
340 and accompanying text.
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Crittenden, who had once lost a Supreme Court case on a section 25
dismissal,3"' responded that the "question here is, whether this [Kentucky]
decision conflicts with the [Northwest] Ordinance of 1787. It may conflict
with the law of Ohio, or Indiana, or the constitution of Ohio or Indiana; but
that confers no jurisdiction on this court."3° In reply, Jones noted that the
basic issue was whether the slaves had become free by traveling in territory
governed by the Northwest Ordinance and then argued: "And did not the
court of Kentucky in this case decide upon the effect of the Ordinance of
1787? It is agreed that this case arises under the laws of Kentucky. But
Kentucky could not pass laws inconsistent with the ordinance. They
cannot make a slave of one whom the Ordinance makes free.
'310
Neither counsel nor the Court mentioned an 1831 slave case, Menardv.
Aspasia,311 that involved some of the same issues. Aspasia was born to a slave
woman in the Illinois territory after passage of the Northwest Ordinance,
but before Illinois became a state. She was later sent as a slave to Missouri,
but she filed a freedom suit there and ultimately obtained a ruling from the
Missouri Supreme Court that she was free based on her earlier residence in
Illinois. 31" Her putative owner, Menard, sought review of this decision in
the U.S. Supreme Court, but, in a unanimous opinion by Justice McLean,
the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section 25, because the state
court decision under review "was not against, but in favour of the express
provision" banning slavery in the Northwest Ordinance.31 3 The Menard
opinion did suggest, however, that the Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery
provision could be the basis for Supreme Court review of a state court
decision that rejected a slave's claim to freedom based on this anti-slavery
provision. Thus, in an intriguing dictum, Justice McLean wrote that if the
Missouri decision under review "had been against Aspasia, it might have
been contended, that the revising power of th[is] court, under the twenty-
308 SeeCommonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56,57-58 (1840).
309 Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) 82, 90 (851).
310 Id. at 90.
311 Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505 (183).
312 Seeid. at 51i.
313 Id. at 515. Menard argued, unsuccessfully, for section 25 jurisdiction on the ground
that the Missouri judgment was againsthis rights under the Northwest Ordinance, specifically a
provision guaranteeing property rights. See id. at 514-15 (referring to that part of the Northwest
Ordinance providing that "no man shall be deprived of his ... property, but by the judgment
of his peers"). In rejecting this argument, the Court held that this "general" provision in the
Ordinance was not the basis for Menard's asserted right to ownership of Aspasia, "which had
its commencement in other laws and compacts [e.g., Virginia slave law that governed the
Illinois territory before the Northwest Ordinance]." Id. at 515-16. Because Menard's "title
does not arise under an act of congress," an "essential" element of section 25 jurisdiction was
missing, and thus his appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 517.
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fifth section of the judiciary act, could be exercised. ' 314 This was the very
contention made by the Strader defendants, but the Court rejected it.
C. Taney 's Opinion
In Strader, Chief Justice Taney, writing for seven members of the Court,
held that the defendants' argument for the slaves' freedom could not be
based on the Northwest Ordinance, because that law was no longer still "in
force."3 ' Taney's view was that, once new states had been formed out of a
territory, the law that had governed the territory gave way to those states'
laws. This view, he argued, "has been settled by judicial decision in this
court,"
3 1 6 citing an 1845 case involving the Louisiana territory.317
Taney's conclusion that the Northwest Ordinance was not "still in
force in the states since formed within the territory, and admitted into
Union"31 was based on the Constitution. First, he noted that the original
Ordinance, having been enacted prior to the Constitution, "could have no
force beyond its limits" and "ceased to be in force upon the adoption of
the Constitution. 31 9 Second, the Ordinance's re-enactment by the first
Congress did not mean that its provisions continued in force after new
states were formed, a view he contended the Court had made clear in an
earlier "carefully considered" decision.3 0 To the extent that Ohio and
314 Id. at 515.
315 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) at 93.
316 Id.
317 Id. (citing Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845)). In Permoli,
the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Catron, declined jurisdiction under section 25
in a case where Louisiana's highest court had rejected a freedom-of-religion claim based
on a provision in Louisiana's pre-statehood territorial ordinance that closely resembled the
Northwest Ordinance, on the ground, as Chief Justice Taney put it in Strader, that "the
Ordinance ceased to be in force when Louisiana became a State." Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S.
(io How.) at 95. Based on Permoli, Taney concluded in Strader that if "this Ordinance is not
in force in Louisiana, it follows that it [the Northwest Ordinance] cannot be in force in Ohio."
Id.
318 Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (so How.) at 93-95. In reaching the conclusion that
the Northwest Ordinance was not "perpetual," see id. at 94, Taney discounted that part of
the Ordinance declaring that certain of its guarantees, including the ban on slavery, would
"forever remain unalterable unless by common consent." Id. (referring to the preamble to
Articles I-VI of the Northwest Ordinance). In Taney's view, even if Congress had the power
to make these provisions unalterable in the first place, the subsequent formation of the states
within the Northwest Territory and their adoption of state constitutions and laws amounted
to an alteration of the Ordinance "by common consent." Id. at 96.
319 Id. at 94, 97.
320 Id. at 95 (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,44 U.S. (3. How.) 212 (1844)). The principles
established by Pollards Lessee v. Hagan may have been clear to Taney, but the case is not an
easy one for the modern reader to fathom. Hagan was a dispute over ownership of property
in Mobile, Alabama, that was adjacent to navigable waters, in which one party's claim was
based on current Alabama land law and the other's was based on various U.S. laws and treaties
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Indiana had chosen to ban slavery by enacting laws consistent with the
Ordinance's anti-slavery provision, Taney believed that those state laws
"owe their validity and authority to the Constitution of the United States
and the constitutions and laws of the respective states, and not to the
authority of the [Northwest] Ordinance.
32'
Because the Strader defendants' argument for George, Reuben, and
Henry's freedom was based on the laws of the free states where they had
traveled and not on any federal law, the Kentucky decision under review
was not against the validity of any federally based claim. Therefore, Taney
concluded, "this court has no [section 25] jurisdiction of the case, and the
writ of error must on that ground be dismissed.1
3
11
Taney's jurisdictional holding was, as one commentator has put it,
"unexceptionable contemporary legal doctrine. '3 3 His opinion, however,
included two other views that made Strader important. First, he opined
that the Kentucky Court of Appeals had been correct in determining that,
even if Ohio and Indiana law treated Graham's slaves as free, their status
was to be governed by Kentucky slave law. According to Taney:
Every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic
and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory; except
in so far as the powers of the states in this respect are restrained, or duties
and obligations imposed on them, by the Constitution of the United States.
There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States that can in any
degree control the law of Kentucky upon this subject. And the condition of
the negroes, therefore, as to freedom or slavery, after their return, depended
altogether upon the laws of that state, and could not be influenced by the
that pre-dated Alabama's statehood. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 219-21.
The former won in the Alabama Supreme Court, and the latter, whose U.S.-based claims had
thereby been ruled against, sought review in the Supreme Court. The Court had section 25
jurisdiction, but it went on to affirm the Alabama court's judgment. See generally supra note
302 and accompanying text. In an opinion by Justice McKinley, the Court determined that
the earlier U.S. laws governing the Alabama territory "can have no controlling influence in the
decision of the case before us," because the "shores of navigable waters, and the soils under
them were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the
states respectively[, and] new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over
this subject as the original states." Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.(3 How.) at 230.
In Strader, Chief Justice Taney read Hagan as establishing the correct "reasoning and
principles" by which the "whole question" of the Northwest Ordinance's applicability to the
defendants' claims should be governed; that is, that these claims should be governed by the
current laws of Ohio and Indiana, rather than the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance,
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (1o How.) at 93-95, because these new states had the sovereign
right under Hagan to choose to adopt or reject the anti-slavery provision of the Northwest
Ordinance.
321 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (Io How.) at 95-97.
322 Id. at 97.
323 Wiecek, supra note 6, at 53, reprinted in THE LAw OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 654 (Kermit
H. Hall ed., t987).
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laws of Ohio. It was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to determine
for itself whether their employment in another State should or should not
make them free on their return.
324
This meant that the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision "that by the laws
of the state [of Kentucky] they continued to be slaves" was "conclusive
upon this court, and we have no jurisdiction over it."325 As we shall see, this
deference to state-court determinations regarding slavery would become
an important factor in the DredScott litigation.
32 6
Taney's second gratuitous point was even more dramatic. Having
announced that nothing in the U.S. Constitution limited state law on the
subject of slavery,327 he then went on to suggest that slavery could not be
limited in new states by Congress. This suggestion was in that part of
the Strader opinion holding that the Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery
provision was no longer in force.328 One reason it could not be in force,
wrote Taney, was that "it is impossible to look at" this provision "without
seeing at once that [it is] inconsistent with the present Constitution.'
' 329
According to Taney, the people who had migrated to the Northwest
Territory after adoption of the Constitution were "entitled to its benefits"
on an equal basis "as the people of the then existing states.1330 These
benefits included certain rights of "commerce" and the opportunity "in
due time... [to] be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with
the old states. ' 331 This meant that if the people of a state formed out of the
Northwest Territory chose to have slavery, that choice-being one that the
original states had been constitutionally entitled to make-could not be
limited by anything Congress had said in the Northwest Ordinance. The
Constitution extended to the people of the Northwest Territory "much
greater power over their municipal regulations and domestic concerns than
the [Northwest Ordinance] had agreed to concede. ' 332 In other words,
when the first Congress re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance, it exceeded
its constitutional power to the extent that this statute purported to ban
slavery in the new states. The fact that a state like Ohio had chosen to ban
slavery after it became a state was entirely a choice made by its people; this
determination could not be imposed by Congress.
333
324 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) at 93-94.
325 Id. at 94.
326 See infra text accompanying notes 430-31.
327 See supra text accompanying note 324.
328 See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying texts.
329 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) at 95.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. Taney conceded that many of the original Ordinance's key provisions, including
its ban on slavery, "have been the established law within this territory ever since the ordinance
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Taken together, Taney's two key dicta in Strader went a long way towards
establishing total state power over the issue of whether an individual was
slave or free. Nothing in the federal Constitution, either by itself or through
any power given to Congress, could limit what a state chose to do about
slavery. Furthermore, like his endorsement of state discretion to determine
the status of slaves, Taney's comments about the lack of congressional
power to require the people in a new territory to forever abandon slavery
would have a significant impact on Dred Scott.
334
D. The Two Concurring Opinions
Only two justices-McLean and Catron-refused to joinTaney's opinion
in Strader. Each wrote a brief opinion, concurring in the determination that
the Court lacked section 25 jurisdiction, but expressing concern with the
broader aspects of Taney's opinion.
3 5
Justice Catron, a senior member of the Court fromTennessee who would
take an active role in advocating for a broad pro-slavery decision in Dred
Scott,
33 6 dealt primarily with non-slavery issues. He first agreed with Taney
that the Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery provision had been replaced
in Ohio by a similar provision in that state's law and that, because the
defendants were therefore basing their freedom claim on state rather than
federal law, "no [section 25] jurisdiction exists to examine the [Kentucky]
state decision. '337 However, Catron's reason for believing that Ohio law had
replaced the Northwest Ordinance was different from Taney's. Catron felt
that, as a result of Ohio's constitutional ban of slavery having been agreed
to by Congress upon Ohio's admission as a state, the Ordinance's anti-
slavery provision had, according to its own terms, been altered "by common
consent. ' 338 As for the rest of the Ordinance's "unalterable" provisions,
however, Catron was "unwilling to express any opinion, as no part of either
is in any degree involved in this controversy."33 9 He suggested that these
other provisions, not having been altered, might still be in force and that
was passed." Id. He concluded, however, that this was because "in the States since formed
in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, owe their validity and
authority to the Constitution of the United States, and the constitutions and laws of the
respective States, and not to the authority of the [Northwest O]rdinance." Id. at 95-97.
334 See infra text accompanying notes 426-27.
335 See Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (Io How.) at 97-98.
336 See infra notes 414-15 and accompanying texts. For more on Justice Carron's
background and service on the Court, see supra note 282 and accompanying text; Frank Otto
Gatell, John Catron, in I THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-I969, at
737-49 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) [hereinafter JUSTICES-I].
337 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (Io How.) at 98.
338 See id. (referring to the Northwest Ordinance's provision that its articles would
"forever remain unalterable unless by common consent").
339 Id.
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this would be consistent with the Constitution.34 Catron was particularly
concerned about the on-going validity of a provision in the Ordinance's
fourth article, which "secured the free navigation of the waters leading into
the rivers Mississippi and St. Lawrence." 34 He considered maintenance of
such free navigation to have been "a wholesome course of decision," one
he was "unwilling to disturb" in a case like Strader "where the fourth article
is in no wise [sic] involved. 34Z
Justice McLean's concurrence in Strader focused exclusively on the
jurisdictional issue and, though shorter than Catron's, proved to be more
significant. McLean, a former Ohio Supreme Court justice and politician
from Cincinnati, had been on the Court since 1829 and was its most senior
justice at the time of Strader.343 Later in his career, he would pen one of
the two dissents in Dred Scott and also entertain hopes of becoming the
Republican nominee for president in 1856.34
McLean's concurrence agreed with the Court and Catron that section
25 jurisdiction was lacking because the defendants' freedom claim was
based on state rather than federal law.3'5 McLean believed that the
Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery provision "was incorporated into the
constitution of Ohio, which received the sanction of Congress when the
state was admitted into the Union," meaning that this Ohio constitutional
provision "must be considered, in regard to the prohibition of slavery, as
substituted for the ordinance."'  As a result, McLean wrote, "all questions
of freedom must arise under the [Ohio] constitution, and not under the
Ordinance. This ... decides the question of jurisdiction, which is the only
question before us." 347 This meant, as McLean pointedly concluded his
opinion, that "anything that is said in the opinion of the court, in relation
to the ordinance beyond this, is not in the case, and is, consequently,
extrajudicial." 348
340 See id. According to Catron, the Northwest Ordinance was an "engagement entered
into" before the Constitution's adoption, id., and therefore, in the words of Art. VI, "shall be
as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation." See
U S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
341 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) at 98 (referring to article four of the Northwest
Ordinance).
342 Id. at 99.
343 For more on Justice McLean's background and service on the Court, see supra note
28o and accompanying text; Frank Otto Gatell, John McLean, in JUSTIcES-I, supra note 336, at
535-46.
344 See infra note 409 and accompanying text. McLean also had presidential aspirations
earlier in his career. See HAL, supra note z8o, at 81.
345 Straderv. Graham, 51 U.S. (io How.) at 96-97.
346 Id. at 97.
347 Id.
348 Id.
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E. Summary of the Supreme Court's Performance in Strader
As the two concurring opinions demonstrate, it was possible for the
Court in Strader to decide the case based on its lack of jurisdiction without
the Justices' expressing their views on other issues. Indeed, until Strader,
the Court's practice in cases where it found section 25 jurisdiction lacking
had simply been to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction without
commenting on the merits of the federal issue.349 Of course, as the Strader
concurrences showed, some comment on the meaning of the relevant U.S.
law was necessary in such cases to explain why that law was not the source
of the appealing party's challenge to the state court's decision.3 0 And there
had been a few pre-Strader cases in which the Court went beyond what
seemed necessary in discussing the lurking federal law before concluding
that that law did not apply and therefore section 25 jurisdiction failed. 31
Still, Taney's opinion seemed extreme in this regard. As noted above,
he used Strader to opine not only that the Kentucky Court of Appeals had
correctly handled the slavery issue, but also that Congress was without
constitutional power to ban slavery in perpetuity in the Northwest
Ordinance-and therefore presumably in any other territory where new
states were to be formed.
35
1
Even more remarkable, Taney was able to persuade six other Justices to
join this opinion and to eschew the more narrow ground advocated by their
senior colleagues, Justices McLean and Catron. These six other Justices
349 See, e.g., Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 61o (1845) (cited on
other grounds in Strader by Chief Justice Taney, see supra note 317 and accompanying text);
McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 693, 707 (1845); The Commonwealth Bank v.
Griffith, 39 U.S. (I4 Pet.) 56, 58-59 (1840); M'Bride v. Hoey, 36 U.S. (ii Pet.) 167, 171-72
(1837); Cromwell v. Randall, 35 U.S. (IO Pet.) 368, 398 (1836); City of New Orleans v. De
Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 235-36 (1835); Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505, 517 (1831);
Fisher v. Cockrell, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 248, 259 (1831); Hickie v. Starke, 26 U.S. (i Pet.) 94,98-99
(1828); Winn v. Jackson, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 135-36 (1827); Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. (1z
Wheat.) 117, 128 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 448, 449-5o (18i); Miller v.
Nicholls, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 311, 315 (1819); Houston v. Moore, i6 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 433, 434
(I818); Inglee v. Coolidge, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 363, 368 (1817); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 350 (18o9); Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) z68, 269 (18o6).
Under such circumstances, Chief Justice Marshall early on established the practice of
denying costs to the party that had successfully argued the absence of section 25 jurisdiction.
SeeInglee, i 5 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 368 ("The court does not give costs where a cause is dismissed
for want of jurisdiction."); accord Houston, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 434. This practice was invoked
by the Court in denying costs to Dr. Graham after he prevailed based on the absence of
section 25 jurisdiction. See infra note 382 and accompanying text.
350 See supra notes 337-38 and 345-47 and accompanying texts.
351 See, e.g., Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505,514-15 (1831) (described supra notes
310-14 and accompanying texts); see also Fisher v. Cockrell, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 248, 253-55, 258-
63 (1831) (presuming, over a dissent, how the state court proceedings below dealt with a
particular land-title issue on appeal).
352 Seesupra notes 324-33 and accompanying texts.
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thus made Strader an indicator of just how willing the Supreme Court
was in the early 1850s to defend a state's efforts to maintain slavery and
also to curb any federal attempt to restrict those efforts. And four of these
Justices-Wayne, Daniel, Nelson, and Grier-would still be on the Court
six years later to help Taney form a majority to rule against Dred Scott's
claim for freedom.
3 53
IV. AFTERWARDS: THE IMPACT OF STRADER V. GRAHAM
A. Post-Strader Events
The Nation was made aware of the Supreme Court's decision in Strader,
but the reaction it engendered seems to have been modest. Four days
after the Court's ruling, at least one Washington newspaper covered "the
decision at length. ' 354 The first Kentucky-area paper to report on Strader
was Cincinnati's Enquirer, which published an eight-paragraph article on
January 14, 1851, entitled "Important Slave Case Decision."355 Two days
later, both of Louisville's major newspapers reported the Strader decision,
with the Louisville Daily Journal providing without comment an excerpted
version of Chief Justice Taney's opinion356 and the Louisville Daily Courier
simply re-printing the Cincinnati Enquirer's story.
35 7
This latter article provided a summary of the case's facts and Taney's
opinion, concluding that the main point of the decision was that the
Northwest Ordinance "ceased to be of any binding force; and if in force,
could have no influence on the State laws of Kentucky."3  This being
the "substance of the decision," the article accepted Taney's view that this
"was so decided by the same court in Pollard vs. Hagan, 3 How. 212," 319
thereby implying that Strader had not broken any new ground. The main
commentary provided in the article was based on a factual error-that
Taney's decision for the Court was "dissented from by Judges McLean,
Wayne and Catron.
' 36
0
353 See infra note 4o6 and accompanying text.
354 Important Slave Case Decision, CINCINNATI DAILY ENQUIRER, Jan. 14, 1851, at 2
(referring to coverage in the WASHINGTON REPUBLIC of Jan. io, 1851); see also id. (referring to
"an item in the Washington Union, which stated than an important case was decided in the
Supreme Court of the United States on the 6th inst .... on the subject of slavery").
355 Important Slave Case Decision, CINCINNATI DAILY ENQUIRER, Jan. 14, 1851, at 2. This
article mentioned that the Enquirer had also "alluded" to a Washington newspaper's report of
the case "Saturday last" (i.e., January I I, 1851). Id.
356 See Supreme Court of the United States, LOUISVILLE DAILY J., Jan. 16, 85i, at 3.
357 See Important Slave Case Decision, LoUIsvILLE DAILY COURIER, Jan. 16, I851, at 3.
358 Id.
359 Id.
36o Id. The article's final paragraph commented: "It will be remarked, that of the
three judges who dissented, two are from slave States-Wayne, of Georgia, and Catron, of
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The limited coverage of Strader provided by the Louisville newspapers
seems somewhat surprising, given the fact that both regularly reported
what they viewed as important news from Washington. 361 Obviously, the
papers understood the importance of the case's subject matter, as evinced
by the Louisville Daily Courier's publication a few days later of a full column
devoted to a Senate speech by Henry Clay in which he presented a petition
that identified slavery as "the greatest cause of discord" in "our land."
3 6
1
On this issue, however, the Nation was still focused primarily on the
recently enacted Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.363 The Strader decision,
to the extent it was noted nationally, was generally seen as a part of the
overall slavery debate that the 1850 legislation was designed to diffuse.
Thus, for example, in April of 1851, a pro-slavery periodical published an
article that, in the course of challenging Northerners to obey the new law
lest they become responsible for nullification of the entire Compromise
of 1850, simply mentioned Strader in a footnote for the proposition that
"the Constitution and Laws of the United States have superseded" the
Northwest Ordinance's anti-slavery provision.
364
On the other side, Kentucky-born abolitionist leader James G. Birney
36s
sharply criticized Taney's opinion in Strader in an 1852 pamphlet in which
he charged that "in order to reach our colored people---especially the
Tennessee-and one, McLean, from a free State. Of the Judges who concurred in the opinion,
three are from slave states and three from free States." In reality, as described above, there
was no dissent in Strader, although McLean and Catron (but not Wayne) did file concurring
opinions. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying texts.
361 For example, on the very page with its report of Taney's opinion in Strader, the
Louisville Daily Journal included a five-paragraph report on the previous day's activities in
Congress. See Thirty-First Congress-Second Session, LOUISVILLE DAILY J., Jan. 16, 1851, at
3; see also infra note 362 and accompanying text (reporting on a recent speech by Senator
Clay); Opinion of Foreign Papers in Regard to President Fillmore and His Message-Goin's Speech
in the Senate on the California Question, &c., &c, LOUISVILLE DAILY CoURIER, Jan. 14, 1851,
at 2 (reporting on reactions to an address by President Fillmore); Mr. Crittenden's Levee, on
New Year's Day-The Ritchie and Rives Quarrel-Publication of Letters from Gen. Jackson by Mr
Blair---Gvn. Foote's Union Speech in Philadelphia-Feeling in Favor of a Union Ticket at the Next
Presidential Election-The Austrian Charge d'Affaires at the Hon. Daniel Webster's on New Year's
Day-Attempt of the Abolitionists to Create Unkind Feeling Between Messrs. Clay and Webster, &c.,
&c, LOUISVILLE DAILY COURIER, Jan. 9, 1851, at 2 (reporting on New Year's Day events in
Washington, including a reception given by Attorney General Crittenden).
362 Colonization--Slave Trade: Mr. Clay' rSpeech, LOUISVILLE DAILY COURIER,Jan. 22, 1851,
at 2 (quoting "Mr. Clay's Speech" of Jan. 15, 185I).
363 See supra note 269.
364 The Fugitive Slave Law; Shall ItBe Enforced?, U.S. MAGAZINE AND DEMOCRATIC REVIEW,
Apr. 1851, at 352, 356 n.*. This article warned that if "the free states [were] prepared to say,
that.., the delivery of fugitive slaves, has become so odious and distasteful ... that they will
no longer carry it out .... a refusal here ... will fully justify the other party[] in a dissolution
at their volition.... It is, then, a question of Union or disunion.... Well may the free states
pause and ponder." Id. at 358-59.
365 See supra note 89.
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free portion of them-our Supreme Court are willing to trample down &
disregard the constitutional safeguards of all our rights."366 According to
Birney, Strader's holding would help empower southern states to enslave
any free black found within their borders.3 67 This, in turn, would virtually
legitimize kidnapping of northern blacks under the easy mechanism of the
1850 Fugitive Slave Act.368 Free blacks in free states were therefore little
better off than slaves in the South in terms of security for their personal
liberty, and Birney despondently recommended that blacks migrate to
Liberia.
3 69
Also in 1852, Harriet Beecher Stowe, a Cincinnati native, published her
novel about slavery, Uncle Tom's Cabin,370 which featured a dramatic escape
by a black woman and her child from northern Kentucky across a half-
frozen Ohio River to freedom in the North. The book was a best-seller
whose harsh view of slavery generated strong reactions in both the North
and the South,371 and Lincoln, as president, would later greet Stowe by
remarking, "So this is the little lady who made this big war?
'372
The 1852 presidential election resulted in a landslide victory for
the Democratic candidate Franklin Pierce.373 The Whig party, having
engineered the Compromise of 1850, was dying, as those in the South
found its emphasis on national power threatening and those in the North
and West found its support for slavery's on-going power unacceptable. The
Whigs' greatest leader, Henry Clay, died in 1852.1
7
1
Anti-slavery Whigs founded the Republican party in 1854, and its
first candidates stood for election that year.375 Earlier in 1854, Congress
passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 376 which provided that each of these two
new states would choose whether to have slavery, despite their being north
of the "free" line established by the 1820 Missouri Compromise.3 77 The
366 Wiecek, supra note 6, at 54, reprinted in THE LAW OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 655 (Kermit
H. Hall ed., 1987) (quoting James G. Birney).
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (1852).
371 See, e.g., SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN
656-57 (2005).
372 See DONALD, supra note 4, at 542.
373 J. CLARK ARCHER ET AL., HISTORICAL ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1877-
2004, at 67-68 (2006).
374 See supra note 96.
375 See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 4, at I8o-8I.
376 See Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, io Stat. 277. The political events leading up to
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act are described in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at I78-87.
377 See infra note 385.
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Kansas-Nebraska Act created a "firestorm" in the North, energizing the
new Republican Party and bringing Lincoln out of political retirement.
3 8
Five years passed between the Supreme Court's decision in Strader and
the first oral argument in Dred Scott in early 1856. 379 During this period,
two new justices joined the Court: Benjamin Curtis, a Massachusetts Whig,
appointed by President Fillmore in late 1851 to fill the seat made vacant
by the death of Justice Woodbury;1 0 and John Campbell, an Alabama
Democrat appointed by President Pierce in 1853 to the seat made vacant
by the death a year earlier of Justice McKinley.
381
These new justices were in place by the time the Court denied
Crittenden's motion for an award of costs on behalf of Dr. Graham in the
Strader litigation on May 9, 1856.382 Three years earlier in 1853, Graham
had sold his resort in Harrodsburg.3 3
B. The Dred Scott Case
1. Background and Supreme Court Opinions.-The basic facts of the Dred
Scott case are well known. 384  Scott was a Missouri slave owned by an
Army surgeon, John Emerson, who took Scott with him in 1834 to a fort
in Illinois, a free state, and then in 1836 to a fort in Minnesota, a territory
where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820.385 In
1838, Scott returned to Missouri with Mrs. Emerson while Dr. Emerson
continued to travel with the Army until his death in 1843, when his widow
became Scott's owner. In 1846, Scott sued Mrs. Emerson for his freedom
in a Missouri state court, claiming that his time in Illinois and Minnesota
made him free. 3 6 After more than five years of litigation-during which
378 See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 4, at 168-71; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 188-92.
379 See supra note z6o and accompanying text and infra note 399 and accompanying
text.
380 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1850.
381 See id.
382 See Strader v. Graham, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 602 (1856); Ashmore, supra note 26o, at 67.
The basis for this denial was that the Court did not make such an award "in a case dismissed
for want of jurisdiction." Strader v. Graham, 59 U.S. (j8 How.) at 602. See generally supra note
349 para. 2.
383 See supra note 134.
384 The background of the Dred Scott case given in this and the following textual
paragraph is based on FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 239-83.
385 Enacted by Congress on March 6, I82O, the Missouri Compromise provided that
Missouri would be admitted to the Union as a slave state, but prohibited slavery in other areas
covered by the Louisiana Purchase north of latitude 36* 30' (i.e., Missouri's southern border);
territories below this line could decide whether to allow slavery and could make that choice
when admitted as states. See Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, 545-48.
386 Both this suit and Scott's later federal suit were also brought on behalf of his wife and
their two children. See FEHRENBACHER, Supra note 4, at 250, 251 n.2, 255, 276 n.25.
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time the Strader case was making its way to the Kentucky Court of Appeals
for the second time and then to the U.S. Supreme Court38 7-the Missouri
Supreme Court in 1852 ruled against Scott, holding that he was still a slave
under Missouri law.
388
Scott could not appeal this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court under the
jurisdictional precedent laid down in Strader.89 Therefore, he brought a
new action to secure his freedom in a U.S. trial court in Missouri against
John Sanford,3" the brother of Mrs. Emerson to whom Scott had been
sold.39' Sanford was a citizen of New York, and Scott invoked the federal
court's diversity jurisdiction based on the claim that he was a citizen of
Missouri. Sanford disputed Scott's claim to citizenship, thereby challenging
both Scott's right to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction and his claim
to freedom on the merits. The federal court rejected the challenge to its
jurisdiction, but ruled against Scott in a trial on the merits in 1854, holding
that, based on Missouri law and the Missouri Supreme Court's earlier
387 See supra notes 250-51 and 26o-61 and accompanying texts.
388 Scott v. Emerson, I5 Mo. 576 (Mo. 1852). This ruling reversed a jury verdict in
favor of Scott, who had initially lost but succeeded in having that first verdict set aside on
a technicality. See Emmerson [sic] v. Scott, i1 Mo. 413 (Mo. 1848) (affirming trial court's
grant of a new trial for Scott, which Mrs. Emerson challenged in an interlocutory appeal).
The Missouri court proceedings in DredScott are described in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at
250-65, and Boman, supra note 75, at 420-28.
In ruling against Scott in 1852, the Missouri Supreme Court relied on Justice Taney's
opinion in Strader to support its view that a slave who returns with his master after spending
time in a free state remains a slave. See Boman, supra note 75, at 425-26 (discussing Scott v.
Emerson, 15 Mo. at 586-87).
389 See supra notes 315-23 and accompanying texts. This point would be confirmed in
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott, which stated:
If the plaintiff supposed that this judgment of the Supreme Court of
the State was erroneous, and that this court had jurisdiction to revise
and reverse it, the only mode by which he could legally bring it before
this court was by writ of error directed to the Supreme Court of the
State, requiring it to transmit the record to this court. If this had been
done, it is too plain for argument that the writ must have been dismissed
for want of jurisdiction in this court. The case of Strader and others v.
Graham is directly in point; and, indeed, independent of any decision,
the language of the 25th section of the act of 1789 is too clear and precise
to admit of controversy.
Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393, 453 (1857). For an argument that Strader did not block
Dred Scott's appeal, see FEIHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 269 (noting that Scott's freedom claim
had been based on U.S. law (i.e., the 182o Missouri Compromise that provided for freedom
in the Minnesota territory) whereas the freedom claim in Strader was seen to be based on the
state laws of Ohio and Indiana, and characterizing Taney's conclusion to the contrary in the
quotation above as "preposterous").
390 Sanford's name is misspelled in the official U.S. report of the Dred Scott case as
"Sandford." See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at ix.
391 Id. at 270-76.
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decision against Scott, he was still a slave.3 9 Scott challenged this judgment
by bringing a writ of error in the U.S. Supreme Court.3 93
The jurisdictional problem in Dred Scott, unlike the one in Strader,
did not involve the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, which in Dred Scott was
clearly appropriate under a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act that gave the
high court jurisdiction to review certain decisions of lower federal courts."
Rather, the problem was whether the U.S. trial court had jurisdiction based
on diversity,39 a problem that, then as now, could be raised throughout the
litigation, even at the appellate stage in the Supreme Court.
396
392 It seems natural in the modern era after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), for a federal court sitting in diversity to follow state law, but in the nineteenth century,
such a court was empowered to disagree with the Missouri Supreme Court's view and to have
ruled that Missouri law favored Scott. See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842),
overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This point, as illustrated by Swift,
is further discussed infra note 432 para. 2.
393 See Scott v. Sandford (DredScott), 60 U.S. (i9 How.) 393, 396, 400 (1857). For more
on the significance of the "writ of error" procedure by which this Supreme Court review was
conducted, see supra notes 259 para. 2, 297.
394 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84-85, which provided, inter alia,
that
upon a writ of error,.., final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and
suits in equity in a circuit court, brought there by original process...
[may] be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court
.... But there shall be no reversal ... on such writ of error for error in
ruling any plea in abatement, other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the
court, or such plea to a petition or bill in equity, as is in the nature of a
demurrer, or for any error in fact.
395 Diversity jurisdiction has always included both constitutional and statutory
components. In the Constitution, Article III's section 2 grants the federal judiciary power
over only a specified set of disputes, one of which is "Controversies ... between Citizens of
different States." In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established a system of lower federal
courts and provided, in section i I, that the U.S. circuit courts-then the principal trial courts-
would have original jurisdiction where "the suit is between a citizen of the State where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § i I, I Stat. 73,
78-79. In 1875, Congress amended this statute to eliminate the local-party requirement, thus
broadening diversity jurisdiction to include all suits between "citizens of different States," see
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 , 470, which is the phrasing that has continued
through the present day. See z8 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (zooo). The only statutory changes to
this particular type of jurisdiction since 1875 have been periodic increases to the additional
amount-in-controversy requirement, which was originally set at $500 in 1875 and is today
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
396 See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (18o4) (illustrating "then"
by reversing judgment below upon finding that the trial court lacked diversity jurisdiction).
This rule has been steadfastly maintained throughout the two centuries since Capron. See,
e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 369-77 (1978); Mitchell v. Maurer,
293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. 172, 178 (1871); Freeman v. Nw.
Acceptance Corp., 754 Ezd 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1985).
Justice McLean's dissent in DredScot, however, argued that the jurisdictional point could
be and had been waived because of the particular responsive technique employed by the
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As to the merits (i.e., Scott's freedom and thereby capacity for
citizenship), both sides cited Strader in their briefs. Scott's lawyer argued
that the Straderopinion's recognition of the first Congress's re-enactment of
the Northwest Ordinance showed the Court felt that congressional power
over slavery in the territories had been appropriately exercised there and
thus was constitutional here.397 For his part, Sanford's lawyer quoted that
part of the Strader opinion recognizing each state's power to determine the
slave-or-free status of all residents within its borders, by way of arguing that
Missouri's determination here that Scott was still a slave should control.
398
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dred Scott for four days in
February of 1856.3 99 Three months later, the Court ordered that the case be
re-argued, 4°° which did not occur until mid-December 1 In the meantime,
national elections were held in which Democrat James Buchanan won the
presidency by a narrow margin over John C. Fremont, the Republicans'
first presidential nominee.
40
1
After the second argument in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court met in
private and voted 7-2 against Scott.4°3 The majority was made up of:
defendant (a "plea in abatement"). SeeScottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 529-32 (McLean,
J., dissenting). In their initial consideration of the case, the Justices were divided over this
issue. See John S. Vishneski III, What the Court Decided in DredScottv. Sandford, 32 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 373, 377-39 (1988); infra note 400. When the final opinions were delivered, however, a
majority favored reviewing the jurisdiction point, see Vishneski, supra, at 404,409-Il, and only
Justice McLean's opinion continued to dispute this point.
397 See 3 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214, 216 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978).
398 Id. at 236. This brief also cited the Kentucky Court of Appeals' first decision in
Straderto support the propositions that an owner's taking a slave to a free state for a temporary
stay did not establish the slave's freedom and that, upon their return to a slave state, the
owner's full control of the slave must be recognized. Id. at 233-34.
399 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 288.
400 See id. at 29 o (suggesting that the Court ordered re-argument because it was split over
whether the jurisdictional point had been preserved); SWISHER, supra note 4, at 608 (same, and
noting that postponement of the decision "deprived the newly organized Republican Party
of what might have been grist for campaign oratory in its first Presidential campaign. In
particular, it deprived Justice McLean of the opportunity to deliver a ringing dissent, with a
denunciation of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, as a means of getting the nomination.").
401 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 290, 293. John J. Crittenden, now a U.S. Senator,
attended this argument, and his presence was noted by Scott's new lawyer (George Curtis, the
brother of Justice Curtis, see id. at 293), who was discussing Kentucky's status at the time of
the Northwest Ordinance's enactment when he remarked: ".... Kentucky, of whose matured
sovereignty we are reminded by the benignant presence of my venerable friend, her Senator,
(Mr. Crittenden,), was then just ready, in her stalwart youth, to be separated from her parent,
Virginia." See 3 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 397, at 255.
402 See CARDINAL GOODWIN, JOHN CHARLES FREMONT vii (1930); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1789-1968, at 1032 (1971).
403 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 305-06.
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" Chief Justice Taney;
" Justice Campbell, a pro-slavery Alabama Democrat who had replaced
Justice McKinley,4 who in 1851 had joined Taney's opinion in Strader, 4 5
- Justices Wayne, Daniel, Nelson, and Grier, all of whom had joined Taney's
opinion in Strader and were still on the Court;4 and,
* Justice Catron, who had filed a concurring opinion in Strader. 4 7
All seven of these Justices had been appointed by Democratic presidents,
and all except Nelson and Grier were from slave states.408 The two votes
for Scott came from Justices McLean and Curtis: the former was the Court's
most senior member, had written one of the concurring opinion in Strader,
and, in the interim, had sought the Republican presidential nomination
in 1856;4 the latter, a Massachusetts Whig, was the Court's second most
junior member,40 having six years earlier replaced Justice Woodbury, who
had joined Taney's Strader opinion. 41 ' (No member of the Court at the
time of Dred Scott was a Kentuckian, a situation that was unusual in the
nineteenth century.412 )
Initially, the Court's principal opinion was assigned to Justice Nelson,
one of two Northerners in the majority, who focused solely on the lack
of diversity jurisdiction based on Scott's slave status in Missouri, noting
that Strader had established that a territorial law of Congress could have
no extraterritorial force superior to that of state law. 413 As the weeks wore
404 See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
405 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
406 See supra notes 315, 353 and accompanying texts.
407 See supra note 337-42 and accompanying texts.
408 The slave-state Justices were Taney from Maryland; Wayne from Georgia; Catron
from Tennessee; Daniel from Virginia; and Campbell from Alabama. See supra notes 279,
281-84, 381 and accompanying texts. Nelson was from New York, and Grier was from
Pennsylvania. See supra notes 285, 287 and accompanying texts.
409 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 291 (noting that "McLean had strong support at
the Republican convention, receiving about 35 per cent of the votes on a first informal ballot"
before Fremont was eventually chosen); supra note 400.
410 See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
411 Seesupra notes 286, 315 and accompanying texts.
412 The first Kentuckian to become a member of the Supreme Court was Thomas Todd,
who was appointed by President Jefferson in 1807 and served until 1826. See COHEN ET AL.,
supra note 267, at 1848-49. He was succeeded by another Kentuckian, Robert Trimble, who
served until I828. Id. at 1849. As noted above, Justice McKinley, who was a member of the
Court from 1837 to 1852, had strong Kentucky ties and lived in Lexington toward the end
of his tenure. See supra note 283. The first Kentuckian to become a Supreme Court Justice
after the Civil War was John Marshall Harlan, who served from 1877 until 1911, see COHEN ET
AL., supra note 267, at 1851-52, and came to be considered one of the Court's greatest justices
based, inter alia, on his now vindicated dissent in Plessy v. Feiguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. od Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See HALL, Supra note 280, at 173-77.
413 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 307-08; SWISHER, supra note 4, at 618-19. Nelson's
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on, however, backroom negotiations-including a series of letters in
which Justice Catron alerted president-elect Buchanan of the case's likely
outcome and the latter agreed to help lobby his fellow Pennsylvanian,
Justice Grier, to join a broader pro-slavery decision 4 14-led Chief Justice
Taney to draft what would become the Court's main opinion, one that was
eventually agreed to by all of the concurring Justices except Nelson.
4I
On March 6, 1857, two days after Buchanan's inauguration, 4 6 the Court
handed down its decision in the Dred Scott case in a series of opinions by
all nine Justices that take up 234 pages in the U.S. Reports.417 As he had
in Strader, Taney authored the principal opinion. The Chief Justice first
concluded that the trial court lacked power to hear Scott's suit for want of
diversity jurisdiction.48  This conclusion was based on Taney's view that
African slaves and their descendants could never become citizens under the
Constitution and thus could not claim a citizen's rights or privileges under
that document, including the right to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.
41 9
eventual opinion maintained this position, but it was not joined by any other Justice. See Scott
v. Sandford (DredScott), 6o U.S. (i 9 How.) 393,457-69 (1857).
414 See FEHRENBACHER, SUpra note 4, at 307, 309-12; SWISHER, supra note 4, at 616-I8.
415 See Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i 9 How.) at 399-454. Taney's opinion is described infra
text accompanying notes 418-33.
416 In his inaugural address on March 4, Buchanan referred to the issue of how the western
territories would determine whether to have slavery and stated, somewhat disingenuously
given his advanced knowledge:
This is, happily, a matter of but little practical importance. Besides,
it is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme
Court of the Untied States, before whom it is now pending, and will,
it is understood, be speedily and finally settled. To their decision, in
common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit, whatever this
may be.
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 313.
417 Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (I9 How.) at 399-633.
418 Id. at 403-3 o . Five of the six other concurring Justices agreed with Taney on
this jurisdictional point. See id. at 457-59 (Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 454-55 (Wayne, J.
concurring); id. at 472-82 (Daniel, J. concurring); id. at 493,517-18 (Campbell, J. concurring);
id. at 469 (Grier, J. concurring). Justice Catron felt that Scott's claim sufficiently disclosed
a diversity case, but that Scott should lose on the merits. See id. at 518-i9 (Catron, J.,
concurring). Both dissenters thought that jurisdiction was proper, but for different reasons:
Justice McLean felt that the defendant could not challenge the trial court's jurisdiction in this
type of appeal, id. at 530-33 (McLean, J., dissenting), while Justice Curtis believed that the
Supreme Court could review this point, but that Scott's pleading was sufficient to establish
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 564-88 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
419 See Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) at 405-07. In so holding, Taney was requiring
that, for a person to invoke diversity jurisdiction, he must be a citizen of the United States
as well as a state citizen and that the latter did not necessarily establish the former. Justice
Curtis's dissent, by contrast, opined that "every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a
citizen of that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States."
Id. at 576.
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Taney described such people as "an inferior class of beings" who were
"doomed to slavery"412 and who, at the time of the Constitution's adoption,
were simply not thought to be part of the governing people.4"' Noting that
state laws then in existence generally did not recognize blacks as citizens,
42
Taney concluded that a "perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to
be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to
slavery."42 3 In any event, according to Taney, even if a state were to grant
blacks freedom and civil benefits such as the right to vote, this would be
insufficient to make them U.S. citizens entitled to sue in federal court.
42 4
The Supreme Court could have ended its decision based on this
jurisdictional ruling,4 5 but Taney decided, as he had in Strader, to go further.
On the merits of the case, the Chief Justice opined that Scott's time in
Minnesota and Illinois had not made him free, because Congress lacked
power to limit the rights of white settlors in new territories to have slaves.
4 6
To so limit slaveholding settlors would violate their Fifth Amendment
property rights.4 7  Since slave owners could not be constitutionally
limited by Congress, its determination in the Missouri Compromise to
outlaw slavery in the Minnesota territory and other northern places was
unconstitutional, 48 a conclusion that five of the six concurring justices
specifically endorsed.
4 9
420 Id. at 405, 410; see also id. at 407 (referring to them as an "an inferior order").
421 Id. at 404-05. Justice Daniel's concurring opinion made the same point, arguing
that "the introduction of that [African] race into every section of this country was not as
members of civil or political society, but as slaves, as property in the strictest sense of the
term," meaning that "the African was not deemed politically a person." Id. at 475,481 (Daniel,
J., concurring).
422 Id. at 412-17 (majority opinion). Taney here cited an 1822 Kentucky case for the
proposition that even free negroes were not considered citizens. Id. at 413. Although Taney
did not name this case, it appears to be Amy v. Smith, i i Ky. (i Litt.) 326 (Ky. 1822), which is
described supra note 83.
423 Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) at 4o9.
424 Id. at 405-o6.
425 See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) iz6 (18o4) (described supra note
396);seealso Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1lZ, 114-15 (1834) (reversing plaintiff's judgment
based on his failure to aver positively that defendant was a citizen of a diverse state from the
plaintiff's state without discussing the merits of the case).
Indeed, there is evidence that a prior draft of Justice Nelson's opinion, which relied solely
on the jurisdictional point and Strader, see infra notes 434-37 and accompanying texts, was
originally to be the Court's opinion. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
426 Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) at 432-52.
427 Id. at 450-52. According to Taney, "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution." Id. at 451.
428 Id. at 452. Under the same reasoning, Scott's time in Illinois could not make him
free. Id. at 452-54.
429 See id. at 454-56 (Wayne, J. concurring); id. at 482-92 (Daniel, J. concurring); id. at 517
(Campbell, J. concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J. concurring); id. at 519-29 (Catron, J. concurring).
The remaining concurrence-Justice Nelson's-rejected Scott's claim solely on jurisdictional
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Because no federal power could make Scott free, his status, under Strader,
was to be based on the law of the state where he resided.430 According to
Taney, this part of the Dred Scott case depended on a principle that:
was decided in this court, upon much consideration, in the case of Strader
et al. v. Graham, reported in 10th Howard, 82. In that case, the slaves had
been taken from Kentucky to Ohio, with the consent of the owner, and
afterwards brought back to Kentucky. And this court held that their status
or condition, as free or slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when
they were brought back into that State, and not of Ohio, and that this court
had no jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State court upon its own
laws. This was the point directly before the court, and the decision that
this court had not jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the report
of the case.
So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by
his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in that character,
his status, as free or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of
Illinois.43'
Taney then determined that the laws of Missouri considered Scott a slave,
as shown particularly by the Missouri Supreme Court's earlier ruling
against Scott.42 Taney concluded, therefore, that Scott remained a slave
and rejected his claim to freedom.
433
grounds. See id. at 457-69 (Nelson, J., concurring).
Both dissenters would have upheld the Missouri Compromise, being of the view that
Congress's power to govern the territories and admit new states was sufficient to justify
banning slavery in these areas. See id. at 539-47 (McLean, J., dissenting), and id. at 604-33
(Curtis, J., dissenting).
430 Id. at 452 (majority opinion).
431 Id.
432 Id. at 452-54. Interestingly, the two dissenters agreed that Scott's status upon
his return to Missouri was to be determined by Missouri law, but, contrary to Taney, they
concluded that Missouri law did recognize Scott's freedom based on his time on free soil.
See id. at 555-64 (McLean, J., dissenting), and id. at 594-95 (Curtis, J., dissenting). For a
modern argument that the Missouri Supreme Court in Dred Scott had indeed deviated from
prior Missouri decisions in ruling against Scott, see Boman, supra note 75, at 420-26.
The dissents' idea that federal judges in a diversity case are entitled to interpret a state's
law inconsistently with a recent state supreme court decision seems odd to a modern reader
familiar with the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (I938), but this was not
unusual in the pre-Erie days of DredScott. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, 18 (1842)
(holding, in a commercial case, that state court decisions are not binding on U.S. courts in
diversity cases if those decisions "differ from the principles of established general commercial
law"); see also Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (i8 How.) 595, 598-99 (1856) (describing, in a diversity
case decided the year before DredScott, the circumstances under which federal courts have a
right not to defer to a state supreme court's interpretation of that state's law). Indeed, Taney's
opinion, itself, included a review of Missouri law as a necessary element in determining Scott's
status. See Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i 9 How.) at 452-54.
433 Within a few weeks of the Supreme Court's decision, Sanford died, and Dred Scott
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Among the seven justices voting against Scott, only Justice Nelson chose
to limit his opinion to the jurisdictional point.4" Nelson's opinion relied
heavily on Strader.435 He concluded that Strader's principle of exclusive
state sovereignty over the status of its people and slaves was not affected by
the Northwest Ordinance nor could it have been constitutionally, because
Congress "possesses no power to regulate or abolish slavery within the
States." 436 Because Missouri law, as determined by the Missouri Supreme
Court, held Scott to be a slave, that, "according to the decision in the case
of Straderetalv. Graham, is conclusive of the case in this court. '437 Another
concurring opinion-that of Justice Daniel-also relied on Strader to
support his view that the Northwest Ordinance ceased to be in effect after
adoption of the Constitution.
438
Thus, Nelson, Daniel, and Taney cited Strader for what they viewed
as the principle it established (i.e., that state, not federal law, controlled
whether a person was slave or free), and Taney went even further by viewing
Strader as establishing which state's law controlled this determination. In
doing so, all three relied on Strader as making authoritative substantive
rulings, not merely determining that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction
to decide that case.
Taney in particular seemed anxious to push Strader beyond its obvious
limits. Thus, even though he recognized that Strader's holding was that the
Court "had no jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State court upon its own
laws,' 439 he still went on to say that one of his key substantive conclusions-
that Scott's status was to be controlled by "the laws of Missouri, and not of
Illinois"-was the "point directly before the court" in Strader.440 Taney
concluded this part of his opinion with an obvious misstatement-that "the
decision [in Strader] that this court had not jurisdiction turned upon it [that
and his family were freed by their new owners. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 272.
434 See supra note 429.
435 SeeScottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 462-66.
436 Id. at 464.
437 Id. at 466.
438 See id. at 490-91 (Daniel, J., concurring). According to this part of Justice Daniel's
opinion:
This court has, in repeated instances, ruled, that whatever may have
been the force according to this ordinance of 1787 at the period of its
enactment, its authority and effect ceased, and yielded to the paramount
authority of the Constitution, from the period of the adoption of the
latter. Such is the principle ruled in the cases of Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, (3 How., z12), Permoli v. The First Municipality of New Orleans,
(8 How., 589), Strader v. Graham, (16 How., 82).
Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i 9 How.) 490-91 (Daniel, J., concurring).
439 Id. at 452 (majority opinion).
44o Id.
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Kentucky law controlled]"441-whereas in truth the jurisdictional point in
Strader turned on the fact that the defendants' freedom claim was based on
the laws of Ohio and Indiana, not those of the United States.44
Justice McLean's dissent challenged Taney's use of Strader. According
to McLean, the fact that Strader was being cited "as having a direct bearing
in the case before us" was inappropriate, because:
No question was before the court in that case, except that of jurisdiction.
And any opinion given on any other point is obiterdictum, and of no authority.
In the conclusion of his opinion, the Chief Justice said: "In every view of
the subject, therefore, this court has not jurisdiction of the case, and the writ
of error must on that ground be dismissed.
' '
4
3
McLean may have seen this coming at the time of Strader, for, as noted
above, he was at pains there to file a special concurrence limiting his
ruling to the jurisdictional point and noting that anything else said in
Taney's opinion for the Court "is not in the case, and is, consequently,
extrajudicial." 4" In his separate dissent in Dred Scott, Justice Curtis, who
had not been on the Court when Strader was decided, did not mention that
case, but he did criticize the majority for reaching the substantive issue
of the Missouri Compromise's constitutionality once it had decided that
jurisdiction was lacking.44
2. The Reaction to Dred Scott.-Unlike Strader, Dred Scott was one of
those Supreme Court cases whose importance was apparent at the time
of its argument and decision."6 The Justices, themselves, were aware, as
441 Id.
442 See supra notes 315-23 and accompanying texts.
443 Scottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) at 560.
444 See supra text accompanying note 347.
445 SeeScottv. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i 9 How.) at 590. According to this part ofJustice Curtis's
opinion:
I do not consider it to be within the scope of the judicial power of the
majority of the court to pass upon any question respecting the plaintiff's
citizenship in Missouri, save that raised by the plea to the jurisdiction;
and I do not hold any opinion of this court, or any court, binding, when
expressed on a question not legitimately before it. The judgment of
this court is, that the case is to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
because the plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, as he alleged in his
declaration. Into that judgment, according to the settled course of this
court, nothing appearing after a plea to the merits can enter. A great
question of constitutional law, deeply affecting the peace and welfare of
the country, is not, in my opinion, a fit subject to be thus reached.
Id. (citation omitted).
446 See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 305 ("By Christmas 1856, Dred Scott's name
was probably familiar to most Americans who followed the course of national affairs.").
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Taney's opinion put it, that the case presented questions "of the highest
importance." 447 (Justice Curtis, one of the two dissenters, developed such
an animosity with Taney over the Court's decision that he resigned a few
months later.448 ) Coverage in the Nation's newspapers was widespread. 449
Nevertheless, the national reaction to the decision was perhaps more
strident than Taney and the other concurring Justices could have imagined.
Although it was predictably applauded in the slave-holding South,4 0 the
decision prompted an extremely hostile reaction elsewhere,451 even among
non-abolitionists such as Abraham Lincoln.42  The problem, as Lincoln
and others in the North and West saw it, was not that DredScott had rejected
one slave's claim to freedom or even that the decision foreclosed the federal
courts to such claims. Rather, it was that part of the decision holding that
Congress lacked the power to provide for free areas within the country.
With the Missouri Compromise declared unconstitutional, those in the
North and West who wished to preserve their states' free-labor status now
felt at risk, for Dred Scott offered constitutional protection to slave owners
everywhere in the country, including in free states and the vast western
territories.
Furthermore, changing the constitution to overturn DredScott would be
virtually impossible, given the ability of the many slave-holding states to
block constitutional amendments. 453 Short of the kind of long-term political
success that could elect presidents and congresses who would eventually
replace the current Supreme Court justices with those willing to overturn
DredScott, there was no longer any possibility of a "political" solution to the
issue of whether slavery could be limited in the United States. By taking
this issue away from Congress and therefore making a political solution
impossible, the Supreme Court in Dred Scott created a situation where the
only course open to anti-slavery forces was radical political success or war.
447 Scotty. Sandford, 60 U.S. (i9 How.) at 399.
448 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 316-18; HALL, supra note 280, at 126. Curtis
was replaced by Nathan Clifford, a Maine Democrat nominated by President Buchanan. See
COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1850.
449 See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 4, at 199-200; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 417-19.
450 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 428-29.
451 Id. at 424-27,431-35-
452 Lincoln, in a speech in June of 1857, stated: "[W]e think the DredScott decision is
erroneous. We know the court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall
do what we can to have it to overrule this." Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Springfield, Illinois
(June 26, 1857), in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 418 (Philip Van Doren Stern
ed., 2ooo). Lincoln also said: "I do not resist it.... [A]II that I am doing is refusing to obey it
as a political rule.... We will try to reverse that decision .... [W]e mean to reverse it and we
mean to reverse it peaceably." Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago (July IO, 1858), in THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAm LINCOLN, supra, at 445-46.
453 Then, as now, a constitutional amendment required approval by "two thirds of both
Houses" and ratification "by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States." U.S.
CONsT. art. V.
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For those who opposed DredScott, the Court's decision gave the Republican
Party what it had lacked in the elections of 1856-a powerful issue that led
to increased electoral successes in 1858 and ultimately the election of a
president in 18 6 0 .4
54 As to the latter, the Republican platform denounced
Dred Scott as a "dangerous political heresy,"4 5 and its convention nominated
Lincoln on the third ballot, eschewing more aggressive abolitionists like
Seward and Chase.456 In the general election, Lincoln easily defeated the
Democratic nominee (his long-time rival Senator Stephen Douglas of
Illinois) and two other candidates (Kentucky's John C. Breckinridge and
John Bell of Tennessee),4 7 although Lincoln received hardly any votes in
his native Kentucky and other slave states.
48
454 See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 562-67 (describing the Republican Party's
growing vote percentages in Northern states from the 1856 elections to those of 1858 and 186o
in the course of evaluating Dred Scott's impact on national politics). Also as part of the 1858
elections, Lincoln became a national figure as a result of his debates over the potential spread
of slavery with Stephen Douglas in the Illinois race for a U.S. Senate seat. See, e.g., DONALD,
supra note 4, at 2 14-46.
455 See ROBERT K. CARR, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 258 (1942).
456 See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 4, at 246-49.
457 See, e.g., ARCHER, supra note 373, at 72-74. The Democratic Party split, with the
southern wing nominating Breckinridge, the incumbent Vice President. John Bell ran as the
nominee of the "Constitutional Union Party."
A grandson of a U.S. Senator from Kentucky, Breckinridge was born near Lexington,
graduated from Centre College, studied law at Transylvania University, was an officer in the
Mexican-American war, served in Congress, and, in 1856 at the age of 36, became-and still
is-the youngest person ever elected Vice President. See FRANK H. HECK, PROUD KENTUCKIAN:
JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, 1821-1875, at 1-3, 6-1 i, 20-25 (1976). In the i86o presidential
election, he came in third in the popular vote with i8% and second in electoral votes, winning
all of the states in the deep South along with two other slave states, Maryland and Delaware
(Bell won Kentucky). See ARCHER, supra, at 72-74. During the Civil War, Breckinridge was
a Confederate General and, for a few months in early 1865, the Confederacy's last Secretary
of War. He fled the country after the war, but, upon being granted amnesty, returned to
Lexington in 1869 and practiced law there until his death six years later. See HECK, supra,
xi-xii.
458 Lincoln, who was not even on the ballot in nine southern slave-holding states
(Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Texas), polled 1,865,9o8 (40%) of the popular vote and won 18o (59%) of the total 303
electoral votes; Douglas won just over 29% of the popular vote, but only 12 electoral votes;
Breckinridge won 18% of the popular vote and 72 electoral votes; and Bell won just under 13%
of the popular vote and 39 electoral votes, including Kentucky's. See ARCHER, supra note 373,
at 72-74; HECK, supra note 457, at 90-91.
Within Kentucky, Lincoln received only 1364 votes (less than I%) out of over 146,oOO
cast; Bell won the state with 66,058 (45%), while Breckinridge received 53,143 (36%) and
Douglas polled 26,651 (just under 18%). See HECK, supra note 457, at 9o-9I.
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C. The Civil War and Beyond
Within weeks of Lincoln's election, secession movements began in
various southern states, including Virginia, one of whose native sons, Justice
Daniel, had returned home after the Court's 1858 term and died in 1860.1s9
Shortly after Lincoln's inauguration in early 1861, Justice Campbell also
resigned, returning to his native Alabama.' Justices Wayne of Georgia and
Catron of Tennessee, however, remained loyal to the Union and continued
to serve on the Court throughout the Civil War.461 Justice McLean, the lone
Dred Scott dissenter still on the Court after Justice Curtis's resignation in
1857, died in late 1861. 461
As for Chief Justice Taney, he continued to serve, clashing with Lincoln
in a famous 1861 case that pitted the President's war powers against the
constitutional right of habeas corpus.463 Taney's death in 1864 brought to
an end what would remain the second longest tenure of any Chief Justice
in our history, shorter only than John Marshall's. 464
Lincoln replaced Taney with Salmon Chase, a long-time opponent of
slavery who was then Treasury Secretary and a Lincoln rival within the
Republican Party 6s In the two prior years, Lincoln had made four other
Supreme Court appointments.4 By the end of 1872 when Justice Nelson
resigned shortly before his death,467 the last member of the Court who had
participated in Strader and Dred Scott was gone.'
Of course, Lincoln's election had more important consequences than
changing the Court's make-up. It prompted secession by seven Southern
slave states before he was even inaugurated, and four more followed soon
thereafter.469 Armed hostilities began in April of 1861 when secessionist
459 See HALL, supra note 280, at I IO.
460 Id. at 129.
461 See supra text accompanying notes z81-82.
462 See supra text accompanying note 280.
463 Seexparie Merryman, 17 F Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 186i) (No. 9487). For descriptions
of the Merryman case, see DONALD, supra note 4, at 299, 303-04; SWISHER, supra note 4, at
844-54.
464 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1848-56. Taney served for over twenty-eight
years compared to Marshall's more than thirty-four. See id. at 1848-49.
465 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at I85o; DONALD, supra note 4, at 535-36, 551-52;
HALL, supra note 28o, at 154-55.
466 Samuel Miller of Iowa was appointed in 1862 to take the seat vacated as a result
of Justice Daniel's death; Noah Swayne of Ohio was appointed in t862 to replace Justice
McLean; David Davis of Illinois was appointed in 1862 to take the seat vacated by Justice
Campbell's resignation; and Stephen Field of California was appointed shortly after Congress
created a new seat by an Act dated March 3, 1863. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1850.
467 See HALL, supra note 280, at I 13.
468 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 267, at 1850.
469 See Philip Van Doren Stern, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, in THlE LIFE AND WRITINGS
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forces in South Carolina attacked the federal garrison at Ft. Sumter.470
"And," as Lincoln's second inaugural would later put it, "the war came."47'
It had been just four years since the Court's decision in DredScott.472
Lincoln's first inaugural actually sought to reassure slave owners that he
did not seek abolition: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere
with the institution of slavery in the States where it exits. I believe I have
no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.' '4 73 As the war
dragged on, however, Lincoln tried several times to persuade Kentucky to
adopt a gradual scheme of compensated emancipation.4 4 He also warned
that if the war continued, slavery would not survive: "It will be gone, and
you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it.
475
But moderation and gradual change were not to be. The Civil War and
Kentucky slavery continued until 1865,476 by which time the unprecedented
carnage of modern warfare had resulted in over 600,000 casualties.
477
The Union's victory led to constitutional amendments that reversed
the key holdings of Dred Scott. Within months of the war's end in 1865,
the Thirteenth Amendment banning slavery was adopted.478 Three years
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 452, at 95-96. Kentucky was one of five slave-holding states
that did not secede. See generally 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 853-67 (describing
Kentucky's neutrality and the Union).
470 See Philip Van Doren Stern, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, in ThiE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 452, at I 12-13.
471 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in TIHE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 452, at 841.
472 See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
473 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, I86I), in ThE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF ABRAHtAM LINCOLN, supra note 452, at 647.
474 See HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 179 ("If a state would commit itself to
a definite date for ending slavery, say January I, 1882, then [Lincoln] would recommend to
Congress that owners receive four hundred dollars for each slave.").
475 Id.
476 Slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia by congressional statute on April
I6, 1862. SeeAct of April 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376, 376-78; DONALD, supra note 4, at 348.
Maryland emancipated its slaves by amending its constitution in 1864. DONALD, supra note
4, at 544.
477 See generally DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. (2008) (describing the terrible death toll of the Civil War and its
subsequent impact on the lives of nineteenth-century Americans).
478 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § I (providing that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction").
The Thirteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution in December of 1865.
After being approved by Congress some ten months earlier, it was sent to the states for
ratification, a process that covered the period of Lee's surrender at Appomattox and Lincoln's
assassination. See HARRISON & KLOTrER, supra note 15, at I8O.
The Thirteenth Amendment freed the approximately 40,000 slaves remaining in
Kentucky in 1865, a number that had been greatly reduced from the approximately 225,000
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later, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, 47 9 overruling another
part of Dred Scott in its first sentence by declaring: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. ' '4 s The
remainder of the Fourteenth Amendment's first section provided that such
persons were entitled to "due process" and "equal protection of the laws"
and were to be protected against state infringement of their "privileges and
immunities."'1 's Both amendments included final sections giving Congress
additional powers to enforce the amendments' substantive provisions. 481
Kentucky refused to ratify these amendments for over a century.4s3
Indeed, for most of the century following the Civil War, Kentucky
generally chose to follow the states of the old Confederacy in creating and
maintaining a "Jim Crow" system of legally mandated racial segregation.
41 4
For example, Kentucky: (1) continued, after enactment of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments, to forbid blacks from testifying in cases
slaves counted in the 186o census, see supra note 16, by runaways, service in the Union army,
and individual emancipations. See HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 18o. Kentucky's
remaining slaves had not been affected by Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1863,
because this proclamation applied only to slaves in states that had seceded. See, e.g., MICHAEL
PERMAN, EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1862-1879, at 15 (1987).
479 Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the states on June 13, 1866. See
ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 1O5 (1998). It took over two years for the
necessary number of states to ratify the amendment, which occurred by July 9, 1868. Id.
Kentucky rejected the amendment on January 8, 1867, although Missouri and six states of
the old Confederacy-Tennessee, Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Louisiana, and South
Carolina-did ratify it. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 13, at 916.
48o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
481 See id.
482 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, amend. XIV, § 5. These enforcement provisions
have been the basis, inter alia, of Congress's power to enact civil rights laws outlawing racial
discrimination. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968). As the
Court stated in Jones, these enforcement clauses "clothed 'Congress with the power to pass all
laws necessary and properfor abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States."' Id.
at 439 (quoting United States v. Stanely (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
483 See HARRISON & KLOTTER, supra note 15, at 18o n. I (reporting that Kentucky agreed
to ratify these amendments only as part of the Nation's bi-centennial in 1976).
484 The term "Jim Crow" as an abbreviation for demeaning portrayals of African-
Americans and eventually the entire post-Civil War system of legislated segregation traces
back to an elderly Kentucky slave (Jim, owned by a man named Crowe), whose songs
and shuffling dances were mimicked by a blackfaced white comic in a minstrel show first
performed in Louisville in the 1830s. See FROST, supra note 67, at 88.
2oo8- 2oo9]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
involving whites;4"' (2) barred blacks from serving on juries until 1880,1
when this practice was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court;487
(3) adopted, in 1891, a law mandating separation of the races in railroad
cars;488 (4) adopted, in 1904, the "Day Law" banning racial integration in
all levels and types of schools, even private colleges;' and (5) adopted, by
1903, a law barring inter-racial marriages,4' ° a practice whose counterpart in
Virginia was eventually struck down by the Supreme Court.491 In 1917, the
Court also struck down a Louisville zoning ordinance that mandated racial
segregation in residential areas.49
485 See Blyew v. United States, 8o U.S. 581,583,593 (1872) (noting that "two persons who
witnessed the murder [in 1868 of a "colored woman" by two white men] were citizens of the
African race, and for that reason incompetent by the law of Kentucky to testify in the courts of
that State," which then provided that "a slave, negro, or Indian[] shall be a competent witness
in the case of the commonwealth for or against a slave, negro, or Indian, or in a civil case to
which only negroes or Indians are parties, but in no other case."). For more on this Kentucky
law, see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
486 See I RICHARD H. STANroN, THE REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY 77 (1867) (setting
forth section II of Article III ("Petit Jurors") as providing: "No person shall be a competent
juryman for the trial of criminal, penal, or civil cases in any court unless he be a white citizen,
at least twenty-one years of age, a housekeeper; likewise, sober, temperate, discreet, and of
good demeanor); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509, 509 (Ky. 1880) (quoting this statute
and also noting another statute that limited grand-jury service to whites).
487 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 1oo U.S. 303 (i88o); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky.
509 (Ky. I88o).
488 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 276.440 (West 1963). This practice's counterpart in Louisiana
was upheld by the Supreme Court a few years later in Plesry v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (896),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. od Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
489 i9o4 Ky. Acts 181 (Act of Mar. 22, 19o4). This law was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (19o8), where Kentucky's brief "spent significant
effort attempting to persuade the Court to take judicial notice that African-Americans are
mentally inferior to whites. 'This is not the result of education,' Kentucky argued, 'but is
innate and God-given; and therein lies the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon-Caucasian race.'"
David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical
Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 831-32 (1998) (quoting Brief of Commonwealth of Kentucky
at 40, Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (19o8)). As he had in Plessy, Justice Harlan filed a
vigorous dissent in the Berea College case, arguing that that "[tihe right to impart instruction
... is, beyond question, part of one's liberty as guaranteed against hostile state action by the
Constitution of the United States." Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 67.
490 See Moore v. Moore, 98 S.W. 1027, 1028 (Ky. 1907) (referring to the prohibition on
inter-racial marriages in "sections 2097 and 2098 of the Kentucky Statutes of 1903"); Ky. STAT.
ANN. § 2097, at 998 (Carroll 1922) (setting forth the prohibition in § 2o97); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 402.020 (West 1966) (setting forth the prohibition as of 1966).
491 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 6 n.5 (1967) (noting that Kentucky was one of
sixteen states at the time to have such laws and holding that they violated "the central meaning
of those constitutional commands" in "the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
492 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (1917). For a detailed review of the Buchanan
litigation, see Bernstein, supra note 489, at 839-56.
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In 1954 when the Supreme Court began the process of dismantling
this system in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,493 Kentucky law still
mandated the segregation of public schools by race.49 Louisville's efforts
to comply with Brown by de-segregating its school system and then trying
to maintain an integrated system produced significant litigation well into
the twenty-first century.49 The modern era has also seen the Court employ
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
to strike down non-racial forms of discrimination 49 and other restrictions
on individual liberties.
497
D. Strader and Dred Scott in the Modern Era
Historians and legal scholars who commented on Straderin the twentieth
century generally saw its importance solely as a precursor to Dred Scott.49s
For example, in a 1978 article, Missouri history Professor William M. Wiecek
concluded that, while Strader's jurisdictional holding was unexceptionable,
"Taney was uneasy over the crescendo of abolitionist attacks on slavery,
and went on to indulge himself in a tendency he had that was to produce
the fatal result of Dred Scott: he let fall several gratuitous dicta on issues
not before him in an effort to resolve, through judicial means, questions
493 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
494 Ky. REv. STAT. § I58.O20 (1953).
495 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2749
(2007).
496 For example, governmental sex discrimination was generally outlawed under the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 0971).
497 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding that state's ban
of homosexual sodomy violates the right of adults to engage in private consensual sexual
intimacy "in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (affirming the
determination in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) that "the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy"); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(holding that the Due Process Clause includes "the principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment").
The Due Process Clause has also been the basis for applying the substantive provisions
of the First Amendment to state and local governments. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39, 40 n.2 (1980); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
498 See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 260-62; ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 61-62 (3d ed. 2000); SWISHER, supra note 279, at 484-85; SWISHER,
supra note 4, at 556-58 (describing Strader in a chapter entitled "Sectionalism and Slavery"
that precedes two chapters on, respectively, "Soil for Slavery" and "The Dred Scott Case" and
concluding the discussion of Strader by observing that a "battle was shaping up for the courts
... which was to divide the country more and more and lead eventually to civil war"); see also
id. at 604-05, 6 11, 629 n. 142 (discussing Strader's role in the DredScott case).
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that were metajudicial." 499 Wiecek also noted that Taney's dicta in Strader,
by suggesting that Congress could not require any new state to abolish
slavery, was seen, when added to the Court's 1842 holding in Prigg and the
1850 Fugitive Slave Law,"° as fueling fears in the North that any southern
state could enslave any free black found within its borders."s ' Wiecek
concluded:
If ever a court needed a sense that issues coming before it presented
questions that could not be resolved by judges, it was in the slavery cases of
the 1840s and 1850s.... Slavery in some of its aspects was a constitutional
problem, but the Supreme Court's disastrous handling of it serves as a
caution that not all constitutional issues are susceptible of being resolved
by courts.
02
As for the exact jurisdictional issue in Strader, the decision is no longer
relevant, because section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act was amended in later
times to extend the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review state court
decisions involving federal issues well beyond the limited scope provided
for in section 25.503
In contrast, some aspects of the Court's handling of the jurisdictional
issue in Dred Scott remain good law. It is still true, for example, that a
federal trial court's diversity jurisdiction remains open to challenge
through all appellate stages even up through the Supreme Court;s04 that
499 Wiecek, supra note 6, at 53, reprinted in THE LAW OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 654 (Kermit
H. Hall ed., 1987).
500 See supra, respectively, note 6 (describing Prigg), 268 and accompanying text
(describing the I85o Fugitive Slave Act).
501 Wiecek, supra note 6, at 54, reprinted in THE LAW OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 655 (Kermit
H. Hall ed., 1987).
502 Id., reprinted in THE LAW OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 66o (Kermit H. Hall ed., 1987). By
way of contrast, a 1935 Taney biography by Columbia professor Carl Brent Swisher wrote
approvingly of the Chief Justice's performance in Strader, commenting that Taney spoke "in
a clear opinion" and that "the court acted wisely in not presuming to decide more points
than were necessary to the decision of the particular case before it." SWISHER, supra note
279, at 485. Between these comments, however, Professor Swisher conceded that Taney in
Strader did opine that the slaves' return to Kentucky there meant that "they were subject to
Kentucky laws; and under those laws they were slaves. Strader had therefore been aiding
slaves when he helped them to escape, and was subject to punishment." Id. In view of this
observation, Professor Swisher's conclusion that Taney's Strader opinion did not "decide more
points than were necessary," id., seems odd, particularly in light of his willingness to criticize
DredScott on this ground. See id. (concluding, by way of contrasting Strader and DredScott, that
it was "a major tragedy that [the court] did not exercise the same self-restraint six years later
in the handling of the DredScott case").
503 See supra note 298.
504 See, e.g., Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322 (1888); post-Dred Scott cases cited in supra
note 396.
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the plaintiff has the burden of proof of establishing such jurisdiction;0 5 and
that, even though the diversity issue turns on the parties' state citizenship,
determinations thereof are a matter of federal law.501
On the merits, of course, Dred Scott has been overruled by subsequent
constitutional amendments. 07 It is such a discredited decision that it is
never cited even for the jurisdictional points that are still good law.
Indeed, the high degree of contempt with which the modern era views
Dred Scott goes far beyond its lack of continuing substantive significance.
Dred Scott is now uniformly viewed as among the worst decisions ever
produced by the Supreme Court.0" Modern advocates who want to criticize
a contemporary Court decision in the most extreme way often compare it
to Dred Scott, a technique engaged in by critics of all political persuasions,
e.g., from Justice Scalia's condemnation of the Court's approval of abortion
on the right 5°9 to those on the left outraged by Bush v. Gore.510 In short, Dred
Scott has become the gold standard for arrogant judicial ineptitude.
505 See, e.g., Anderson v. Watts, 138 U.S. 694 (891); Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322
(1 888); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (5th ed. 1994).
506 See, e.g., Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 Ed I1 16, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973) (citing, inter alia,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 0.74[1], at 707.1 (1972)).
507 See supra notes 478-8o and accompanying texts.
508 See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 573, 580 (providing examples of historical
criticisms of Dred Scott); MCCLOSKY, supra note 498, at 6z (describing Taney's decision in Dred
Scott as "the most disastrous opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued"); SWISHER, supra
note 4, at 631 (the DredScott decision "has gone down in history as a major disaster, degrading
the Court and the Constitution and precipitating the Civil War"); Suzanna Sherry, Judges of
Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 8oo-ol n.41 (2003) (providing examples of disparaging
remarks made about Dred Scott by modern professors and judges).
509 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1101-02 (1992). In Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, Justice Scalia compared the plurality opinion upholding the constitutional right to
abortion with Taney's performance in Dred Scott and noted:
It is no more realistic for us in this litigation, than it was for him in that,
to think than an issue of the sort they both involved-an issue involving
life and death, freedom and subjugation-can be "speedily and finally
settled" by the Supreme Court, as President James Buchanan in his
inaugural address said the issue of slavery in the territories would be.
Quite to the contrary, by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep
passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political
forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a
fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid
national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court
merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.
Id. at IOO2 (citation omitted).
510 See, e.g, Sherry, supra note 508, at 800-02 (arguing that the Court's decisions in Dred
Scott and Bush v. Gore "have much in common," including their reflection of a high degree of
"institutional arrogance" by the prevailing Justices).
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Kentucky slavery is the story of how a small, but virulent, malignancy
that was first transported across the mountains by Virginia settlors grew to
dominate Kentucky's legal and social institutions for generations. When
this cancer was not excised in Kentucky's first constitution in 1792, it
grew too strong to kill, becoming a force that drove much of Kentucky's
development in its first half-century of statehood. By 1841 when Dr.
Graham's slaves boarded the Pike for Cincinnati and their journey to
ultimate freedom in Canada, Kentucky slavery permeated every part of the
state's culture, including its government and legal system.
This is hardly surprising. After all, slaves "were property, and a basic
function of government was to protect property."' I In 1840, Kentucky had
more than 182,000 slaves,512 and, at $500-$1000 each, their value exceeded
$100 million, or about $2.5 billion in today dollars.
13
The law played a crucial role in creating, protecting, and administering
this form of property. The Graham v. Strader litigation provides a vivid
example of how a "property" loss suffered by one Kentuckian came to be
protected by a powerful network of legislative enactments designed first
to prevent the harm (e.g., by creating a strict liability scheme that made
steamboat operators diligent in protecting the rights of complete strangers
like Graham and, by extrapolation, the system of slavery itself), and after
that failed, other rules aimed at remedying this loss (e.g., laws rewarding
bounty hunters and making Graham's loss actionable against third-parties
like the Pike's owners).
The case also illustrates how the courts aggressively came to the
rescue-not only by providing compensation for Graham, but also by
deciding along the way questions they could have avoided (e.g., the
Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision to allow the Strader defendants to
assert the slaves' freedom claims, presumably so it could rule against these
claims on the merits; the Supreme Court's determination to proceed, after
finding its lacked jurisdiction, to opine on the inability of federal power to
restrict Kentucky slave law). Clearly, the phenomenon of activist courts is
not a recent development. Nor is a rather schizophrenic approach to states'
rights by the Supreme Court, which first concluded in Strader that states
had unbridled authority to declare blacks slaves and then held in DredScott
that states lacked the power to make such persons citizens.
For their part, the lawyers in the Strader litigation, particularly in the
Kentucky courts, seemed to perform well according to traditional standards.
They were thorough and appropriately zealous advocates. In fact, it is hard
511 HARRISON & KLOTrER, supra note 15, at 174.
512 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
513 See supra note 119 and accompanying text and note 169.
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not to be impressed generally with the talents, skill, and quality of Kentucky
lawyers and judges in the first half of the nineteenth century. To the extent
that these men labored to advance Kentucky slave interests, however, it
is equally hard not to believe that their many talents were wasted, if not
misused.
The story of Kentucky's commitment to slavery leading up to the time
of Graham's litigation against the Pike's owners has few heroes, but there
were some. Among these were the sixteen men who voted against the
slavery article in the 1792 constitution; if only five more of their twenty-
six other colleagues had voted with them, they could have defeated the
slavery article, and Kentucky's subsequent history would have been
vastly different. Another hero was Judge Benjamin Mills, who wrote two
impassioned opinions favoring freedom over slavery before losing his
Court of Appeals seat.5 14 Another might be Garnett Duncan, the lawyer
for the Pike's owners, who devoted an entire decade of his professional
life to arguing, albeit unsuccessfully and in a purely commercial case, that
George, Reuben, and Henry were free."I' And, of course, there were the
three young slaves themselves, who chose to put at risk their relatively easy
form of bondage in order to gain freedom in a far-off land.
However, most Kentuckians who participated in the Strader litigation
appear to modern eyes as, at best, misguided and amoral. Dr. Graham, for
example, seems to have thought of himself as a kindly slave owner who
had real admiration for the skills of George, Reuben, and Henry, and who
sought to expand and use those skills for his guests' pleasure as well as his
own commercial gain. Graham reflects the fact that Kentucky slavery, as
a number of its critics at the time noted,516 had negative consequences for
whites as well as blacks, such as creating a poorly developed sense of civic
virtue and private morality, an aversion to manual labor, and a willingness to
accept a stratified social order even among whites and other free persons.
Another example of this phenomenon was the great Whig lawyer
and politician, John Crittenden, whose constant need to defend slavery
often overcame his better political instincts, which otherwise might have
helped move the state in more progressive directions. As a result, he, like
his mentor Henry Clay, is now consigned to the second tier of American
political figures instead the loftier position that his vast skills might have
achieved."' I Lesser men, of course, fell even farther under slavery's spell,
as illustrated by the Harrodsburg-area witnesses who, in the course of
514 See supra notes 77 para. 2, 83 para. 2.
515 See supra notes 172, 193, 289 and accompanying texts.
516 See supra notes 31, 93 and accompanying texts.
517 A similar fate befell Virginia's leaders in the two generations after the presidencies of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. See SUsAN DUNN, DOMINION OF MEMORIES: JEFFERSON,
MADISON, AND THE DECLINE OF VIRGINIA (2008).
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testifying for Dr. Graham, blithely made scurrilous attacks on a neighbor's
character simply because he advocated negro freedom."'
To undo this pervasive and cancerous system would not be easy, and
the carnage of the Civil War was the price that the Nation paid to do so. As
Lincoln's second inaugural put it, "every drop of blood drawn with the lash
shall be paid by another drawn with the sword." 19
The war ended slavery, but not its effects. Kentucky joined other
former slave states in continuing to treat blacks as an inferior class of
people by adopting segregation laws and otherwise denying them equal
protection. For almost a century after enactment of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, states south of the Ohio River-still the "River
of Styx" of race relations, as Crittenden put it in his Supreme Court
argument in Strader5 -- operated a legal and social system characterized by
the separation and inferior treatment of everyone of African descent.
Only in the second half of the twentieth century were efforts made to
dismantle this system. At first, those efforts came almost exclusively from
the Supreme Court, a high irony in view of the Court's historic performance
in Strader, Dred Scott, and other antebellum slave cases.
Modern Kentuckians are still fighting battles over the remaining
"badges and incidents of slavery," ' as the work of dismantling slavery's
effects continues into the twenty-first century. One example of this is
Louisville's school desegregation litigation,"' but education is hardly the
only area of entrenched racial isolation. Virtually every aspect of modern
Kentucky life, from where we live to how we worship, is characterized by
a high degree of racial segregation. We still reap what our eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century forebears sowed.
518 See Supreme Court Record, supra note 9o, at 85, 87, 93, 107 (criticizing Harrodsburg
abolitionist Peter R. Dunn as, respectively, not being worthy of "confidence in what he might
state ... owning to strong natural prejudice, particularly on the subject of slavery"; "a man of
exceedingly high prejudices, and that I would not regard the man entitled to any credit in a
controversy of this kind"; "a man of very violent prejudices, and [deponent] does not think
with those prejudices would give an impartial statement on oath"; and "violent ... and a man
of high prejudices").
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Yet, if God wills that it [the Civil War] continue until all the wealth piled
by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall
be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid
by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago,
so still it must be said "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous
altogether."
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
ABRAHAm LINCOLN, supra note 452, at 842.
520 See supra note 304 para. 3.
521 See supra note 482.
522 See supra note 495 and accompanying text.
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History, of course, is not a total straight-jacket that defines every
element of our current situation. Change is always occurring, sometimes in
small ways-as represented by the decision of George, Reuben, and Henry
to board the Pike on a January day in 1841-and sometimes in cataclysmic
events such as the Civil War.
What does seem certain in the United States, however, is that law and
those who make and administer it will always be engaged in protecting and
legitimizing our deepest social commitments. In the Strader litigation, this
was reflected in judicial decisions about which of the various competing
legal and social interests would prevail and in the willingness of courts to
become activist players in pursuit of the dominant social position of the
day. The case also offered an example of ironic justice in which men like
the Pike's owners were forced to make arguments in favor of negro freedom
that, one suspects, they would never have done unless their own pecuniary
interests required it.
Can this story of an old case spawned by the failed relationship of a
successful Kentucky resort owner and his wonderfully talented slaves
teach anything to those of us who are part of the modern legal system?
One lesson from the Supreme Court's miscues in Strader-and later in Dred
Scott-is that courts should be wary of making broad pronouncements in
cases where a narrower ground will do, particularly where that ground is
their own lack of jurisdiction. But Americans have always brought their
most troubling issues to the courts,"2 3 and, on occasion as in Brown v.
Board of Education,2 4 judicial leadership has clearly advanced the Nation's
interests. How are we to know at the time whether decisions like Roe v.
Wade or Bush v. Gore will similarly advance the Nation's interests or, on
the other hand, eventually be seen, as Strader and Dred Scott now are, as
examples of judicial hubris that are both inappropriate for a democratic
society and ultimately extremely harmful? One obvious conclusion is that
a Supreme Court decision that seeks to "solve" a major national problem
without being grounded in America's key values of liberty and equality
seems doomed to failure.
Another lesson is that it will always be dangerous-and exhaustive of
legal resources-for law-givers to create or support any doctrinal system
that divides people into inferior and superior classes. Furthermore, if one's
own interests are being advanced by an aggressive use of such resources-
as were those of the Supreme Court's pro-slavery justices in Strader and
DredScott-a certain degree of modesty and restraint is highly desirable.
Finally, one always feels safe in closing with Lincoln. In his second
inaugural in 1865, Kentucky's greatest son urged the Nation to "strive on to
523 "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question." I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
280 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
524 See supra note 493 and accompanying text.
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finish the work" of ending the offense of American slavery." 5 Unfortunately,
succeeding generations in Kentucky and elsewhere failed to heed this
admonition. The result is that in our time, as in his, much remains to be
done to achieve a society based on equal justice under law.
525 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in ThE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 452, at 842.
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